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Throughout the vast majority of its history, hedonism about well-being has been 
perennially unpopular (Feldman 2004). The arguments in this essay take steps 
towards reviving the plausibility of hedonism about well-being. The main argument 
currently used to refute hedonism about well-being, the Argument from False 
Pleasures, is shown to lack sufficient evidence to be compelling. The main evidence 
provided for the Argument from False Pleasures comes in the form of two thought 
experiments, the Experience Machine (Nozick 1974) and the Deceived Businessman 
(Kagan 1998). These thought experiments typically produce strong intuitive 
responses, which are used to directly support the Argument from False Pleasures.  
 
This essay investigates how theories of well-being are currently evaluated by moral 
philosophers, with a specific focus on the place our intuitions have in the process. 
Indeed, the major role that moral intuitions play in evaluating theories of well-being, 
despite their sometimes dubious epistemic credentials, leads to an in-depth enquiry 
into their inner workings and potential for containing normatively significant 
information. The investigation, which draws on the work of Woodward and Allman 
(2007), concludes that intuitions about unrealistic thought experiments should not 
play an important role in evaluating theories of well-being. Rather, they should only 
act as a warning sign, highlighting moral propositions for further analysis. Based on 
these findings, a new method for assessing theories of well-being is suggested and 
applied to a specific internalist account of hedonism about well-being to show how 
the Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine thought experiments lack 
normative significance, leaving the Argument from False Pleasures without sufficient 
evidence to be compelling. Indeed, this essay concludes that the Argument from 
False Pleasures should no longer be thought to provide any good reason to believe 
that hedonism about well-being is implausible. This result is only one step on the 
road to reviving hedonism about well-being, but it is a very important one. 
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Virtually since its conception, hedonism about well-being, the theory that only 
pleasure makes your life go well and only pain makes it go badly,1 has been 
perennially unpopular (Blake 1926; Crisp 2006a; Feldman 2004; Savery 1934; 
Silverstein 2000).2 Going against this trend, this essay argues that the main argument 
currently causing hedonism about well-being’s unpopularity is not nearly as 
convincing as it is often believed to be. Specifically, it is argued that the Argument 
from False Pleasures should not be used to cavalierly reject hedonism about well-
being. The most commonly used pieces of evidence provided for the Argument from 
False Pleasures, versions of Nozick’s (1974) Experience Machine and Kagan’s (1998) 
Deceived Businessman thought experiments, are also discussed in great detail. These 
thought experiments typically produce strong intuitive responses, which are used to 
directly support the Argument from False Pleasures. However, this essay argues that 
these intuitive responses do not constitute reliable or relevant evidence for evaluating 
hedonism about well-being. 
 
This essay investigates how theories of well-being are currently being evaluated by 
moral philosophers, with a specific focus on the place our intuitions have in the 
                                                 
1
 A more precise definition is given later. 
2
 That is, except for the brief period of British Empiricism, when the likes of Bentham (1789) and Mill 
(1861) were giving detailed accounts of hedonism (Sumner 1996). 
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process. Indeed, the major role that moral intuitions play in evaluating theories of 
well-being, despite their sometimes dubious epistemic credentials, leads to an in-
depth enquiry into their inner workings and potential for containing normatively 
significant information. The investigation, which draws on the work of Woodward 
and Allman (2007), concludes that moral intuitions about unrealistic thought 
experiments should not play as important a role as they traditionally have in 
evaluating theories of well-being. Rather, they should only act as a warning sign; 
highlighting moral propositions for further analysis. Based on these findings, a new 
method for assessing theories of well-being is suggested and then applied to 
hedonism about well-being with the Argument from False Pleasures and the 
Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine thought experiments in mind. This 
re-evaluation of hedonism about well-being reveals how the Deceived Businessman 
and Experience Machine thought experiments lack the normative significance they 
are widely held to possess, leaving the Argument from False Pleasures without 
sufficient evidence to be compelling. Consequently, this essay concludes that the 
Argument from False Pleasures should no longer be thought to provide any good 
reason to believe that hedonism about well-being is implausible.  
 
Of course, there are many other arguments against hedonism about well-being. 
However, it is assumed that, as a consequence of the arguments in this essay, more 
attention will be focused on the other objections and that they might also be rejected 
as scientific developments continue to shed light on how our minds work. This essay 
removes a major obstacle from hedonism about well-being’s path to plausibility and 
should encourage more path-clearing. This could result in a full revival of hedonism 
about well-being in the future, allowing it to regain equal plausibility with the other 
popular views about well-being.  
 
Taking steps towards reviving the plausibility of hedonism about well-being is a 
useful project because it can help us to better understand what well-being might 
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actually be. Indeed, if this essay helps to delineate and find truth about well-being, 
then it will be very useful in ongoing discussions in normative ethics and moral 
philosophy in general. Well-being is a central component of moral philosophy 
(Feldman 2004, p14; Kagan 1998) and having a better understanding of it is valuable 
to everyone. Indeed, Raz (2004) notes that a better understanding of well-being is 
important to both individuals and societies because it helps us to know what makes a 
life good for the one living it and, therefore, provides insight into what we might 
want our life or the lives of others to be like.3 This is especially so if consequentialism 
is the preferred view of normative ethics because well-being makes for an excellent 
end goal of actions (Feldman 2004, p14). Philosophical theories of well-being do not, 
as a general rule, preach how to live one’s life. This is, perhaps, particularly the case 
with defenses of hedonism about well-being (e.g. Feldman 2004) because of the 
Paradox of Hedonism: that the direct pursuit of pleasure often fails to produce the 
greatest overall pleasure for an individual (Crisp 2006b; Mill 1969, p85-86;4 Sidgwick 
1913, p48). However, accounts of well-being can be used as a desired endpoint for 
egoistic or egalitarian normative theories, especially by welfarists (who believe that 
only well-being has value (Crisp 2006b)), providing guidance of sorts for what people 
might want to strive towards. Indeed, even if there is no ‘meaning’ to life, we still 
have to decide how to live and how to treat others, something that a better 




With the importance and aim of this essay established, what follows is an outline of 
what each chapter sets out to achieve and how that relates to the overall aim of this 
essay. Chapter 1 begins by defining well-being, hedonism about well-being, and a 
specific internalist theory of hedonism about well-being to be used in this essay. The 
                                                 
3
 Scanlon also notes this as a possibility but attempts to create an argument against such a use of well-being 
and even argues against the concept of well-being itself (1998, esp. Chapter 3). 
4
 Mill revealed this in his Autobiography (1873/1969, p85-86; c.f. Silverstein 2000, p294). 
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specific choice of theory, and especially the internal nature of pleasure that it 
prescribes, is then defended against other options. The theory, referred to as 
Hedonism about Well-Being (with capitals), is as follows: 
All pleasure, and only pleasure, intrinsically contributes positively to well-being and all 
pain, and only pain, intrinsically contributes negatively to well-being, where pleasure and 
pain supervene on mental states such that pleasure is the intrinsically good part of mental 
states that we are consciously aware of and pain is the intrinsically bad part of mental 
states that we are consciously aware of. 
 
Following the establishment of Hedonism about Well-Being as the theory to be 
discussed in this essay, its history of unpopularity, and its current philosophical status 
as a dead theory, is then discussed in order to motivate the aim of this essay. The 
Argument from False Pleasures and the considerable damage that it is doing to 
Hedonism about Well-Being’s plausibility is then discussed. The two thought 
experiments that are usually used as evidence for the Argument from False Pleasures: 
Nozick’s (1974) Experience Machine and Kagan’s (1998) Deceived Businessman, are 
described, including explanations of how they supposedly support the Argument 
from False Pleasures. This discussion provides sufficient detail on the Argument 
from False Pleasures to set it as the target for refutation in order to help revive 
Hedonism about Well-Being. Then, drawing on the work of Timmons (2006), Kagan 
(1998), and Griffin (1986), how theories of well-being are evaluated by moral 
philosophers is discussed in detail, noting the major role that most philosophers 
afford to moral intuitions, despite their apparent drawbacks.  
 
The approach moral philosophers take when evaluating theories of well-being is then 
formalised into the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, which is 
explained with a focus on the role that intuitions play in this methodology. The role 
of these intuitions is then analysed further with guidance from Rachels (2003). This 
discussion of the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, and particularly 
the role that intuitions play in it, is presented as questionable, highlighting the need 
for the thorough scientific analysis of intuitions that follows in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 discusses psychological, neuroscientific and philosophical research on 
intuitions, and moral intuitions in particular, with the goal of providing a clear 
understanding of how they are formed and what that should mean for their use in 
evaluating theories of well-being. First, Woodward and Allman’s (2007) account of 
moral intuitive cognition is explained in detail and corroborated by the research of 
other leaders in the field of cognitive science. Then, this clear understanding of how 
moral intuitions work is used to assess Woodward and Allman’s (2007) 
recommendations for the appropriate use of moral intuitions. One of Woodward and 
Allman’s (2007) important recommendations is then expanded on and made more 
relevant to the aim of this essay by adapting it into an argument for restricting the 
role of intuitions in evaluating theories of well-being. The conclusion of this 
argument: that intuitions about unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments are 
an unreliable source of evidence for evaluating theories of well-being and, therefore, 
should not be used if other types of evidence are available, is discussed and 
supported. With this argument in mind, the Old Method of Assessing Theories of 
Well-Being is found to be in need of at least slight amendment.  
 
The New Method for Assessing Theories of Well-Being is then proposed and 
explained, including a discussion of how it deals with intuitions about unrealistic 
thought experiments more appropriately than the Old Method of Assessing Theories 
of Well-Being. This explanation includes a guide on how to apply the New Method 
for Assessing Theories of Well-Being and is followed by noting its implications for 
well-being-related thought experiments, such as the Deceived Businessman and 
Experience Machine, and theories of well-being in general. These implications open 
the door for further investigation into the normative significance of the Deceived 
Businessman and Experience Machine thought experiments for Hedonism about 
Well-Being, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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With the New Method for Assessing Theories of Well-Being sufficiently explained 
and supported in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 uses it to assess Hedonism about Well-Being. 
First, a brief case will be made for the prima facie plausibility of Hedonism about Well-
Being before the main criticism against it is considered. Since a complete assessment 
of all of the arguments against Hedonism about Well-Being is not possible within the 
space of this essay, specific attention is focussed on the most popular one: the 
Argument from False Pleasures. The bulk of Chapter 3 is dedicated to assessing the 
normative significance that the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine 
thought experiments hold for Hedonism about Well-Being.  
 
Each of the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine thought 
experiments is analysed in turn, revealing that, even when interpreted as charitably as 
possible, neither proves to have the normative significance that the proponents of the 
Argument from False Pleasures suppose. The power of the Deceived Businessman 
thought experiment is found to rest purely on a strong but misguided intuition that 
should not have been consulted in the first place. Furthermore, it is argued that any 
attempt to rework the Deceived Businessman thought experiment could not avoid 
this criticism of irrelevance. Likewise, the strength of the Experience Machine 
thought experiment is also found to rest on misguided intuitions, although less 
obviously so. The Experience Machine is then reinterpreted into what must be its 
strongest reincarnation to date; the Pleasure Machine. Even when given this new 
look, no good evidence to support the Argument from False Pleasures is produced.  
 
Based on the irrelevance of the Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine 
thought experiments, it is then concluded that the Argument from False Pleasures 
lacks the evidence it requires to refute Hedonism about Well-Being. Importantly, the 
process used to evaluate the evidence that the Deceived Businessman and the 
Experience Machine thought experiments are supposed to provide will be so 
thorough that it is compatible with the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-
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Being and any approaches that place more importance on intuitive evidence. This fact 
makes the conclusions of Chapter 3 significant even if the arguments of Chapter 2 
are not considered persuasive and the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-
Being is not accepted. The implications of this are then briefly considered, resulting 
in the conclusion that Hedonism about Well-Being might soon be shown to be at 
least as plausible as the other two major types of well-being; the desire-fulfilment and 
objective list theories. The major findings of this essay and their implications are then 
reiterated in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1:                                                       
What Hedonism about Well-Being is and 





This chapter begins with a setting of the scene for this essay by defining the theory to 
be defended. First well-being, the life that is good for the one living it, is disentangled 
from other notions of the good life. Then, a specific internalist experiential theory of 
hedonism about well-being, referred to as Hedonism about Well-Being, is defined 
and defended against other alternatives. Following this, Hedonism about Well-Being’s 
history of unpopularity, and its current philosophical status as a dead theory, are 
argued for in order to show why Hedonism about Well-Being needs reviving. The 
objection that is currently doing the most damage to Hedonism about Well-Being’s 
plausibility, the Argument from False Pleasures, is then discussed. Following this, the 
two thought experiments that are usually used as evidence for this argument: the 
Experience Machine and the Deceived Businessman, are described, including 
explanations of how they support the Argument from False Pleasures.  
 
Then, drawing on the work of Timmons (2006), Kagan (1998) and Griffin (1986), 
how theories of well-being are evaluated by moral philosophers is discussed in detail, 
noting the major role that most philosophers afford to moral intuitions, despite their 
apparent drawbacks. The approach moral philosophers take when evaluating theories 
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of well-being is then formalised into the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-
Being, which is explained with a focus on the role intuitions play in this methodology. 
The role of evaluative intuitions is then analysed further with guidance from Rachels 
(2003), including a discussion of reflective equilibrium. However, the conclusion 
Rachels (2003) reaches about the normative significance of intuitions is challenged, 




Defining Hedonism about Well-Being 
In order to take any steps towards reviving Hedonism about Well-Being, it first needs 
to be clearly defined. This section defines well-being in general and then Hedonism 
about Well-Being specifically. Although well-being is associated with the good life, 
there are certain types of good life that well-being is not related to. These less 
relevant types of good life are identified and discussed before going on to an 
examination of exactly how well-being does relate to the good life. The point of this 
discussion is to avoid confusion over the different ways in which a person’s life could 
be considered good.  
 
Well-being does not refer to the aesthetically good life; a life that would make a good 
piece of art, such as a story (Feldman 2004, p 9). For example, while the life of Anne 
Frank makes for a great story,5 we certainly do not wish that we have a traumatic life 
like hers. Well-being also does not refer to the good example of a life; the life that 
would be documented and reported on in a museum exhibit showing what the life of 
the average modern-day human is like (Feldman 2004, p9). The average life, although 
probably lived by many of us, certainly does not make for a very appealing version of 
the good life. Some lives, such as the life of Mother Teresa, are considered to be 
                                                 
5
 See: The Diary of Anne Frank, The Critical Edition, by Anne Frank and the Netherlands State Institute for 
War Documentation (1989). 
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causally good. A causally good life brings about good, as exemplified by Mother 
Teresa’s work with the sick (Feldman 2004, p8-9). However, living a causally good 
life is no guarantee that the life will be good for the one living it, as again exemplified by 
Mother Teresa, whose life was full of depression and loneliness.6 Well-being is also 
often thought of as the healthy life; the life you might be trying to achieve if you visit 
a well-being centre (Crisp 2006b). Although a well-being related account of the good 
life might involve being healthy, the philosophical notion of well-being is generally 
broader than that (Crisp 2006b). While these distinctions between different types of 
good lives are quite obvious, the morally good life is not quite as easy to disentangle 
from the type of good life that well-being is referring to: the prudentially good life. 
The next few paragraphs are dedicated to this more subtle task. 
 
The type of good life that well-being refers to is the prudentially good life, or the life 
that is good for the one living it (Crisp 2006b; Feldman 2004, p8-12). There are many 
definitions of well-being in the literature on psychology and moral philosophy but 
most are fairly synonymous. For example, psychologists are becoming increasingly 
interested in subjective well-being, which many of them see as a preferable alternative 
to economic accounts of objective well-being (Angner 2005), such as Gross 
Domestic Product (Pigou 1960) or indicators of real income or purchasing power 
(Rutherford 2002). Economic accounts of well-being are too abstract to pursue here, 
but psychologists’ accounts are somewhat closer to what philosophers mean by well-
being, making them more useful to discuss. Most psychologists tend to endorse a 
happiness account, a life-satisfaction account, or a combined account of well-being. 
Those who equate well-being with happiness attempt to measure well-being with 
direct questions about happiness (e.g. Bradburn 1969), monitoring smiling (e.g. 
Ekman, Friesen & O’Sullivan 1988; Ekman & Rosenberg 1997), averaging the data 
compiled by constantly paging participants and getting them to report their happiness 
at that moment (e.g. Kahneman 1999; Kahneman et al. 1999; Kahneman et al. 2004), 
                                                 
6
 See Mother Teresa: Come Be My Light (Doubleday, 2007), a compilation of her writing and commentary 
by Brian Kolodiejchuk. 
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and even using neuroimaging techniques (e.g. Davidson 1992; 2000; Davidson, 
Jackson & Kalin 2000). Psychologists who equate well-being with life satisfaction: 
being satisfied with how one’s life is going (e.g. Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000; 
Pavot & Diener 1993), or combination accounts (e.g. Urry et al. 2004), use similar 
measures but with more of an emphasis on self-reporting. However, all of these 
psychological accounts of well-being are designed with measurement in mind, which 
increases the chances of them being restricted in a way that philosophical definitions 
do not have to be. 
 
Philosophers are slightly more consistent with their definitions, describing well-being 
as: what is “non-instrumentally or ultimately good for a person” Crisp (2006b, np), 
“quality of life” or “thriving” (Nussbaum & Sen 1993, p1), “a life going well” (Moore 
& Crisp 1996, p599), “a person’s welfare” Sumner (1996, p1), “what makes your life 
go well” or what is in “your best interests” (Keller 2004, p39; closely paraphrased 
from Parfit 1984, p493), “the life that is good for the person whose life it is” (Raz 
2004, p269), and “what it is for a given individual to be better… off” (Kagan 1998, 
p41). Several concepts are also used as equivalent to well-being by some 
philosophers, although they are generally seen as “near-equivalents”, such as 
“…happiness, flourishing, eudaimonia, and utility” (Moore & Crisp 1996, 599). The 
most important themes represented in these definitions are the subjective and 
prudential nature of well-being. It should also be noted that the term well-being can 
refer to both positive and negative lives for the person living them, such that the 
addition of certain experiences to a life could make it better for the person living it, 
thereby increasing her well-being, or worse for the person living it, thereby decreasing 
her well-being (Nagel 1979, p2). This clear description of well-being makes it easier to 
differentiate it from the morally good life. 
 
Well-being does not refer directly to the morally good or virtuous life: the life that an 
individual should lead just because it is the morally right way to live (Arneson 1999, 
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p1; Feldman 2004, p8; Railton 1989; p155; Silverstein 2000, p280). It is fairly 
common to conflate the morally good life with well-being, an error that can occur for 
various reasons. For example, the word ‘good’ can be taken to mean ‘morally good’, 
as opposed to ‘prudentially good’. This conflation can also arise when moral 
intuitions do not allow a person to imagine any kind of life that she considers to be 
immoral to be enjoyable from the inside, even by someone with different preferences 
to herself. Such a lack of empathy and imagination can cause some people to 
unintentionally conflate accounts of well-being with their personal versions of the 
morally good life, which leads them to unfairly reject many accounts of well-being. A 
very similar type of conflation, however, is not necessarily erroneous. Some moral 
philosophers, such as Aristotelian Virtue Ethicists (e.g. Hursthouse 1999), propose 
positive arguments that well-being (the prudentially good life) is the same as, or at 
least very close to, the virtuous life. This kind of equating of the morally good life 
with the prudentially good life is reasonable as long as it is explained how the ultimate 
bearer or bearers of value in a life make that life better for the person living it. 
 
It should now be clear that a person’s well-being concerns how well his life goes for 
him, although it might not yet be obvious what it means for a life to be going well for 
the person living it. Many different accounts of well-being have been developed over 
the last 2,000 or so years, but they nearly all fall into one of three categories outlined 
by Derek Parfit (1984, p493): either hedonistic theories, desire-fulfilment theories, or 
objective list theories. Objective list theories, such as Hurka’s (1993) account of 
Perfectionism and Moore’s account of Ideal Utilitarianism (1903; 1912), propose a list 
of things that make lives go better or worse for the individual living them (Parfit 
1984, p493). These theories may include certain mental states, such as pleasure, or the 
satisfaction of preferences in the list of things that make lives go better. However, 
they cannot consist of solely one or the other because that would make the account 
of well-being collapse into one of the other two major categories.  
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Desire-fulfilment accounts of well-being hold that our life goes well to the extent that 
our preferences are satisfied (Parfit 1984, p493). There are several more specific 
varieties of desire-fulfilment accounts, but the more considered ones, such as 
Railton’s (1986) very complex account,7 tend to recommend that only the satisfaction 
of certain types of desires actually improve well-being. The usual candidates are more 
fundamental desires, rationally formed desires, or desires about which the subject of 
the life in question is relevantly informed (Brandt 1979; Griffin 1986, p11).  
 
Hedonistic accounts of well-being, as illustrated by Parfit (1984), describe the best life 
for someone as the happiest one. However, Hedonism about Well-Being is really just 
one type of mental state or experiential account, albeit the dominant one (Kagan 
1998, p34). A mental state account of well-being purports that only certain mental 
states, such as being in pleasure or pain, contribute to well-being and experiential 
accounts maintain that only our experiences, such as the experience of pleasure or 
pain, contribute to our well-being. The only notable difference between the two views 
is that it is possible to have a certain type of mental state without experiencing it and 
it might be possible to have an experience8 that doesn’t affect your mental state at all, 
such as someone making a rude gesture at you behind your back. However, as this 
essay argues in more detail later, the best accounts of hedonism are only concerned 
with the intersection of the two: mental states that we experience. A more detailed 
explanation of hedonism about well-being and a defense of internalist experiential 
mental state accounts of hedonism about well-being follow. 
 
Before giving a precise definition of hedonism about well-being, however, the general 
notion of hedonism about well-being needs to be clarified by distinguishing it from 
two other types of hedonism. The first type of hedonism that needs to be 
differentiated from hedonism about well-being is folk hedonism. Folk hedonism is 
                                                 
7
 Railton states that "an individual's good consists in what he would want himself to want, or to pursue, 
were he to contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully and vividly informed about himself and 
his circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive error or lapses of instrumental rationality” (1986, p16). 
8
 More on this point follows when externalism is discussed. 
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the way that the word ‘hedonism’ is used in everyday language and non-philosophical 
literature. It commonly refers to a way of life that involves pursuing risqué pleasures, 
especially pleasure from sex, drugs and food, with scant or no regard for the future 
consequences to others or even the hedonist himself (Feldman 2004, p21). For 
example, Hedonism Resorts invites anyone over eighteen years old to purchase a 
“daring day pass” or a “naughty night pass” and “Experience a world where almost 
anything goes”.9 And, from the novel Drop City, by T.C. Boyle (2003, p416): “What 
was his goal in life? Pan had asked [Joe] one night… To have a good time. To get 
drunk, get laid, raise some hell and answer to nobody. ‘So you’re a hedonist, then?’ 
Dale had put in. ‘Bet your ass I am,’ Joe said.” Also, for Feldman (2004, p21) an 
unnamed but easily identifiable “former publisher of a slightly scandalous girlie 
magazine” is the paradigm folk hedonist, with his “bevies of voluptuous young 
women” who regularly “reveal extensive amounts of tanned flesh”.  
 
Hedonism about well-being generally makes no distinction between different types of 
pleasure, such that sex is not necessarily chosen over a conversation with a good 
friend.10 However, by not making a distinction between intellectual and bodily 
pleasures (or higher and lower pleasures as Mill referred to them),11 most 
philosophical hedonists were attacked by other philosophers for endorsing a moral 
theory that encouraged profligacy (Feldman 2004, p21). For example, Hedonism has 
been referred to as the philosophy of swine (c.f. Crisp 2006a, p630; 2006b, ss4.1), 
because it doesn’t discriminate between pleasure from morally irreproachable acts 
and pleasure from morally questionable acts, such as sex with animals. Indeed, this 
view has been held by many important philosophers, who all refuse to grant equal 
value to pleasures from acts that are disgraceful, base, malicious, or undesirable in 
                                                 
9
 For information on Hedonism Resorts, see http://www.superclubs.com/brand_hedonism/index.asp. 
Accessed on 22/02/2008. 
10
 The hedonism of Aristippus is the only well-known example of a philosophical account of hedonism that 
is close to folk hedonism (c.f. Feldman 2004, p30-33). 
11
 See Mill’s (1861, p12-14) Utilitarianism. 
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some way (Feldman 2004, p 38-39).12 It seems that these philosophers had a moral 
problem with hedonism based on a conflation of the morally good life and the 
prudentially good life, as discussed above. Presumably, many anti-hedonistic 
philosophers have been heavily influenced by folk hedonism, and its pervasive image 
of profligacy, in this way, motivating them to argue ferociously against it.  
 
Another form of hedonism that needs to be distinguished from hedonism about well-
being is psychological hedonism; an explanatory theory about our behaviour, which 
claims that all of our actions are necessarily either subconsciously or consciously 
pleasure-seeking. Psychological hedonism has been endorsed by some historically 
important thinkers, such as William James (1902, p78) and perhaps Darwin and 
Spencer (c.f. Badcock 2000, p125-126), and has been used as evidence for hedonism 
about well-being by many of its earlier supporters, such as Bentham (1789), Epicurus 
(c.f. Feldman 2004, p5), and Mill (1861). However, psychological hedonism’s claim 
that everything we do is pleasure-seeking is not required to support hedonism about 
well-being and so will not be defended here. This is fortunate because psychological 
hedonism would be very hard to defend, particularly in the light of examples Feldman 
(2004, p5) provides, such as a moral saint who seeks the pleasure of others as the goal 
of his actions, or perhaps seeks to do what is morally right just because he believes it 
to be the right thing to do. Furthermore, consider performing habitual actions, such 
as running one’s hand through one’s hair, making a clicking sound with one’s tongue, 
or sacrificing something for one’s child. Providing reasoned justifications as to how 
these actions could be solely based on the pursuit of pleasure is a daunting, if not 
impossible task.13 The reason that psychological hedonism is not useful for a defense 
of hedonism about well-being is that it makes a descriptive claim about how we 
function, as opposed to a theoretical claim about what kind of life would be best for 
us. Nevertheless, the distinction is important because hedonism about well-being has 
                                                 
12
 Feldman cites Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, X, 3), Brandt (1979, p316), Brentano (1969, p90) and 
Broad (1930, p53-54). 
13
 Some examples adapted from Irvine (2006). 
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been rejected in the past due to its ignoble ties to psychological hedonism (e.g. 
Dewey 1922; c.f. Blake 1926, p3). 
 
Several philosophical dictionaries are also misleading on the topic of what the term 
hedonism refers to. Simon Blackburn (2005, p161) and Gregory Pence (2005, p25) 
both severely limit hedonism by describing it as a specifically normative theory, which 
claims that pursuing our own pleasure should be the aim of all our actions without 
mentioning any other types of hedonism. This normative account of hedonism is 
better known as hedonistic egoism and stands opposed to hedonistic utilitarianism 
(Moore 2004), which states that the morally good action is the one that is likely to 
maximise net pleasure for everyone (Brink 2006, p 381). In a similarly misleading way, 
Vesey and Foulkes (1990) take the opposite approach and only discuss hedonistic 
utilitarianism and psychological hedonism. Furthermore, while Gosling (1995, p337) 
acknowledges the two different normative branches of hedonism, and psychological 
hedonism, in his philosophical dictionary entry, he, like Blackburn (2005), Pence 
(2005), and Vesey and Foulkes (1990), fails to specifically mention hedonism about 
well-being. These omissions are inexcusable because it is clear that normative 
versions of hedonism rely on hedonism about well-being as a justification.14 Such 
narrow descriptions of hedonism could lead a reader to assume that hedonism is just 
a normative theory, which is simply not the case. 
 
Some of the first records of philosophical discussion, as captured by Plato in 
Protagoras and Philebus, mention hedonism about well-being. Furthermore, some 
philosophers have based all of their work around hedonism about well-being, such as 
Epicurus, whose account of hedonism is discussed in Book X of The Lives of the 
Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius (c.f. Feldman 2004, p91). Perhaps the most 
detailed definition of hedonism about well-being is provided by Feldman (2004, p25-
                                                 
14
 However, Gosling’s mention of rationalizing hedonism, which he describes as “pleasure is the only 
object that makes a pursuit rational” comes close (1995, p337). Furthermore, that particular philosophical 
dictionary, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (edited by Honderich 1995), also has an entry on Ancient 
Hedonism (p337-339), which does discuss hedonism about well-being, or the good life. 
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30), who refers to it as Default Hedonism. Feldman’s (2004, p27) Default Hedonism 
can be summarised as follows: 
Every episode of pleasure is intrinsically good. Every episode of pain is intrinsically bad. 
An individual’s well-being is entirely determined by the intrinsic values of the episodes of 
pleasure and pain contained in that life, such that as an individual’s net pleasure (total 
pleasures minus total pains) increases, so does their well-being.15 
 
Feldman’s (2004, p27) Default Hedonism is a fairly general account of hedonism 
about well-being (which is in its favour because it captures the commonalities 
between most of the variations of hedonism). A similar definition is provided by 
David Sobel (2002, p240), who describes hedonism about well-being as “the thesis 
that pleasure is the only intrinsic benefit and pain the only intrinsic harm an agent’s 
well-being can receive.” Sobel’s (2002, p240) definition does seem to capture the 
most important components of hedonism about well-being, although, it remains 
silent on whether all pleasure and pain contribute to well-being. This omission counts 
against the definition because if not all pleasure and pain intrinsically contribute to 
well-being, then the theory becomes a lot more flexible, allowing it to avoid all 
objections by claiming that certain kinds of pleasure and pain do not intrinsically 
contribute to well-being for some reason. Such flexibility allows for hedonism about 
well-being to be bent out of shape, creating a theory that is potentially quite unlike 
what we really have in mind when we discuss it. Therefore, a combination of Sobel’s 
(2002) and Feldman’s (2004) definitions will be used, resulting in the following very 
simple definition of hedonism about well-being: 
Hedonism about well-being is the theory that all pleasure, and only pleasure, intrinsically 
contributes positively to well-being and that all pain, and only pain, intrinsically 
contributes negatively to well-being. 
 
This definition is very general, with different accounts of pleasure and pain allowing 
for many different variants of hedonism to be captured. And, it is also fairly self-
explanatory, except perhaps for the use of ‘intrinsically’, which is explained below.  
 
                                                 
15
 Feldman’s (2004, p27) actual definition is more detailed than this but the essential elements (as I see 
them) are repeated here. 
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For something to be intrinsically, or non-instrumentally, valuable, it has to be 
valuable in and of itself; not because of anything else that it might bring about 
(Feldman 2004, p58). Many things are instrumentally valuable in that they provide 
something that is intrinsically valuable. The common test used to discern if 
something is of intrinsic or instrumental value is to ask why the thing is valuable. If 
no reason can be given, then the thing in question is probably intrinsically valuable. 
However, if we can provide an answer, then the thing is likely to be only 
instrumentally valuable. Indeed, a particular event of apparent value might have to be 
reduced in this way several times before settling on the intrinsic value provided by 
this instrumentally valuable event. For example, finding $100 in your pocket is prima 
facie valuable. However, when you ask yourself why it is valuable, you will likely have 
to ask yourself several times before you reach the non-reducible reason for why the 
$100 is intrinsically valuable to you.  
 
When the notion of intrinsic value is considered in the case of well-being, the exact 
question to ask about a thing of prima facie value is: ‘why does this thing make my life 
better for me?’, or ‘why does this thing increase my well-being?’ It should be noted 
that many things, such as finding $100 can lead to intrinsically valuable and 
instrumentally valuable things at the same time. For example, if a hedonist found 
$100 she might feel pleased about it (and the pleasure she felt would have intrinsic 
value for her) and then she might buy herself a delicious vegetarian curry (the money 
is instrumentally valuable in that it allowed her to buy the curry) and then feel 
pleasure from eating it (intrinsic value from the pleasure again). Interestingly, the 
answers that you find yourself providing for the question: ‘why does this thing 
increase my well-being?’, also provide insight into which of the three general accounts 
of well-being you intuitively support. For example, if you always end up on the 
answer ‘because it gives me pleasure’ and cannot provide something intrinsically 
valuable that pleasure instrumentally brings about, then your intuitions about well-
being are hedonistic. Discerning what has intrinsic value is epistemologically prior to 
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discovering instrumentally valuable things, which only lead us to what is intrinsically 
valuable. This is why theories of well-being ultimately aim to account for what thing 
or things intrinsically affect well-being and how it or they achieve it. 
 
The general definition of hedonism about well-being mentioned above is a broad one 
because it does not define pleasure in any particular way. Of course, exactly how a 
specific account of hedonism about well-being defines pleasure is vital to its success, 
since many objections against hedonism refer to particular notions of pleasure (e.g. 
Dennet 1988; Ryle 1954; Sprigge 1988). Indeed, certain accounts of pleasure, such as 
some of Feldman’s (2004, p55-63) variations on his own Intrinsic Attitudinal Pleasure 
(which describe pleasure as a positive attitude about a state of affairs) appear to be 
specifically designed to avoid certain objections to hedonism. For example, Feldman’s 
(2004, p112-114) Truth-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, which allows the 
value pleasure contributes to well-being to be adjusted based on if the pleasure is 
based on truth or falsity, seems to be posited solely to refute the Argument from 
False Pleasures (discussed below).16 Although this essay will not attempt a lengthy 
defense of a particular account of pleasure, an account will be stipulated for sake of 
consistency when dealing with the objections to hedonism about well-being.  
 
Following Bentham (1789), Crisp (2006c) and Hume (1777), and to a lesser extent 
Moore (1903, p12-13) and Broad (1930), this essay proposes an internalist account of 
pleasure as an enjoyable experience, which places pleasure and, thereby, value for 
well-being solely within the mind of each individual. On this kind of account, 
pleasure supervenes on brain states, such that there can be no change in pleasure 
without a change of mental states. Internalist accounts of pleasure stand opposed to 
                                                 
16
 Feldman (2004, p112-114) rightly claims that his Truth-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 
adequately deals with the Argument from False Pleasures. However, Truth-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal 
Hedonism is not an easily recognisable form of Hedonism because of the theory of pleasure it posits. In 
fact, I have argued against Attitudinal Pleasure being hedonistic elsewhere (Turton 2007). Regardless of the 
final verdict on whether any of Feldman’s (2004) variants of Hedonism satisfy the criteria for hedonistic 
theories about well-being (Feldman 2004, Chapter 8), his variants are certainly not as hedonistic as a theory 
of Hedonism about well-being that uses the account of pleasure that follows here. 
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externalist accounts of pleasure, which can share the value for well-being between the 
mind and the outside world (Moore 2004). Internalist accounts of pleasure are subject 
to the criticism that introspection reveals a wide variety of pleasures, many of which 
are enjoyable in different ways.17 This is an empirical issue, however, and one that 
might be resolved in the not-too-distant future, as discussed briefly in Chapter 3. 
Regardless, this essay will continue on the assumption that internalism about pleasure 
is true, since a philosophical defense would require another essay and cognitive 
scientists will probably provide a more informative answer to this question in due 
course.  
 
One fixed definition of pleasure is certainly needed to make an account of hedonism 
about well-being complete and to avoid the main mistake made by Feldman (2004) in 
his defense of hedonism about well-being. Feldman’s (2004) error was to employ a 
strategy that included using different definitions of pleasure to refute each different 
objection to hedonism. This strategy fails to provide a complete vindication for any 
particular account of hedonism about well-being because no particular account is run 
through the gauntlet of all of the important arguments against it. Clearly, for 
hedonism about well-being to become plausible in the face of a barrage of different 
objections, then one specific account of it must be able to survive each of the 
important objections (Turton 2007).   
 
Feldman (2004), continuing a popular trend in recent times (Crisp 2006a), also used 
externalist accounts of pleasure in his defense of hedonism about well-being. As 
mentioned above, externalist accounts of pleasure put some of the value of pleasure 
out in the world, as opposed to internalist accounts, which hold that pleasure, and the 
value it provides, supervene on mental states only.18 Externalist accounts of pleasure 
                                                 
17
 (e.g. Griffin 1986, p8; Gosling 1969, p37-40; Sprigge 1988, p130, Sumner 1996, p92-93; Feldman 1997 
p8, 132; Bernstein 1998, p25; Carson 2000, p13-14; Sobel 2002, p241; c.f Crisp 2006c, p104). 
18
 See Crisp (2006a; 2006b) and Sobel (2002) for more information on the distinction between internal and 
external pleasures and particularly Crisp (2006a) for a defense of internalism about pleasure being more 
suited to hedonism about well-being. 
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do not match well with the common conception of what pleasure is because they 
begin to merge the sensation of pleasure with the actions and objects in the world 
that do or should cause pleasure.19 Internalist accounts, however, focus on the 
phenomenology of pleasure, how it feels to us on the inside. Internalist accounts of 
pleasure also completely comply with the requirements of experiential accounts of 
well-being, which is important because Nozick (1974, p42, 43) devised the 
Experience Machine thought experiment specifically to show that more than just how 
our experiences feel to us “from the inside” matters to us.20 For these reasons, the 
following internalist account of pleasure (and pain) will be used henceforth: 
Pleasure and pain supervene on mental states such that pleasure is the intrinsically good 
part of conscious mental states, and pain is the intrinsically bad part of conscious mental 
states, where the intrinsically good (or bad) part of a conscious mental state is the part 
that we find enjoyable (or the opposite of enjoyable).  
 
This account of pleasure (and pain) is broad and undiscerning. The account is broad 
because all mental states that we are consciously aware of, and have a positive or 
                                                 
19
 Arguably, all externalist accounts of pleasure are not very hedonistic because of their inclusion of 
something other than how pleasure feels from the inside in what intrinsically contributes positively to well-
being. The externalist move allows them to give varying weights (including no weight) to any pleasure 
depending on what causes it. This move seems opposed to a central tenet of hedonism; that all pleasure, 
and only pleasure, intrinsically contributes positively to well-being, because it allows for something other 
than pleasure to dictate how much value that pleasure has. Even if this pleasure-plus-qualifier type of 
externalism about pleasure can be passed off as pleasure, it is clear that it is not as hedonistic as an 
internalist account, which focuses solely on the pleasure. A classic example of externalist accounts being 
un-hedonistic can be seen in Feldman (2004, p55-63), who takes his externalism about pleasure to the 
extreme. His account of pleasure, which he describes as Intrinsic Attitudinal Pleasure, asserts that the only 
thing that contributes positively to well-being is being intrinsically pleased about some state of affairs – 
being pleased about something for itself and not because it leads to something else. This view of pleasure 
clearly causes his Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism to collapse into a desire-fulfillment account of well-being 
when one considers being pleased about something but feeling no pleasure about it. How can one know that 
one is pleased when one feels no pleasure? Indeed, it seems that one can have an opinion about something 
but as soon that opinion stops being neutral, one becomes pleased about it, which necessarily entails the 
feeling of at least some small amount of pleasure. The capacity to feel pleasure, allows us to differentiate 
between things that please us and things that neither please nor displease us. Indeed, with all of the 
phenomenology of pleasure removed, all that is left in Feldman’s Intrinsic Attitudinal Pleasure is the 
preference for certain states of affairs. 
20
 Externalists will agree with Nozick, suggesting that the pleasures we would experience in the Experience 
Machine would not be valuable because they would fail to fulfill some criterion about accurately tracking 
the world outside of our heads. Unfortunately for externalists, that criterion is difficult to specify in a way 
that is not trivial. Arguably, the Experience Machine is the real external cause of anything we experience 
while we are in it. Furthermore, our experiences outside of the machine are dogged by various delusions, 
deceptions and, perhaps most importantly for the philosophically-minded, doubt about the very existence of 
the external world. 
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negative valence (as opposed to a neutral one), will intrinsically contribute to our 
well-being. It should be noted that mental states are often complex and that the 
positive or negative valence of a mental state comes from the intrinsically good or 
bad part of that mental state. The account is undiscerning because the cause of the 
mental state is unimportant. The intrinsically good or bad part of mental states 
directly contributes to well-being regardless of what caused those mental states. When 
construed in this way, our pleasure and pain can be thought of as the enjoyment and 
suffering that we are consciously aware of.21 Feeding this account into the definition 
of Hedonism about Well-Being above, we can state a particular theory of hedonism 
about well-being, which will be referred to as Hedonism about Well-Being (with 
capitals): 
All pleasure, and only pleasure, intrinsically contributes positively to well-being and all 
pain, and only pain, intrinsically contributes negatively to well-being, where pleasure and 
pain supervene on mental states such that pleasure is the intrinsically good part of mental 
states that we are consciously aware of and pain is the intrinsically bad part of mental 
states that we are consciously aware of. 
 
This specific account of hedonism about well-being is the most appropriate for use in 
this essay because the arguments against hedonism about well-being that are 
discussed below are used to refute exactly this kind of theory. Therefore, attempting 
to defend Hedonism about Well-Being against these objections is much more 
preferable than using an external account of hedonism about well-being, which would 
only skirt around the objections. Indeed, using Hedonism about Well-Being allows 
the objections to be tackled head-on, producing a result that will satisfy both 
traditional hedonists and those who have been arguing against them. 
 
                                                 
21
 Following Crisp (2006c, p103-111) the emphasis on enjoyment (as opposed to pleasure) is to help ward 
off irrelevant intuitions about pleasure being profligate. 
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The Argument from False Pleasures 
Hedonism about well-being has had many opponents over the years, the arguments 
of whom have made it perennially unpopular amongst philosophers (Blake 1926; 
Crisp 2006a; Feldman 2004; Savery 1934; Silverstein 2000), except for the brief 
period of British Empiricism (Sumner 1996).22 This unpopularity, caused by the 
strength and number of arguments devised to undermine it, has effectively killed 
hedonism about well-being as a philosophical theory. As with many other deceased 
entities, hedonism about well-being is still discussed, however, the discussion is often 
disparaging in tone and focuses mainly on its opposition’s latest ‘knock-down’ 
argument (Silverstein 2000). Indeed, it seems that hedonism about well-being is often 
only discussed to allow readers to learn from the mistakes that it supposedly makes 
(Sumner 1996). This approach of acknowledging hedonism about well-being, refuting 
it due to the latest objection, and then moving on to more plausible theories is 
common in texts specifically on well-being (e.g. Darwall 1997; Griffin 1986; Sumner 
1996), metaethics (Brink 1989) and normative ethics (e.g. Kagan 1998), and 
introductory texts on ethics (Bagani & Fosl 2007; Frankena 1973; Furrow 2005; 
Rachels 2005; Rosen 1993) and political philosophy (Kymlicka 1990). Furthermore, 
this type of swift rejection of hedonism about well-being is often outright (e.g. 
Furrow 2005, p112; Griffin 1986, p10) even though some of its staunchest opponents 
have acknowledged that hedonism about well-being cannot be proven wrong (Moore 
1903, p238). There have been several influential arguments used by the anti-
hedonistic movement since hedonism about well-being’s conception.23 However, 
only the argument that is currently most influential will be discussed in any detail in 
this essay. 
 
                                                 
22
 Indeed, Hedonism could even have been considered popular during this era and was discussed much 
more positively by the leading philosophers of the time (e.g. Bentham 1789; Hobbes 1650; Hume 1754, 
1777; Locke 1689; Mill 1861; c.f. Crisp 2006b, p619). 
23
 Early influential arguments came from Plato’s Socrates (e.g. Philebus 21a) and more recent arguments 
were most famously discussed by Moore (e.g. 1903, Chap 3). 
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If a recent text on ethics (or related subject) is going to hastily sweep aside hedonism 
about well-being, then the Argument from False Pleasures is the brush they are likely 
to do their sweeping with.24 And, despite admonitions against dealing with it this way 
(Crisp 2006b), the same cavalier treatment of hedonism about well-being can also be 
found in many undergraduate philosophy courses: an explanation of hedonism about 
well-being, followed quickly by a heralding of the champions of the Argument from 
False Pleasures, and then on to more plausible theories of well-being. The Argument 
from False Pleasures attempts to refute hedonism about well-being by arguing that 
pleasures based on falsity, deception, misinformation, or experiences too far detached 
from reality, are not as valuable as pleasures based on truth or more directly based on 
reality. The Argument from False Pleasures can be described as follows: 
P1) Hedonism about well-being states that all pleasure, and only pleasure, intrinsically 
contributes positively to well-being and that all pain, and only pain, intrinsically 
contributes negatively to well-being. 
P2) Pleasure based on truth, or something like it, contributes more positively to well-
being than pleasure based on falsity. 
P3) Therefore, something other than pleasure (truth of some sort) must contribute  
 positively to well-being. 
c) Therefore, hedonism about well-being is false. 
 
The controversial premise of the Argument from False Pleasures is Premise 2. 
Premise 1 is a common and reasonable definition of hedonism about well-being, as 
discussed and endorsed above. Indeed, straying from this definition would depart 
from the core principles that have always underpinned hedonism, resulting in a 
theory of well-being that may have hedonistic influence but should not be considered 
purely hedonistic. Premise 3 and the major conclusion, Premise 4, are not 
contentious because they deductively follow from the first two premises. Premise 2, 
however, needs evidence of some sort to make it compelling and this evidence is 
supposedly provided by the current champions of the anti-hedonists: the Experience 
Machine and the Deceived Businessman thought experiments. These two thought 
experiments are explained in more detail below. 
                                                 
24
 As typified by Bagani & Fosl (2007, p74-76), Brink (1989, p223-224), Darwall (1997, p162, 178), 
Griffin (1986, p9-10), Kagan (1998, p34-36), Kymlicka (1990, p13-14), and Rachels (2005, p103-104). 
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The Experience Machine thought experiment, as described by Robert Nozick (1974, 
p42-45), was the first and is probably the most renowned of the new wave of anti-
hedonistic champions; even though, it is not clear that he initially intended it as a 
refutation of hedonism (Feldman 2004, p109). Indeed, Nozick (1974) employed the 
Experience Machine as just a cog in his wider argument involving how animals 
should be treated. However, the function this cog now serves is to cast doubt on the 
commonplace assumption that nothing else really matters to us “other than how our 
lives feel from the inside” (1974, p43). Importantly, if Nozick’s argument is correct, 
then all purely internalist experiential accounts of well-being,25 including Hedonism 
about Well-Being, will be false. Regardless of his initial intention, mental images of 
the Experience Machine, perhaps aided by exposure to The Matrix trilogy of films,26 
have converted many would-be undergraduate hedonists into non-believers, further 
swelling the ranks of those who find Hedonism about Well-Being implausible.  
 
In the Experience Machine thought experiment, Nozick (1974, p42) asks us to 
imagine a machine built by “superduper neuropsychologists” that can provide us with 
any experience we desire, such as the pleasure of publishing an award-winning novel. 
The machine can also provide a comprehensive range of other amazing experiences 
that we might never have thought of, such as the pleasure of seducing a whole 
volleyball team at once. Nozick invites us to plug into the Experience Machine, but 
expects that, even after a two-year test run, we would not accept his invitation (1974, 
p42). Indeed, when posed with this choice, most people tend to forgo a life of 
endless pleasures for what they currently have, a presumably less pleasurable but 
more real life.27 This choice appears to be based on the “firmly held” negative 
intuition aroused by considering a life plugged in to the Experience Machine, an 
intuition that Sobel (2002, p244) thinks strikes “at the heart of hedonism”.  
                                                 
25
 Experiential accounts of well-being hold that only experiences can contribute intrinsic value to well-
being (as discussed above). 
26
 Nozick refers to the machine as a type of tank that you would be floating in while having electrodes 
plugged into your brain (1974, p42 & 43), a gruesome description given illustration by The Matrix movies. 
27
 Personal experience has shown me that about 9 out of 10 undergraduate philosophers do not want to plug 
into the Experience Machine 
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Although Nozick does not claim to have all the answers to the question of what, 
“other than how our lives feel from the inside”, matters to us, he does have a 
suggestion. He (1974, p43-44) briefly considers being a certain kind of person and 
achieving certain things as possible reasons for our not wanting to get into the 
Experience Machine but quickly dismisses them, noting that more specific machines 
could offer such experiences and we still would not want to plug into them. Nozick 
then proposes that our wanting to really experience the limitless reality of living our 
own real life, as opposed to having a machine live it for us, is probably what prevents 
us from plugging in to the Experience Machine (1974, p43-45). If this is true, as many 
people believe it is, then it shows that something like truth or reality matters to us, 
not just pleasure. Based on the realisation that truth or reality matters to us, the 
assumption is then made that truth (or something like it) must contribute positively 
to well-being, thereby providing evidence for Premise 2 of the Argument from False 
Pleasures. 
 
The Deceived Businessman thought experiment and its more recent variants have a 
more traceable evolution than Nozick’s (1974) Experience Machine: from Nagel 
(1979), to Kagan (1998) and on to other modern variants such as Rachels (2005, 
p104). Perhaps initially influenced by Nozick’s (1974) Experience Machine thought 
experiment, Thomas Nagel (1979, p4-5) laid out the foundations for the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment and a more formal understanding of the Argument 
from False Pleasures. Nagel (1979, p4) notes the common remark: “that what you 
don’t know can’t hurt you” (the underlying principle of all internalist experiential 
accounts of well-being, such as Hedonism about Well-Being), but then offers reasons 
to think that the remark is wrong. He gives the example of someone being betrayed 
and then claims that the reason people are unhappy when they find out about 
betrayal is because “it is bad to be betrayed”, not because it is bad to find out about it 
(Nagel 1979, p5). The claim that it is bad to be betrayed implies that deception, lack 
of truth, or something like it is bad for people whether they experience it or not. 
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Therefore, if correct, this claim supports Premise 2 of the Argument from False 
Pleasures by suggesting that the intrinsic ‘badness’ of deception, lack of truth, or 
something like it negatively contributes to our well-being even when we do not 
experience it. 
 
The example is painted more vividly (and perhaps most vividly) by Shelly Kagan 
(1998, p34-36) who also premises his discussion with the “common saying that what 
you don’t know can’t hurt you”, before going on to give reasons to doubt its wisdom. 
He asks us to imagine a successful businessman who died thinking that he had 
achieved everything he wanted: a loving wife and children and the respect of the 
community (Kagan 1998, p34). However, Kagan (1998, p35) then reveals that the 
businessman was completely wrong about his assessment of how things had gone: his 
wife was cheating, his children and the community at large were just using him for 
their own ends, and his business partner had been stealing from the soon-to-be-
bankrupt business. Kagan (1998, p35) asserts that the businessman’s life did not go as 
well as it could have and points out that if he had really been loved and respected like 
he thought he was, then his life would have gone better.  
 
Indeed, the intuition that the Deceived Businessman thought experiment elicits is not 
a pleasant one. Kagan (1998) offers similar reasoning to Nozick (1974) about why we 
would dislike having a life like the Deceived Businessman’s: a life full of pleasures 
that are not based on truth or directly on reality. The reason he offers is that the 
deceived businessman was not really living the life that he had wanted to; his 
preferences were not being satisfied (Kagan 1998, p36). Kagan (1998) concludes that, 
since we value a life where our preferences are really satisfied over one in which we 
only think they are, the truth or reality of our experiences affects the value of them. 
Clearly, this conclusion, if correct, supports Premise 2 of the Argument from False 
Pleasures because it claims that pleasure (a type of experience) is less valuable if based 
on falsity or something like it. 
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Both of these two anti-hedonistic champions, the Experience Machine and the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiments, evoke powerful intuitions, which are 
generally thought to provide strong prima facie evidence for Premise 2 of the 
Argument from False Pleasures. Indeed, having identified these two thought 
experiments as the main reason for hedonism about well-being’s current 
unpopularity, and therefore philosophical death, the remainder of this essay is 
dedicated to constructing an argument for why they are not the ‘knock down’ 
refutations that they are thought to be. The success of this argument will be an 
important step towards reviving Hedonism about Well-Being. However, before 
leaping to the defense of Hedonism about Well-Being, the current method of 
assessing theories of well-being needs to be discussed, as it is in need of re-evaluation. 
An argument will be presented that the current method of assessing theories of well-
being puts too much emphasis on the role of intuitions and that a restricted role for 
intuitions could help Hedonism about Well-Being stave off the assault from the 
Experience Machine and the Deceived Businessman thought experiments. The 
current method of assessing theories of well-being is discussed below. However, it is 
henceforth referred to as the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being 
because one of the aims of this essay is to propose a new method of assessing 
theories of well-being. 
 
 
The Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being 
It is unusual for moral philosophers, and especially applied ethicists, to be specific 
about how moral theories should be evaluated, and yet nearly all of them frequently 
do just that. The justification and evaluation of moral theories is a controversial topic; 
although, nearly all philosophers seem to approach the matter in a similar way, 
including many of those who claim to be doing it differently (Kagan 1998, p16). 
Examples from three authors who have indicated how ethical theories, including 
theories of well-being, should be evaluated are discussed below and formalised into 
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the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being. Special attention is then paid 
to the role of intuitions in the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being 
because Chapter 2 of this essay argues for that role to be restricted. 
 
In the first chapter of his book, Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory, Mark 
Timmons (2006, p8-13) lays out a clear and concise methodology for evaluating 
moral theories before going on to discuss the major ones. He posits six evaluative 
criteria and explains that the extent to which moral theories can meet all of the 
criteria, and how they score on the criteria compared to competing theories, indicates 
how good a particular moral theory is; how successful it is at fulfilling the practical 
and theoretical aims that we hold for moral theories (Timmons 2006, p12-13). The 
criteria Timmons (2006, p9-12) posits are as follows: 
Criterion 1: Consistency 
Criterion 2: Determinacy 
Criterion 3: Applicability 
Criterion 4: Internal Support 
Criterion 5: External Support 
Criterion 6: Explanatory Power 
 
Timmons’ (2006, p9)28 Consistency criterion stipulates that the underlying principles 
of a theory should not contradict each other or produce results that are inconsistent 
with each other, such as concluding that a particular action is both right and wrong 
simultaneously. His Determinacy criterion asserts that moral theories should be able 
to produce answers (as opposed to drawing blanks) about the majority of moral 
problems when the relevant facts are available (p9-10). The Applicability criterion 
requires moral theories to be applicable, and therefore useful, in real life situations 
(p10). To be applicable, the relevant facts that a theory needs in order to make its 
moral evaluations should be at least theoretically obtainable. As an example, 
Timmons (p10) points to the difficulty in ascertaining the likely net consequences for 
the happiness of all involved, information that hedonistic utilitarianism requires to 
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 All further in text citations in this paragraph are to (Timmons 2006). 
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make moral evaluations.29 Timmons’ (p10-11) Internal Support criterion asks that the 
evaluations moral theories make are consistent with widely-held “considered moral 
beliefs” (p11, his italics), which are exemplified by beliefs such as “torture is wrong” 
(p10) and are presumably formed by reflecting upon our moral intuitions.30  
 
The External Support criterion stipulates that to the extent to which a moral theory is 
supported by, or refuted by, non-moral areas of knowledge makes the theory more or 
less credible (respectively). Timmons (2006, p11) cites Mackie (1977, p203) as noting 
that ethics overlaps with, and therefore affects and is affected by, “psychology, 
metaphysics and religion”, amongst other disciplines, and suggests that the 
correctness of a moral theory is partly dependant on a lack of conflict with or, 
preferably, endorsement from such areas of non-moral enquiry. Timmons’ (2006, 
p12) final criterion, Explanatory Power, requires that the underlying principles of a 
moral theory must explain the theory and why it is normatively significant in the area 
that it is used to make moral evaluations. For example, an explanatorily powerful 
theory of well-being would have underlying principles that clearly explain itself and 
offer compelling reasons for why the evaluations it makes are relevant to well-being. 
The clarity of Timmons’ evaluative criteria make them useful, although he admits the 
potential difficulty in using his framework for ranking moral theories because any 
particular theory might outperform others on some of the criteria while not 
performing as well on others (2006, p13).  
 
Shelly Kagan (1998, p11-17) also discusses how moral theories should be evaluated, 
although his methodology is not divided to the extent that Timmons’ (2006) is. 
Kagan (1998, p11) begins his explanation of how he thinks moral theories, including 
theories of well-being, should be evaluated by noting that defenses of moral theories 
are not the same as defenses of scientific theories, most of which are based solely on 
                                                 
29
 Indeed, measuring, let alone forecasting, happiness is a considerable practical problem for hedonistic 
utilitarianism; the issue certainly deserves more attention. 
30
 More on the relationship between moral intuitions and moral judgments comes later in this section. 
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empirical evidence. He acknowledges that scientific evidence can help with the factual 
information needed to make moral evaluations, but avers: “almost everyone agrees” 
that empirical evidence alone cannot justify fundamental moral principles (Kagan 
1998, p12). Kagan (1998, p12-13) goes on to assert that two main types of reasons 
can be given to believe a moral theory is correct or incorrect: whether the theory 
produces evaluations that agree with our intuitions and how plausible the rationale of 
the theory is. 
 
Kagan’s (1998, p13) first evaluative criteria is that a moral theory produces 
evaluations that fit with our moral intuitions – which he describes as the “immediate 
reactions” to thought experiments or real life situations. This criterion is similar to 
Timmons’ (2006) Internal Support criterion, except that Kagan (1998) does not place 
nearly as much emphasis on the intuitions being reflected upon as Timmons does. 
Kagan (1998, p13) takes care to emphasise the strength of some moral intuitions 
about pared-down thought experiments and claims that our inability to disregard our 
intuitions about these hypothetical scenarios shows how important they are for 
validating moral theories. Kagan (1998, p13) does go on to admit, though, that our 
moral intuitions can contradict themselves, and so must be biased sometimes. Indeed, 
this concession leads him to conclude that we may have to accept a moral theory that 
clashes with some of our intuitions. However, he maintains that showing how a 
moral theory fits with the majority of our intuitions is a “significant aspect of 
defending it” and that, most philosophers would agree (Kagan 1998, p13-14). Indeed, 
Kagan (1998, p16) believes that even philosophers who claim that they do not justify 
moral theories in this way usually do so (an example of which is discussed below). 
 
Kagan’s (1998, p14-15) second evaluative criteria is that a moral theory has a 
“plausible rationale” (his italics). Generally, this criterion requires that there is good 
reason to believe that the theory correctly explains all of the moral features that it 
aims to account for. For example, the rationale of a moral theory should sensibly 
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explain things like why a particular principle is morally important and how important 
it is in any given situation. Kagan (1998) also implies something like Timmons’ (2006) 
criteria of Consistency and Determinacy as being constitutive of a plausible rationale. 
This is mainly because the more complete a moral theory is, the more plausible it 
appears. One particularly important area of completeness for Kagan (1998) is that a 
plausible moral theory’s rationale should have a consistent metaethical justification. 
This is important for Kagan (1998, p15) because he observes that the plausibility we 
confer on the reasons for believing that a moral theory sensibly explains its principles 
is considerably affected by our own “conception of the nature of morality”. At this 
point, Kagan notes that our judgements are also affected by our intuitions and are 
ultimately formed by a reflective equilibrium (discussed below), as we attempt to keep 
our various intuitions and considered judgements consistent. Indeed, after taking care 
to separate his two evaluative criteria, Kagan (1998, p15) concludes by claiming that 
the most plausible moral theory will provide “the best overall fit with our various 
considered judgments”, which allows moral intuitions to play a major role in 
evaluating moral theories.  
 
Should it be the case, however, that moral intuitions should play such an important 
role? In his description of the criteria that should be used for evaluating moral 
theories, James Griffin (1986) chastises the major role intuitions often play, before 
hypocritically going on to use them himself in a cavalier dismissal of hedonism about 
well-being. Griffin’s (1986) discussion of how to evaluate moral theories is perhaps 
the most relevant to this essay because it resides at the start of his influential Well-
Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance, a book dedicated to establishing a 
complete account of well-being (which entails evaluating theories of well-being 
throughout). Griffin (1986, p1) opens the discussion with the observation, similar to 
the one made by Kagan (1998), that “piecemeal appeal to intuition” is the “most 
common” method for evaluating moral theories, before turning his hand to the 
derision of intuition’s normative significance. Griffin (1986, p1-2) clearly states that 
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“intuitions as a class have no probative force” and that even the most “intuitively 
repugnant” conclusion cannot settle a philosophical debate; it only offers “a reason to 
start looking for a good argument”. Despite the apparent clarity of Griffin’s (1986) 
stance on this issue, he goes on to make what can only be described as contradictory 
statements and he routinely fails to follow his own advice.  
 
Although he thinks their number is small, Griffin (1986, p1-2) heralds certain 
intuitions as being “solider than anything else that moral thought is likely to come up 
with”, such as that “battering babies is wrong”, presumably predicting that moral 
thought will never be able to plausibly justify such an act in anything like normal 
circumstances. Griffin may well be right about our inability to plausibly justify such 
an act, although it appears that we could easily justify not performing the act without 
the help of our intuitions on the matter. Regardless, Griffin (1986, p2) remarks that 
the few moral intuitions of such strength that we have are only useful for weeding out 
the “wildest of moral theories”. Griffin’s (1986) stated position on the use of 
intuitions for evaluating moral theories can be summed up as follows: intuitions have 
no normative significance, except for the few cases in which ridiculous moral theories 
bring about very strong negative intuitions. If this is Griffin’s position, then it is 
surprising that on the same page that he laments the rise of intuitions “so far above 
their epistemological station”, he also accuses two moderately tame (certainly not 
wild, at any rate) moral theories: contractariansim and utilitarianism, of being 
“counter-intuitive” (1986, p2) while providing an example of his Completeness 
criterion for evaluating moral theories (discussed below).  
 
Furthermore, in the same 412-page book on well-being, Griffin (1986, p9-10) 
dismisses all internalist experiential accounts of well-being, including hedonism about 
well-being, with a couple of pages of discussion on and around the notoriously 
intuition-eliciting31 Experience Machine thought experiment. Based on the negative 
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 See, for example, Sobel (2002, p244). 
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intuitive response most people feel to the thought of plugging into the Experience 
Machine, Griffin (1986) claims that, since we do not always desire mental states over 
other things in life, then mental state, or experiential accounts, of well-being must be 
wrong. He does admit, however, that by rationally investigating these preferences 
“with a cold eye”, we might find that they are “dubious”, but he fails to pursue the 
matter further, relying on a quick and dirty, intuitively supported rejection of 
hedonism about well-being (Griffin 1986, p9-10). Presumably, Griffin’s (1986, p9) 
“cold eye” method of evaluating moral theories is composed of the rational 
application of the two relatively non-intuitive criteria he had mentioned earlier; 
Completeness and Correctness (which are discussed below). 
 
Griffin’s (1986, p2-3) first criterion for evaluating theories of well-being is 
Completeness and seems to incorporate three of Timmons’ (2006) criteria: 
Consistency, Determinacy and Internal Support. For Griffin (1986), the 
Completeness criterion basically requires that moral theories are able to adhere to 
their underlying principles when evaluating all cases without contradicting 
themselves, failing to provide a judgement, or producing results that do not fit with 
our firmly-held moral intuitions. Griffin (1986, p2-3) rightly notes that the stringency 
of this criterion will undermine the plausibility of many moral theories that we 
currently entertain as possibly correct.  
 
The extreme rigidity of this criterion is best shown by the test Griffin (1986, p3) 
recommends that we use to evaluate how complete a moral theory really is. By 
spreading the moral theory in question as wide as possible, and especially into areas 
that it is likely to run into trouble, Griffin (1986, p3) believes that some theories will 
fail to show their Completeness by producing unintuitive results or abandoning one 
or more of their principles in order to produce more intuitively satisfying evaluations. 
Presumably, most of the places that moral theories run into trouble are in unrealistic 
thought experiments, such as the Experience Machine. Again, we can see that, despite 
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Griffin’s (1986, p1-2) overtly-stated mistrust of intuitions, he recommends that solid 
intuitions should be used to evaluate moral theories, especially through the use of 
unrealistic thought experiments. Indeed, Griffin’s (1986) contradictory stance 
provides evidence for Kagan’s (1998) claim that even the authors who claim not to 
rely on intuitions when evaluating moral theories usually do so. 
 
Griffin’s (1986, p3) second criterion for evaluating theories of well-being is 
Correctness and is similar to the metaethical consistency requirement of Kagan’s 
(1986) second criterion: having a plausible rationale. Griffin (1986, p 3) states that his 
second criterion is more important and even harder to satisfy than the first. He 
asserts that being believable or at least plausible, as most complete theories will be, is 
not enough (Griffin 1986, p 3). For Griffin (1986, p 3), the best moral theory is also 
correct, which means that its metaethical foundations are correct and that those 
foundations support the moral theory in the right kind of way. He acknowledges the 
difficulties of assessing compliance with this requirement and calls for more 
investigation into the relationship between meta- and normative ethics to help with 
this (Griffin 1986, p 4). However, Griffin (1986 p4) does suggest that the richest 
possible accounts of prudence (“everything that bears on one’s self-interest”), 
morality, and how the two interact is the ideal starting point for this complex task. In 
the absence of a more detailed test for Correctness and a reliable methodology for 
discerning the truth of metaethical theories, Griffin’s (1986) second criterion can be 
assumed to be a sort of metaethical consistency requirement. 
 
Based on the evaluative frameworks described above and observing the evaluative 
strategies implicit in many authors’ assessments of theories of well-being (e.g. Bagani 
& Fosl 2007; Griffin 1986; Kagan 1998; Kymlicka 1990; Rachels 2005), what follows 
is an interpretation and explanation of how theories of well-being have generally been 
assessed in the literature: The Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being: 
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Theories of well-being should: 
i)  Produce intuitively pleasing results in most cases 
ii)  Have a compelling rationale, which can provide judgements in all relevant moral 
cases, while: 
a) Being internally consistent 
b) Producing results that fit with pervasive moral judgements (based on 
reflective equilibrium between our moral intuitions and other judgements) 
c) Providing good reason to believe the normative significance of the theory 
d) Being meta-ethically consistent 
e) Being consistent with science 
iii)  Be functional 
And the extent to which a theory of well-being achieves these criteria indicates how 
good a theory it is. 
 
The first two criteria of the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being get by 
far the most attention in the literature and the first, being intuitively pleasing, has 
often taken the role of ‘decisive argument/objection’ in damning evaluations of 
theories of well-being. Indeed, whether used in isolation of reason, or used under the 
guise of reflective equilibrium32 as the main determinant of how compelling a theory’s 
rationale is, moral intuitions often play a major role in the literature when it comes to 
evaluating theories of well-being. Furthermore, this is especially the case when the 
arguments provided for a negative evaluation are not made in great detail (e.g. Bagani 
& Fosl 2007; Griffin 1986; Kagan 1998; Kymlicka 1990; Rachels 2005). Exactly how 
our moral intuitions are supposed to help evaluate theories of well-being is discussed 
below.  
 
As for the compelling rationale criterion, different reasons are often given to 
demonstrate why a particular theory of well-being does or does not have a compelling 
rationale, presumably depending on how such tests would help or hinder the 
particular author’s intended appraisal of the theory. Each test for how rationally 
compelling a theory of well-being is has been discussed above and so will not be re-
explained here. That is, except that Mackie’s (1977) requirement of compliance with 
Metaphysical and Religious beliefs, which is, for obvious reasons, scrapped in favour 
of the compliance with current scientific knowledge criterion. The last criterion, 
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 Discussed in more detail below. 
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functionality, closely mirrors Timmons’ (2006) Applicability criterion. These other 
factors are rarely used as objections and are, therefore, not discussed further here. 
 
Since the use of moral intuitions is so pervasive in evaluating theories of well-being, 
and since the extent of this use is what this essay will argue against later, how 
intuitions are supposed to help evaluate moral principles will now be explained in 
more detail. Rachels (2003, p10-12) discusses how our moral intuitions can have the 
same kind of authority that a “competent judge” (p11) might be considered to have 
in making moral assessments. He acknowledges that the normative significance of 
our intuitions is reliant on us having an “adequate grasp of their content” (p10), for 
which Rachels (2003, p11) considers having had relevant experience “may be crucial”. 
Specifically on the topic of intuiting intrinsic value, such as intuitively assessing the 
intrinsic value of pleasure for well-being, Rachels (2003) refers to various authors and 
describes several ways that we might be able to acquire an adequate grasp on the 
content of our moral intuitions. Presumably, Rachels (2003) thinks that this better 
understanding of our moral intuitions’ credentials will reassure us that our intuitions 
have the moral authority of a competent judge. The methods for understanding the 
content of our intuitions that Rachels (2003) refers to, however, are mainly through 
general agreement across subjects and situations and through introspection, and how 
these types of methods lend authority to our moral intuitions is not exactly clear. 
 
One method for understanding the content of our intuitive evaluations about 
potential sources of intrinsic value, which Rachels (2003, p11) considers to have 
“limited application”, is simply by observing a potential source of intrinsic value in 
various subjects and situations and noting the intuitive response. Rachels (2003, p11) 
cites Lewis (1989, p123) as suggesting that this method is not useful because accurate 
observations of this kind are difficult when they are of other people’s minds and 
especially in mundane situations, in which potentially-observable reactions are 
unusual. Rather, Lewis (1989, p122; c.f. Rachels 2003, p11) recommends reflecting on 
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our own intuitive responses to situations that are as dramatic as possible, while 
adding and subtracting the potential source of value, so that the difference can be 
better perceived. When applied to thought experiments too (instead of just 
experienced situations), this appears to be the approach most generally used in ethics, 
with the perceived difference identified as the intrinsic value of the object that was 
added and subtracted in the thought experiments.33  
 
Rachels (2003, p11) goes on to cite authors using a more direct method to grasp the 
content of moral intuitions: through introspection. Audi (1996, p112-114; c.f. Rachels 
2003, p11) proposed that introspectively reflecting on evaluative propositions, such as 
‘pleasure is good’, creates normatively significant conclusions about the accuracy of 
such propositions. And, Moore (1903, p91 & 223; c.f. Rachels 2003) claimed that 
reflecting on potential sources of value in complete isolation is “the only” safe 
method for determining the intrinsic value of something. Although Rachels (2003) 
notes that each of these methods is an attempt to add the authority of ‘competent 
judge’ to our moral intuitions, it is not obvious that any of them really achieve this 
goal because we cannot so easily understand the content of our intuitions through 
introspection, a point that is elaborated on in great detail in Chapter 2. 
 
Regardless of the exact method various philosophers endorse for grasping the 
content of our intuitions, many of them are very confident about the meaning of at 
least some of their more solid moral intuitions. Indeed, Rachels (2003, p10) hand 
picked some “fine” philosophers that, like Griffin (1986), were inclined to rely heavily 
on at least some of their moral intuitions: Ross (1930, p29) appealed to the obvious 
rightness of promise-keeping to anyone of sufficient maturity, Lewis (1946, p375) 
considered our intuitive evaluations of good and bad to be correct, Nagel (1986, 
p146) recommended that after intuiting a response about what is valuable we should 
then move to find the best explanation for that intuition, rather than questioning it, 
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and, according to Hare (1973, p148), Rawls (1971, p18, line 9 to p20, line 9) relied on 
intuitions to support 30 moral propositions in just two pages. Although, Rawls (1971) 
would claim to have reached these evaluative judgements through a process of 
reflective equilibrium, in which his reflected-upon moral intuitions would interplay 
with his beliefs and other intuitions (Daniels 1996), it seems that his intuitions were 
playing at least a major role in those 30 evaluations.  
 
Indeed, even where Rawls (1971, p49; 1974/5, p8) claimed to be using a process of 
wide reflective equilibrium, in which opposing moral theories are also taken into 
account (Daniels 2003), to reach moral judgements, his intuitive foundations appear 
to be doing most of the evaluative work. Some proponents of wide reflective 
equilibrium have argued that the foundational intuitions involved are not beyond 
revision (Daniels 1979; 2003). However, it is not clear that our intuitions about what 
is morally right and wrong change very easily (Myers 2004), as argued in Chapter 2, or 
that philosophers very frequently remove intuitions from consideration in the face of 
the reason-based evidence provided by an opponents’ moral theory. The important 
point here is that proponents of wide reflective equilibrium, and other more extreme 
forms of intuitionism, agree that moral intuitions have non-trivial normative 
significance for moral judgements. 
 
Rachels’ (2003) revealing of the fact that many fine philosophers use intuitions to 
discern the value of things, however, does not necessarily amount to a good reason 
for using intuitions for that purpose. Just because moral intuitions are used by fine 
philosophers does not necessarily make it right to use them, as is clearly shown by the 
fact that the intuitions held by various fine philosophers, and people generally, can 
and do contradict each other. Indeed, even if we reflected on and accordingly 
adjusted our moral intuitions in light of our beliefs and other intuitions about what 
has value, we would still find ourselves with intuitions that clashed with the reflected-
upon intuitions of others. Therefore, as Rachels (2003, p12) concedes, the fact that 
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people confidently hold moral intuitions that contradict those of their 
contemporaries means that “many of us confidently believe falsehoods”. With this 
admission in mind, Rachels (2003, p12) asserts that, while we can never “confirm” 
the value of something with intuitions, widespread intuitive agreement is enough to 
be able to argue that “everyone agrees because the truth is obvious upon proper 
reflection”. Indeed, this claim does corroborate some of those made above about 
widespread intuitions containing reliable evaluative information. However, even if an 
intuition is universally held, it could still be unreliable (Liao 2007, p9), as discussed 
below. 
 
Indeed, there are many examples which show that pervasive intuitions do not 
necessarily contain reliable evaluative information. History is replete with instances 
where even widespread and heavily reflected-upon intuitions were wrong. 
Furthermore, only extensive scientific evidence (that the sun orbits Earth and not 
vice-versa) or prolonged rational moral argument (that slavery is unfair) could change 
them. Indeed, because a heavy reliance on pervasive intuitions slows the progress of 
knowledge, it is not clear why moral philosophers do not reduce their use of intuitive 
judgements like the thinkers involved with the natural sciences and other branches of 
philosophy have (Griffin 1986, p2). Furthermore, if, as Kagan (1998) suggests, most 
moral philosophers are not intuitionists (who rely solely on intuitions) because they 
consider intuitions to be fallible, then how do they know when any of their particular 
intuitions are reliable? It seems clear that we do not achieve an adequate grasp on the 
content of our intuitions and, thereby, are not able to declare our intuitions 
competent judges solely because lots of intelligent people also hold them. It was also 
briefly mentioned above that we cannot introspect our intuitions to find out more 
about them. So what is the content of our intuitions like? How can we find out? And, 
what does that mean for the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being? While 
scientifically explaining the inner workings of our intuitions, Chapter 2 addresses and 
answers these questions at length. 
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Conclusion 
First, this chapter disentangled well-being from other accounts of the good life and 
provided a clear and reasonable definition of hedonism about well-being. Then a 
specific internalist account of hedonism about well-being (Hedonism about Well-
Being) was endorsed. Following this, reasons for why most moral philosophers 
consider Hedonism about Well-Being to be a dead theory were discussed, thereby 
setting the scene for the rest of this essay, which is dedicated to taking steps towards 
reviving the plausibility of Hedonism about Well-Being and which ultimately leads to 
a suggested overhaul of how theories of well-being are evaluated. The argument that 
is currently doing the most damage to Hedonism about Well-Being’s plausibility, the 
Argument from False Pleasures, was discussed. This discussion included the 
introduction of the two champions of the argument, the Experience Machine and the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiments, both of which elicit strong intuitive 
responses.  
 
Following this, how theories of well-being are evaluated by moral philosophers was 
discussed, with reference to the work of Timmons (2006), Kagan (1998) and Griffin 
(1986). The approach moral philosophers take when evaluating theories of well-being 
was then formalised into the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, which 
was explained with a focus on the role intuitions play in the methodology. Finally, the 
role of intuitions, which had been noted throughout this chapter, was discussed in 
more detail. Special attention was paid to discerning what might give our moral 
intuitions the authority of a competent judge, including the possibility of reflective 
equilibrium. However, the reasons to think that our moral intuitions do have such 
authority that were offered by Rachels (2003) and others were found to be 
unsatisfactory, prompting the need for an in-depth investigation into exactly how our 
intuitions work, which is one of the aims of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2:                                               
Towards a Better Understanding of 
Intuitions and the Role They Should Play 





This chapter discusses psychological, neuroscientific and philosophical research on 
intuitions, and moral intuitions in particular, with the goal of providing a clear 
understanding of how our moral intuitions are formed and what that should mean for 
their use in evaluating theories of well-being. First, Woodward and Allman’s (2007) 
account of moral intuitive cognition is explained in detail and corroborated by the 
research of other leaders in the field of cognitive science. Then, this clear 
understanding of how moral intuitions work is used to assess Woodward and 
Allman’s (2007) recommendations for the appropriate use of moral intuitions. One of 
Woodward and Allman’s (2007) recommendations is then adapted into an argument 
for restricting the role of intuitions in evaluating theories of well-being. The 
conclusion of this argument: that intuitions are an unreliable source of evidence for 
evaluating unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments and, therefore, should 
not be used if other types of evidence are available, is then discussed and supported. 
With this argument in mind, the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being is 
then found to be in need of at least slight amendment.  
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The New Method for Assessing Theories of Well-Being is then proposed and 
explained, including a discussion of how it deals with intuitions more appropriately 
than the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being does. This explanation 
includes a guide on how to apply the New Method for Assessing Theories of Well-
Being and is followed by noting its implications for well-being-related thought 
experiments, such as the Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine, and 
theories of well-being in general.  
 
 
How Moral Intuitions Really Work 
In a recent article, James Woodward, a philosopher, and John Allman, a 
neuroscientist, explain what intuitions are and discuss the role they think intuitions 
have had and should have in ethics (2007). They define intuition as a form of 
cognition in which many different data sources are simultaneously evaluated and 
compressed into a simple one-dimensional message that we feel as a visceral 
sensation or gut feeling (Woodward & Allman 2007, p13). It should be noted that 
Woodward and Allman’s (2007) definition of moral intuition differs from that of 
some moral philosophers, who consider moral intuition to be a belief based on 
“careful observation” and “reason” (e.g. Crisp 2002, p71; Lillie 1955; Sidgwick 
1907).34 This description will be rejected in the discussion below and the view of 
moral intuition supported by many psychologists is argued for: a simple moral 
evaluation (from very good to very bad) that appears in the conscious mind without 
any awareness of having deliberated about it (Woodward & Allman 2007; Haidt 2001, 
p818). Woodward and Allman (2007, p5, p24) argue that a better understanding of 
how our intuitive cognition works should make us reject some widely-held views 
about the appropriate uses of intuitions in ethics and guide us to use our intuitions 
more effectively.  
                                                 
34
 That is not to say that our moral intuitions cannot be affected by repeated morally relevant deliberations 
prior to any particular intuition – just that the process by which the intuitions are created is an unconscious 
one. 
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The discussion and examples used by Woodward and Allman (2007) are all focussed 
on the use of intuitions for evaluating normative moral theories generally, as opposed 
to evaluating theories of well-being specifically. However, there is no reason that their 
arguments should carry any less weight when considering theories of well-being. 
Indeed, both normative theories generally, and theories of well-being specifically, 
perform an evaluative function (evaluating actions and lives respectively) that comes 
under the umbrella of intuitive social cognition. This section describes Woodward 
and Allman’s (2007) explanation of intuitions, including a general discussion about 
how the nature of intuitive cognition affects how they can be usefully applied, and 
provides external support for their view from other leaders in the field of cognitive 
science.  
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) provide a neurobiological account of intuitive 
cognition and contrast it with deliberative cognition, which is also widely used in 
ethics. They describe an intuition as the visceral sensation that results from a very 
fast, unconscious and probabilistic processing of many variables in parallel 
(Woodward & Allman 2007, p13) – a definition that is widely accepted in the 
cognitive sciences (Lieberman 2000; Myers 2004). Deliberative thought35 is a much 
slower cognitive process that consciously uses inductive and deductive reasoning on 
very limited numbers of variables at a time (Woodward & Allman 2007, p13; Bruner 
1960). Despite an abundance of studies showing the shortfalls of intuitive cognition 
and how deliberation can correct them,36 both Lieberman (2000, p109) and Sosa 
(2006, p225) note that it is possible for intuitive cognition to outperform deliberation 
in some areas. Indeed, various social interactions are likely candidate situations for 
intuition to have more utility than deliberative thought. For example, when meeting 
someone new at a party we might not be consciously aware of the constant non-
verbal communication (e.g. body language) taking place (Word, Zanna & Cooper 
                                                 
35
 Sometimes known as ‘analytic’ thought (e.g. Bruner 1960). 
36
 For example, Lieberman cites the following: (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 
1994; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert, 1989; Langer, 1989; c.f. Liberman 2000, p109). 
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1974) but we often come away feeling that we liked the person even though they 
supported the wrong football team and did not appreciate the exquisite heavy metal 
music playing in the background. To understand why this is, we must understand 
how intuitions are formed, an understanding that Woodward and Allman (2007) 
believe will lead us to see the types of circumstances in which moral intuitions are 
likely to be useful and those in which they are not. 
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) plausibly hypothesise that moral intuitions are a subset 
of social intuitions because of their similar developmental trajectories and their 
shared neurobiological substrates.37 Intuitive social cognition has been empirically 
studied since at least Valentine’s (1929) study of men and women’s abilities to 
intuitively judge the character of strangers, providing plenty of evidence for more 
recent neurobiological analyses to discover how intuitive judgement actually works. 
Recent findings suggest that, despite our tip-of-the-iceberg conscious mind thinking 
that it is the cognitive ‘be-all-and-end-all’ (Myers 2004), the vast majority of our 
cognition happens without us being aware of it (Bargh & Chartrand 1999).  
 
Unconscious intuitive learning, including intuitive evaluations of people and events, is 
constantly occurring in our brains, especially when we experience novel stimuli 
(Myers 2004).38 When novel stimuli are encountered the brain runs probabilistic 
inference simulations based on the matches between all of its current stimuli and past 
experiences (Woodward & Allman 2007). Part of the simulation process involves the 
reward centre, which produces the message (the visceral sensation or feeling) that we 
become consciously aware of (Craig 2004; Critchley et al. 2004; c.f. Woodward & 
Allman 2007, p17). Presumably, whether the intuition is felt (consciously noticed), 
and how strongly it is felt, is based on the predicted results of the unconscious 
                                                 
37
 As shown by studies such as: Berthoz et al. (2002), de Quervain et al. (2004), Rilling et al. (2002), 
Sanfey et al. (2003), Shin et al. (2000), and Singer et al. (2004a, 2004b) (all c.f. Woodward & Allman 
2007, p14). 
38
 And, Woodward and Allman (2007, p15) cite Critchley et al. (2001), Singer et al. (2004b), Shin et al. 
(2000) and Berthoz et al. (2002) to show the degree of activity in the substrates linked to intuitive social 
cognition increases with the level of uncertainty in a situation. 
Dan Turton                                      Reviving Hedonism about Well-Being                           MA Thesis 2008 
- 46 - 
simulation. We are effectively always performing unconscious pattern recognition by 
monitoring our current environment, comparing it to our archive of experiences, and 
then evaluating the probabilistic forecasts that result. Indeed, the fact that we 
unconsciously process potential future experiences explains many of the visceral 
sensations we experience everyday, such as the uneasy sinking feeling we experience 
as the overly-dramatic music in a cheesy horror movie indicates that a scary shock is 
just around the corner.  
 
When this knowledge about intuitions is applied to the social context described 
above, we discover that, while our conscious mind was picking up relatively useless 
information for friend-evaluating, our intuitive cognition was recording much more 
useful information and doing it much faster. By tracking the stranger’s body position, 
eye movement, vocal tones, facial expressions and other social cues, and 
automatically running them through our probabilistic experience-dependant 
processors, we can very quickly produce a simple but relatively accurate intuition 
about him or her (Zebrowitz & Collins 1997). The accuracy of this intuition will be 
based on the amount and type of our previous experiences with strangers and how 
this particular stranger fits in with those patterns.39  
 
Probabilistic models always experience outliers, but the more data they gather, the 
more accurate their predictions will be (on average and assuming that nothing else 
dramatic happens that would affect all future experiences). This model of implicit 
learning has been experimentally proven to be how intuitive cognition works 
(Lieberman 2000),40 which, according to Woodward and Allman (2007, p20), gives 
good reason to think that moral intuitions also work that way.41 Therefore, we can 
usually expect any intuition we have in situations that we are very experienced in to 
                                                 
39
 Naturally, some people might also be genetically predisposed to be better or worse at certain types of 
pattern recognition or other processes which may affect the accuracy of their intuitions in most cases. 
40
 Lieberman (2000, p110) cites Aslin, Saffran, and Newport (1998), Biederman and Shiffar (1987), 
DeGroot (1965), Lunn (1948), and Saffran, Aslin, and Newport (1996). 
41
 The link between experience and the accuracy of moral intuitions is discussed in more detail below. 
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be more trustworthy than our intuitions in completely novel situations. This also 
explains the intuition had by an experienced fireman, who saved his crew from a 
potentially fatal fiery fall. Klein (1998) describes the story of the lieutenant fireman 
who ordered his crew to flee from a kitchen with a small fire in it. Just after they left, 
the floor collapsed because of a large fire in the basement directly below where they 
were standing (Klein 1998). When asked what prompted his decision to leave the 
kitchen before the fire was out, the experienced lieutenant put it down to intuition 
(Klein 1998). Further questioning then unearthed the actual cues that his intuitive 
cognition had picked up on; that the small fire wasn’t diminishing as quickly as 
expected and that the house was much hotter than the size of the visible fire could 
account for (Klein 1998). Had the experienced lieutenant not been there, the other 
fire-fighters might not have had the same feeling that something was wrong. Or, if 
they did, they might not have felt it strongly enough to warrant ordering a retreat.  
 
Woodward and Allman (2007), and others,42 also state that the intuitive/deliberative 
cognition distinction holds equally between moral intuitions and moral theorising, 
providing a useful way to think about the different ways that we can arrive at moral 
conclusions.43 Therefore, we can expect that our moral intuitions are based on our 
previous experiences of situations involving moral emotions, moral utterances and 
any other morally relevant factors, such as harm or fairness. Woodward and Allman 
(2007) claim that all of the moral data we continuously collect, and unconsciously 
process, enables us to have insightful moral intuitions, although, only in situations 
with which we are familiar. They suggest that our intuitive cognition constantly 
processes our experiences, including morally relevant data, such as the emotional 
                                                 
42
 Greene (in press), Haidt (2001) and Haidt & Greene (2002) cited from (Woodward and Allman 2007, 
p17-18).  
43
 It should be noted, however, that Mikhail (2007) has proposed a different account of how moral 
intuitions work, in which our intuitions are formed by a more deductive, rule-based process. Mikhail’s 
(2007) legalistic account of moral intuition may have some explanatory use but it lacks the neurological 
evidence needed to strengthen its causal-explanatory power, which may explain why it has not proven 
popular yet. Furthermore, even if Mikhail’s (2007) account of moral intuition proves to be an accurate 
causal account, the psychologically embedded fundamental moral rules it posits would only affect our 
moral intuitions and, thereby, our actual moral judgements, how we should judge situations would still be 
up for debate. This is a point that is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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states of ourselves and others, and can warn us if it forecasts that we are likely to 
transgress a moral norm. The warning comes in the form of that all-too-familiar ‘bad 
feeling’, the visceral sensation often associated with the gut that tells our conscious 
mind that something is wrong.  
 
When we are asked to consider a thought experiment and we get that bad feeling in 
our gut, we immediately attribute it to the scenario we are imagining, and rightly so, 
because that is usually the only new stimuli we have just experienced. It would not 
make sense for that intuitive response to be caused by some unchanging stimulus that 
we had already been experiencing for some time. However, as revealed by a better 
understanding of intuitive cognition, just because an intuition is in response to a 
thought experiment does not mean that it is in response to the morally important 
issue ‘isolated’ within it by the experimenter.  
 
The situations described in thought experiments will be matched with the 
participant’s most similar experiences by her intuitive cognition. Therefore, if when 
choosing between flicking switches to save people and pushing a fat man to his death 
to save people, then the pushing option is likely to elicit a more negative intuition. 
This is because the participant’s most similar experiences are about the times she has 
pushed someone. Indeed, this is exactly what Greene et al. (2001) found during an 
experiment in which they used neuroimaging equipment to measure participants’ 
neural activity while they were subjected to problems similar to those just discussed. 
They discovered that the thought of pushing someone activated an emotional part of 
the brain that the thought of flicking a switch did not. This finding helps explain why 
participants seem more reluctant to push someone than to flick a switch to kill them 
(and save five others). It seems safe to assume that most people have implicitly learnt 
that pushing people is likely to cause more negative consequences than switch-
flicking. The pertinent questions here, however, are: how useful are our intuitions for 
evaluating moral thought experiments and real life situations, and, assuming that 
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some are and some are not, how can we discover which of our moral intuitions are 
the useful ones? 
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) argue that our moral intuitions are probably more 
useful than we might think in certain situations, while being less useful in others. 
They claim that the usefulness of a specific intuition in any situation is predominantly 
based on our amount of experience with that type of situation.44 If moral intuitions 
do track morally relevant data in situations, then the probabilistic nature of the 
process that brings them about should make those intuitions more accurate with 
increased exposure to relevant types of situations. An exception to this general rule 
might be if someone continuously acted against their moral intuitions, by continuing 
to murder people say. This would most likely result in them becoming desensitised to 
some extent, resulting in a weaker intuitive response to murder over time (Sanborn 
2003). Exceptions such as this weaken Woodward and Allman’s (2007) thesis about 
the benefits of experience for moral intuitions. However, this is not the only problem 
for the thesis that moral intuitions can be normatively significant.  
 
More importantly, Woodward and Allman’s (2007) findings imply that we may never 
be able to know for sure if any particular intuition about a thought experiment is 
actually of any use. In order to discover the usefulness of our intuitions for this task, 
we need to be sure that the intuition is in response to the moral issue in question and 
that it is responding correctly. Discerning whether an intuition is responding to the 
moral issue that it is supposed to be responding to is mainly dependent on our 
capacity to introspect or reconstruct our moral intuitions. And, discerning whether 
the intuition is responding correctly to the moral issue relies mainly on the various 
biases and restrictions that intuitive cognition is subject to (because of the 
probabilistic process by which it operates). Woodward and Allman (2007) make 
                                                 
44
 Presumably some people and perhaps some kinds of people also have a more reliable intuitive cognition 
than others because of certain skills or characteristics they have. For example, women are widely thought to 
have better intuition than men, which (very generally) seems to be the case in certain kinds of situations. 
Myers (2004 p45-50) and Lieberman (2000, p126) survey the literature on men’s and women’s intuition. 
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several claims related to the usefulness of moral intuitions for evaluating thought 
experiments. They claim that many factors can bias our intuitions, making them 
erroneous, that effective introspection of moral intuitions is “implausible” (2007, 
p25), that reconstruction of our intuitions will provide “at best limited insight” (2007, 
p24) and that, despite all of this, some moral intuitions could contain “useful 
information” and be “normatively defensible” (2007, p24). Their argument for each 
claim is explained and evaluated in detail below. 
 
Woodward and Allman’s (2007) assertion that various factors make some of our 
intuitions erroneous is undoubtedly correct. Indeed, many authors have written on 
the pitfalls of intuitive cognition, citing screeds of anecdotal and experimental 
evidence. Even supporters of the uses of intuitive cognition point to anecdotal 
evidence that they have their limitations. For example, Philip Goldberg has astutely 
noted that we never hear anyone ask: “give me one good feeling why you think John is 
wrong” (1983, p18).45 A recent experiment by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006, p476-
477) provides compelling evidence that our mood affects the moral judgements that 
we make without us being consciously aware of it, revealing the fickle nature of our 
moral intuitions. Myers (2004, p128) provides a more compelling body of empirical 
literature evidencing the perils of intuitive cognition, which he summarises as: 
“intuition’s dozen deadly sins”. Importantly, these ‘deadly sins’ include intuiting 
relationships where they don’t exist, intuitions being altered by various unrelated 
framing effects, intuitions being less sensitive to disconfirmations than they should be 
and our intuitions being highly self-serving. All of these factors could cause an 
intuition to become useless for moral purposes, as shown below.  
 
First, consider the sin of intuiting a relationship bias that does not actually exist. For 
example, if our intuition about the morality of an action performed by a black-
                                                 
45
 His italics. 
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skinned person was based on a racist bias,46 instead of on the action itself, then the 
intuition would be useless (Kagan 1998, p14).47 Regarding framing effects, 
philosophers’ worries about the effects of wording and ordering of thought 
experiments on moral intuitions (e.g. Fischer & Ravizza 1991; c.f. Petrinovich & 
O’Neill 1996, p147) appear to be valid. Petrinovich and O’Neill’s (1996) study found 
considerable framing effects from both wording and ordering in simple ethical 
thought experiments.48 On intuitive resistance to disconfirmations, Myers (2004, 
p115-119) reports on several studies that show how experiences that disconfirm our 
established intuitions do not always weaken them, which explains why some people 
blame individuals for moral transgressions despite being exposed to evidence that 
various societal issues are really the cause (Gans 1988; c.f. Sasson 1995, p7). Now, 
consider self-serving bias: the phenomena that explains why practically everyone 
(even social psychologists who are well aware of this bias)49 view themselves as more 
moral than the average person, despite that being mathematically impossible (Myers 
2004, p95). If our intuitions about how moral we are are often erroneous, then we 
have good reason to believe that our intuitions about any moral matter in which we 
are involved might also be misguided. It is clear that our moral intuitions can be 
distorted by these biases and probably others as well, providing good reason to 
believe that some intuitions are very unreliable for evaluating moral situations and 
thought experiments.  
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) also stress that it is impossible to introspect our 
intuitions – to gain any information about what is causing them by merely ‘peering’ 
into them. The fact that our intuitions do not come ‘labelled’ in any sense (even when 
we ‘look closer’) goes against the folk conception and the view of some philosophers 
                                                 
46
 “White Americans tend to conflate criminality with blackness” (Sasson 1995, p 6), despite the fact that it 
is impossible for ‘blackness’ to cause crimes. 
47
  See Dasgupta et al. (2000) on the extent of race-related bias. 
48
 It should be noted that Petrinovich and O’Neill (1996) also stress that framing effects can vary greatly 
depending on the context, an area that they think requires more research before any across the board 
generalisations about framing affects can be made. 
49
 (van Lange, Taris & Vonk 1997) 
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on intuitions, despite being considered canonical by psychologists.50 Various 
experiments, such as one performed by Lewicki (1986), reveal why psychologists are 
decided on the issue. Lewicki (1986) showed several photographs of people to 
participants, while informing them about the character of each. Lewicki then showed 
the participants further photographs and asked them to describe the characters of the 
people depicted. Despite the participants not knowing that Lewicki had correlated all 
of the types of characters with the hair length in each photograph, the participants 
generally identified the correct character type fairly successfully through implicit 
learning. However, when asked to reflect on their intuitive responses, the participants 
erroneously claimed that non-relevant features, such as the portrayed people’s eyes, 
were the cause of their judgement. If intuitions were introspectible, then the 
participants in Lewicki’s study would have answered along the lines of: ‘I know it 
doesn’t make sense, but that person’s hair makes me feel like they’re nasty!’  
 
Similar results can be found with respect to moral intuitions. Jonathan Haidt (2001) 
reports on an experiment that he conducted with his colleagues51 in which 
participants were asked if they felt incest to be morally permissible if birth control 
was used and nobody was harmed. Most participants immediately said that incest is 
wrong, even in those circumstances. However, when pushed to justify their moral 
judgement, most participants could not satisfactorily do so (Haidt 2001, p814). These 
participants had a definite moral intuition about the hypothetical incest case but they 
could not say what caused it. This is a predicament Haidt and colleagues termed 
‘moral dumbfounding’ (Haidt 2001, p817), which could not occur if our moral 
intuitions are in fact accessible to introspection.52 Since our moral intuitions (just like 
                                                 
50
 For example: Bastick (1982), Clinchy (1975), Griffin and Ross (1991), Hagafors and Brehmer (1983), 
Smith and DeCoster (1999) (all cited from Lieberman 2000, p110). 
51
 Documented in an unpublished study: (Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy 2000; c.f. Haidt 2001). 
52
 Presumably, some participants provided justifications for their moral judgement against incest, such as 
‘God deems it so’, which they perceived as entirely plausible. However, the purpose of Haidt’s (2001) 
article is to provide good reason to believe that those justifications are nothing more than post hoc 
confabulations that were not the cause of the moral intuition. Therefore, while we may attempt “careful 
observation” of our moral intuitions as Sidgwick recommends (c.f. Crisp 2002), the result of such 
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all of our intuitions) do not, themselves, provide any information about what caused 
them, we cannot discover through introspection whether they are reacting to a 
specific moral stimuli or a morally-irrelevant bias, such as those discussed above.  
 
Due to the various biases of intuitive cognition and the fact that we cannot introspect 
our intuitions for more information, Woodward and Allman (2007, p24) are also 
sceptical about the possibility of reliably reconstructing our moral intuitions. In 
Klein’s (1998) fire-fighter example, the experienced lieutenant’s negative intuition 
about the situation can be reconstructed to show, from the ground up, its likely 
causes. The abnormally warm room and unusually resistant fire were plausible causes 
of the experienced lieutenant’s intuition to flee the kitchen. If the warm room and the 
resistant fire amount to a complete and rational explanation of the intuition, and in 
the absence of any rationally compelling competing hypotheses, then perhaps this 
particular reconstruction tells us that the intuition plausibly reflected the unconscious 
processing of those cues. This would indicate that the experienced lieutenant’s 
intuition probably tracked the relevant features of the situation and interpreted them 
correctly, making that intuition very useful! The fact that the cues in this case were 
physical realities that could be reliably corroborated after the fact, allows us to be 
fairly confident about this reconstruction, although, because there is no direct 
measurable link from the cues to the intuition, we can still never be totally sure.53  
 
However, when attempting to find the possible cues with which to reconstruct moral 
intuitions, we often have no physical realities that we know to be relevant, as in 
Haidt’s (2001) incest case. In fact, we have to propose possible moral justifications 
(moral principles, such as ‘incest is always wrong’)54 in an attempt to explain the 
intuitions, which is problematic because normative ethicists use those moral 
                                                                                                                                                 
introspection should not be dubbed ‘moral intuition’. Rather, moral confabulation seems to better fit the 
bill. 
53
 This point is explained in more detail in the paragraph directly below. 
54
 The, perhaps, more apparent moral principle of ‘it is wrong to procreate in a manner that is more likely to 
create a deformed child’ is ruled out in Haidt’s case by stipulations in the thought experiment. 
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intuitions to evaluate moral principles.55 Any attempt to reconstruct a particular case 
will involve assuming that the individual concerned has a particular implicitly learned 
moral heuristic. And, that is a big assumption! Just because a moral principle could 
explain a moral intuition in one situation does not mean that other moral principles 
could not also explain that intuition while simultaneously disconfirming a moral 
intuition about another situation that the first moral principle endorses. Such a result, 
two examples of which are given in Chapter 3, casts considerable doubt on the 
existence of specific moral heuristics. Therefore, attempts at one-off reconstruction 
of moral intuitions are subject to a vicious chicken and egg problem, which makes it 
very difficult to reconstruct a moral intuition without heavily biasing the outcome. 
Indeed, we can rightly ask: do we actually have unconscious but firmly believed moral 
principles that cause our moral intuitions or do we just judge that various moral 
principles happen to cohere with our moral intuitions in specific cases? In order to 
answer this question, not only would a wide range of moral situations need to be 
investigated, each situation would have to also be subject to multiple minor variations 
to see what kind of moral heuristic or principle, if any, was being consistently and 
unconsciously applied. This kind of investigation would be a large project but one 
that has nevertheless been begun by moral psychologists. 
 
Naturally, it is possible that moral intuitions are in fact caused by one or more 
implicitly learned heuristics that might be very similar in form to moral principles. 
Studies by moral psychologists attempting to discern the causal mechanisms of moral 
intuitions are starting to be published (e.g. Cushman, Young & Hauser 2006; Haidt & 
Joseph 2007; Hauser et al. 2007). However, the results are only statistical inferences 
(which, in individual cases, are limited to providing likely causes) and are based on 
some a priori assumptions about the moral and non-moral differences in abstract 
thought experiments. Essentially, the authors of these studies, just like many moral 
                                                 
55
 As discussed earlier, in Chapter 1. 
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philosophers,56 seem to assume that their sparse thought experiments (which are 
supposedly only differentiated by the moral issue in question) are engaged with 
literally. Unfortunately, any normally functioning person will engage in some sort of 
intuitive cognising when they imagine a thought experiment, which is likely to result 
in them experiencing an intuition about it that was probably not the result of having 
followed all of the stipulations in the thought experiment entirely literally.  
 
Recall the discussion from above, which explained why most experimental 
participants had the intuition that pushing a fat man to kill him and save five others 
was morally wrong while they deemed flicking a switch to kill him and save five 
others as at least morally permissible. It seems that the participants’ unconscious 
processing of the scenario involved probabilistic inferences about other likely 
consequences of pushing the man to his death. Consequences such as the usual 
responses of others to such purposefully-harmful actions that the participants have 
experienced in the past. Unbeknownst to the participants, their intuitive cognition 
probably filled in the ‘meat’ of this ‘bare-bones’ thought experiment, making it more 
realistic but producing an intuition based on more than just its literal components 
(which had been specifically chosen to isolate the moral issue). It is this facet of our 
intuitive cognition that makes it the most difficult to reconstruct moral intuitions 
because even if we experimentally isolate the moral issue, we cannot prevent our 
unconscious mind from processing the thought experiments in the context of screeds 
of other trivially related experiences.57  
 
It seems like the only way to avoid this subconscious adding of irrelevant information 
would be to do extensive real-time neurological and psychological testing on 
                                                 
56
 For example, any thought experiment mentioning a ‘trolley bus’ and “Judith Thomson’s (1971) case of 
spores that become attached to furniture and grow into people, Michael Tooley’s (1972) example of pills 
that turn kittens into human babies, and so on” (c.f. Woodward & Allman 2007, p24). 
57
 Indeed, I wonder whether ‘context-free’ moral dilemmas, such as ‘is it better for 3 people to die than 4?’, 
elicit no intuitive response at all, leaving deliberative cognition to produce a purely reason-based moral 
judgement about the benefits of 4 lives over 3. 
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participants that were performing immoral and morally suspect tasks. However, this 
avenue of research is unlikely to get the chance to help because of the existing moral 
beliefs of university human ethics committees. Furthermore, recall the benefits 
experience provides for intuitive cognition, discussed above. Even if having lots of 
experience with a particular moral issue does not in fact make our moral intuitions 
any more reliable, having no experience with a moral issue or anything even vaguely 
similar will certainly make the intuition much less reliable. If any supposedly morally 
important feature of a thought experiment was completely novel to a participant, 
then any intuitive response of that participant may not have taken that feature into 
account, due to an inability to match it to any prior experience. Alternatively, the 
participants’ intuitive cognition could have incorrectly coded the feature by matching 
it to a similar, but morally irrelevant, past experience. A good example of this 
occurrence is discussed in Chapter 3 during the analysis of the intuitive evidence 
supposedly provided by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment. All things 
considered then, even if we attempted to control for identifiable biases, without the 
benefits of introspection or dramatic (and theoretically unlikely) advances in 
neuroscience, we will never be sure that our attempt to reconstruct a moral intuition 
has been successful. 
 
So, it seems that there are plenty of good reasons to conclude, as Woodward and 
Allman (2007) do, that intuitions are not accessible via direct introspection, that they 
are very unlikely to be able to be reconstructed in a reliable way, and that they are 
susceptible to various biases that would make them inappropriate to use when 
evaluating unrealistic thought experiments. However, Woodward and Allman (2007, 
p24) also claimed that moral intuitions caused by experiments can be useful and, 
therefore, “normatively defensible”. They correctly point out that, despite all of the 
problems with intuitions discussed above, any moral intuition could be responding to 
the morally relevant feature (and nothing else) in a thought experiment. Furthermore, 
Woodward and Allman (2007) point out the widely-reported powers of intuitive 
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cognition and particularly social intuitions58 in certain situations. Indeed, they claim 
that moral intuitions could usefully reflect morally relevant information about a 
situation and that they probably do in certain conditions.  
 
In the event of these conditions (complexity and relevant experience – discussed in 
more detail below) pertaining, Woodward and Allman (2007) believe that moral 
intuitions can be usefully used in combination with reason to evaluate thought 
experiments or various other situations. Indeed, they aver it would be wasteful to 
totally disregard intuitions about the right kind of moral situations because of the 
often-hidden powers of intuitive moral cognition, particularly the power to process 
many variables simultaneously and consider relevant issues that had not necessarily 
been disclosed to the conscious mind. Hence, Woodward and Allman (2007, p27) 
state that the normative significance of moral intuitions will have to be identified on a 
case-by-case basis and is entirely dependant on the presence of the relevant 
conditions. Based on the implications of these findings, Woodward and Allman 
(2007) provide some general advice for when we should and should not use intuitions 
to help evaluate moral situations and thought experiments, correlating with how 
appropriate they consider the intuitions to be in various types of cases. Their advice is 
discussed and expanded on below. 
 
 
Recommendations for the Use of Intuitions in Evaluating 
Theories of Well-Being 
This section discusses and then expands upon the implications of Woodward and 
Allman’s (2007) findings about intuitions as they see them. First, Woodward and 
Allman’s (2007) warnings of when not to use intuitions in moral theorising are 
discussed. The warnings are followed by Woodward and Allman’s (2007) 
recommendations for appropriate use of moral intuitions. These recommendations 
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 As confirmed by a wealth of studies presented by Myers (2004, chap 2). 
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are then incorporated into a formal argument for reducing the role of intuitive 
evidence from unrealistic thought experiments in evaluating theories of well-being.  
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) stress two main ways in which they consider intuitions 
to be misused by moral philosophers: relying solely on moral intuitions to evaluate 
thought experiments and using moral intuitions to help evaluate unrealistic thought 
experiments. Woodward and Allman (2007) advise that relying solely on moral 
intuitions to evaluate thought experiments is a bad idea because it is likely to produce 
a result heavily marred by the many potential biases intuitions are subject to. This 
recommendation seems fair. However, because such an approach is rare when 
evaluating theories of well-being, it will not be discussed further in this essay.  
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) also advise against the use of intuitions to help 
evaluate unrealistic thought experiments because intuitive cognition generally 
processes them unreliably. Ethics courses and articles are riddled with extraordinary 
thought experiments, some so unrealistic and bizarre that one wonders how they 
were ever concocted in the first place. Woodward and Allman (2007, p24) cite Judith 
Thomson’s (1971) scenario of spores attaching to furniture and becoming people and 
Michael Tooley’s (1972) example of pills that can transform kittens into human 
babies as quintessential examples of thought experiments that are so unlikely that 
they verge on the impossible. Woodward and Allman’s (2007) problem with 
extraordinary scenarios like these is that no one has ever experienced anything like 
the relevant parts of them and so our intuitive cognition has very little to go on when 
processing them. As discussed above, any intuitive response that we draw from them 
is likely to be based on the few supposedly morally irrelevant features that we are 
actually familiar with, such as the nuisance of mould on furniture.  
 
Thought experiments can also be unrealistic in the way that they ask us to imagine 
implausible features of situations with which we may be much more familiar. For 
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example, Bernard William’s (1973, p221-222) Jim in the Jungle thought experiment 
asks us to imagine that the evil Pedro and his troops will kill twenty villagers unless 
Jim the hapless explorer kills one of them. The implausible features of this thought 
experiment are that it expects us to: completely rule out any alternative to the two 
options provided by Pedro, to believe Pedro (the crazy bad guy) is totally true to his 
word, and to disregard the non-immediate future implications of our choice.59 The 
only way most of us can relate to this scenario is vicariously, through the actions of 
characters like John Rambo. And, let’s face it, unlike wimpy Jim, Rambo would have 
disarmed Pedro, incapacitated a dozen of his troops and gotten the villagers to safety 
(all while incurring only several minor bullet wounds). As discussed above, our 
intuitive cognition cannot always follow word-for-word the stipulated rules of 
thought experiments, such as disallowing heroics. Our intuitive cognition 
unconsciously matches what it can from the thought experiment to our past 
experiences noting any correlations that arise, regardless of whether or not those 
experiences lay outside of the scope of the unrealistic stipulations of the scenario. 
 
Woodward and Allman’s (2007) well-reasoned admonition of the use of intuitions to 
evaluate unrealistic thought experiments is an important one because not only does it 
bring the findings of many moral philosophers into doubt, it also challenges the 
methodology currently used by psychologists who are trying to unlock the secrets of 
moral intuition. Hauser and colleagues (2007, p3) followed the lead of a procession of 
researchers60 who stick to “artificial dilemmas as opposed to real world cases”, citing 
reasons that the discussion above refutes. They believe that artificial cases eliminate 
bias because participants will have “no familiarity with or personal attachment to” the 
details of the case (Hauser et al. 2007, p4). While they are right to assert that certain 
group-based biases can be eliminated by having only anonymous characters in 
                                                 
59
 Interestingly, Williams (1973, p221) is aware of the difficulties of using thought experiments, such as 
those discussed in the body text, but he considers sufficiently-detailed scenarios to be able to at least point 
to potential problems.  
60
 (O’Neill & Petrinovich 1998; Petrinovich, O’Neill & Jorgensen 1993; Mikhail et al. 1998; Greene et al. 
2001; Greene et al. 2004; c.f. Hauser et al. 2007, p3). 
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thought experiments (Hauser et al. 2007, p4), this could also be achieved in realistic 
scenarios through better sampling techniques. The real problem here is participants’ 
lack of familiarity with the general details of the case, which stretches the capabilities 
of their intuitive cognition to the point where the probabilistic processing will draw in 
irrelevant but nevertheless correlated experiences.  
 
Furthermore, Hauser and colleagues (2007, p4) claim that the artificiality of the 
scenarios allows them to change one of the few extant features to isolate morally 
important issues. This claim is based on a poor understanding of intuitive cognition. 
Recall the discussion above, which explained how our intuitive cognition implicitly 
adds ‘meat’ to ‘bare bones’ thought experiments based on our past experiences. So, 
while Hauser and the other experimenters might think they are isolating particular 
features, they might actually be tapping in to a new set of details that the participants’ 
intuitive processes now deem relevant. If faced with this admonition, these authors 
would likely demand to know in what situations Woodward and Allman would 
propose that moral intuitions are appropriate to use.61 
 
Woodward and Allman’s (2007) recommendations for when moral intuitions should 
be used are based on the relevant experience of the participant, and the complexity of 
the scenario, in question. Based on the accuracy advantages that implicit learning 
gleans from relevant experience, Woodward and Allman (2007) conclude that the 
moral intuitions of people with similar experience to a hypothesised scenario will be 
much more useful for evaluating it than the intuitions of other, less-experienced, 
people. Just as Klein’s (1998) experienced fire-fighter had a useful intuition that his 
less-experienced colleagues did not, Woodward and Allman (2007) suggest that 
people with first-hand experience of torture would have more useful intuitions about 
it than the top generals and politicians who have only read the odd report about it. 
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 Other advice might be to use neuroimaging and self-reports on participants in real-life situations that 
were easy to replicate with high fidelity. This is a technique similar to one already attempted by Montague 
et al. (2002) and is recommended by Casebeer and Churchland (2003) and hinted at in Casebeer (2003). 
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Interestingly, this claim of Woodward and Allman (2007) implies that there could be 
‘moral experts’, with lots of experience in specific moral issues, whose intuitions 
could be particularly normatively significant in their specialised area. It is not clear 
that this particular conclusion of Woodward and Allman’s (2007) is correct, especially 
in situations where desensitisation to immoral acts due to repeated exposure to them 
might occur (Sanborn 2003). Indeed, more research on this issue would be fruitful. 
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) also aver that the more complex the scenario under 
evaluation is, the more useful our intuitive responses will be. They base this claim on 
the distinctively different capabilities of intuitive moral cognition and moral 
reasoning, or deliberation, discussed above. Moral reasoning is a deliberative 
cognitive process that can only process a few variables at a time. This makes it 
incredibly slow at processing large amounts of data because it has to find a way to 
amalgamate and order the variables to be able to take them all into account at once 
(Lieberman 2000). Intuitive moral cognition, on the other hand, has much more 
‘brain power’ at its disposal (Myers 2004), allowing it to process large quantities of 
data in parallel and integrate them into a simple felt judgement very quickly 
(Djiksterhuis et al. 2006). Woodward and Allman (2007) point out that reality’s natural 
combination of complexity and being commonly experienced makes it the prime 
candidate situation for our moral intuitions to have normative significance. 
Presumably, Woodward and Allman would also confer normative significance to the 
intuitions relevantly experienced participants have about realistic thought 
experiments. If Woodward and Allman’s (2007) conclusions about more and less 
appropriate uses of intuitions when evaluating thought experiments are correct, then 
the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being (discussed in Chapter 1), seems 
in need of at least minor amendment. 
 
The most pertinent conclusion from Woodward and Allman’s (2007) research for 
evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being is that intuitions about unrealistic thought 
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experiments are likely to be unreliable; a conclusion that will now be adapted to show 
that the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being is definitely in need of at 
least minor amendment. The following argument draws heavily on the discussion 
above, and provides well-being specific examples, to make a very strong case in 
support of the conclusion that intuitions about unrealistic well-being-related thought 
experiments are unreliable and should only be used when no other reliable form of 
evidence is available.62  
P1) Intuitions about unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments are often 
misleading. 
P2) There is no reliable method for knowing when intuitions about unrealistic well-
being-related thought experiments are or are not misleading. 
P3) If some form of evidence is often misleading and there is no reliable method for 
knowing when that form of evidence is or is not misleading, then that form of 
evidence is unreliable and should only be used when no other reliable form of  
 evidence is available. 
c) Therefore, intuitions about unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments are 
unreliable and should only be used when no other reliable form of evidence is 
available. 
 
In support of Premise 1, the considerable evidence that intuitions can be misleading 
because of the influence of one or more unconscious bias that was discussed above 
also applies to intuitions about unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments. 
These biases can make our intuitive judgements of unrealistic thought experiments 
misleading in several ways. Our intuition may not be in response to the morally-
relevant aspect of the thought experiment; it might be in response to something not 
stipulated, or it might even be in response to something specifically stipulated against 
in the thought experiment. Perhaps most commonly, though, our intuition will be in 
response to the morally-relevant aspect of the thought experiment and other aspects 
that are considered irrelevant, but which might have even more impact on the 
intuition than the relevant aspect. Furthermore, even when our intuitions are in 
response to the morally-relevant aspect of an unrealistic thought experiment, and 
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 While the argument is worded to specifically relate to theories of well-being, it could easily be amended 
to reach a similar conclusion for moral theorising generally. 
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only or at least mainly that aspect, they still might be responding in a misleading way 
because of any number of these duplicitous implicitly learned biases.  
 
Despite the great care exercised by some moral philosophers in creating their thought 
experiments, the intuitions they elicit could be in response to some other supposedly 
irrelevant aspect of the scenario, as opposed to the particular aspect that they have 
attempted to isolate. These types of unreliable responses can occur because of our 
unconscious processing of irrelevant or non-existent aspects of thought experiments; 
the adding-meat-to-bare-bones feature of intuitive cognition discussed above. 
Presumably, Woodward and Allman (2007) would want to add at this point that 
having more experience relevant to the particular thought experiment would help to 
decrease the incidence of these types of bias. And, while it could be true that a 
relevantly experienced participant would have less misleading intuitions, it really 
depends on how realistic the scenario is and any a priori assumptions that are made 
regarding what is relevant. 
 
Although it may be the case that our intuitions are not in response to the morally-
relevant features of unrealistic thought experiments, a more likely occurrence would 
be that our intuitions are in response to the morally-relevant features and other 
features as well. The main problem that arises from this is that the non-relevant 
features might have more emotional salience than, and therefore override, the 
relevant ones. The importance of emotions in moral judgement has been stressed by 
Haidt (2001), who has clearly demonstrated that our moral judgements are very much 
affected by our implicitly learned and emotionally mediated social attitudes.63 Indeed, 
using neuroimaging technology Greene et al. (2004) found that moral judgements 
made about emotionally salient thought experiments were quite different from those 
that did not engage emotional processing. The emotional salience problem is 
exasperated by the way that intuitive cognition processes thought experiments. 
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 Although, there is still debate about whether the emotional aspect of moral judgements is a hindrance or 
not (Sinnot-Armstrong 2006; Woodward & Allman 2007). 
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Intuitive cognition’s adding in of subjectively-experienced features to get a better 
handle on the bare bones of sterile and unrealistic thought experiments can lead to 
the intruding features drawing attention away from the morally-relevant ones because 
they can be emotionally distracting. One example of how our intuitive cognition adds 
information in this way is by attributing various implicitly learned type characteristics 
to tokens that we unconsciously associate with that type, despite not being able to 
consciously perceive any signifiers with which to categorise it (Castelli et al. 2004).  
 
Furthermore, any intuition based on contemplation of a single thought experiment 
(as opposed to comparing multiple thought experiments) could be subject to various 
emotion-affecting biases that make our intuitions more positive or negative than they 
would otherwise be. Indeed, if participants had been exposed to a negative mood-
affecting stimulus that was too subtle to be consciously noticed, then that stimulus 
can make any evaluative intuition that they have more negative than it would have 
otherwise been (Myers 2004, p26-27). For example, graduate students’ evaluation of 
their own work was more negative after being unconsciously exposed to a picture of 
their supervisor making an angry face (Murphy & Zajonc 1993) and participants rated 
people as nicer after being unconsciously exposed to pictures of kittens and nastier 
after being unconsciously exposed to pictures of dead people (Krosnick et al. 1992) or 
the word ‘hostile’ (Higgins, Rholes & Jones 1977). Since our evaluative intuitions are 
so easily primed by uncontrollable factors and our intuitions can be swayed by 
intruding emotionally salient past experiences, even if our intuitions are partially in 
response to the morally relevant aspect of a thought experiment, they may well still be 
misleading. 
 
It must also be considered possible that our intuitions are responding to the morally-
relevant aspect of the unrealistic thought experiment and only that aspect, or at least 
mainly that aspect. However, any such intuition may still be misleading because of 
how some implicitly learned and morally irrelevant biases affect the way the morally 
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relevant factor could be unconsciously processed. Although they do not wield 
neuroscientific evidence, prominent ethicists, such as Bentham (1789), Singer (1974) 
and Unger (1996),64 stress that our moral intuitions about particular scenarios are 
consistently self-serving or based on obsolete social practises that had once conferred 
some reproductive or survival benefits onto our ancestors (c.f. Woodward & Allman 
2007, p3).  
 
Two biases of particular concern for evaluative intuitions about well-being are 
familiarity and self-serving biases, as they tend to make us evaluate the kinds of lives 
we know and have experienced more positively than they might deserve. Myers 
(2004, p39-40) summarises the research on familiarity bias (a type of status quo bias), 
noting that repeated exposure to numerous stimuli, from Chinese characters to 
people, made participants’ evaluations of them more positive.65 Myers (2004, p40) 
astutely considers the familiarity bias to have a good evolutionary explanation in that 
familiar things are safe (they have allowed us to survive and perhaps reproduce so far) 
and what we are not familiar with could be dangerous and impair our evolutionary 
fitness. Applying familiarity bias to thought experiments about well-being, it is clear 
that any lives that are markedly different from ours, such as Socrates’ Oyster 
Example66 (in which readers are required to imagine that they are an oyster),67 will 
have an intuitive disadvantage when compared to a life more like our own.  
 
The well-documented implicit self-serving bias has also been implicated in many 
studies that report our various evaluative biases (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Steele, 
1988; c.f. Jones et al. 2002). For example, we are much more inclined to prefer 
partners (Pelham et. 2001), professions, and places to live (Pelham, Mirenberg, & 
Jones 2002) that have the same first letter of their name as we do, although we are 
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 It should be noted that Unger (1996) thinks that he can avoid this problem by using further thought 
experiments to expose these biases. However, it is not clear exactly how a positive result could ever arise 
from this approach. 
65
 Myers (2004 p39-40, 257) cites two comprehensive reviews of the literature (Bornstein 1989; 1999). 
66
 (c.f. Plato in Philebus, ii. p353). 
67
 This example is explained in more detail in the next section. 
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not consciously aware of this preference.68 This preference for things with similar 
names to ourselves has been dubbed “implicit egotism” (Pelham, Mirenberg, & Jones 
2002) because it is thought to stem from an evolutionarily advantageous positivity 
about the self that leads to, amongst other things, more successful interactions with 
others and better health (Buss 2000; Myers 1992). This phenomenon explains why 
Philip Petit is enjoying his dream job as a professor of philosophy and political theory 
at Princeton69 and Paul and Patricia Churchland are happily married philosophers at 
the University of California at San Diego.70  
 
The implication of this bias for thought experiments about well-being is that we are 
likely to have biased intuitions about at least the names of any characters, places or 
professions that they contain and, unfortunately, substituting numbers would not 
help because a similar bias exists for the numbers of our birthdays (Kitayama & 
Karasawa 1997)! Indeed Garner’s (2005) study showed that participants reported 
increased ability to relate to and liking of characters in scenarios that had similar 
names to themselves. Therefore, any Olivias or Olivers pondering Socrates’ Oyster 
Example (c.f. Plato in Philebus, ii. p353), might be less resistant to the oyster’s life 
than Johns and Julies. Consider also Mill’s (1861) assertion that opera contributes to 
one’s well-being in a more valuable way than pushpin and Aristotle’s claim that 
philosophising is the pinnacle of human flourishing.71 Both of these philosophers 
appear to have been suffering from a heavy bout of self-serving bias when they made 
these self-affirming claims. While the evidence above makes it is clear that many 
biases can make our intuitions misleading, the problem is considerably compounded 
because we cannot know for sure whether or how much they are misleading, as 
discussed below. 
                                                 
68
 It should be noted that this name letter bias is most likely over and above any mere familiarity bias 
(Nuttin 1987; Hoorens & Nuttin 1993; Pelham, Mirenberg & Jones 2002) and is more likely to be related to 
identity and the self-serving bias (McGuire & McGuire 1981). 
69
 Information on Philip Petit retrieved from his Princeton homepage on 5/02/2008 
(http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/). 
70
 Information on the Churchlands from a New Yorker article by Larissa MacFarquhar, accessed on 
5/02/2008 and available from: (http://www.scribd.com/doc/3113/Paul-and-Patricia-Churchland-Profile) 
71
 Nicomachean Ethics. 
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In defense of Premise 2, as discussed above, intuitions cannot be introspected or 
reliably reconstructed, which means that there is no reliable method for knowing 
when intuitions about unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments have been 
mislead by one or more of the biases mentioned above. Even in realistic scenarios, 
about which Woodward and Allman (2007) maintain that our relevantly-experienced 
moral intuitions could have normative significance, we cannot know if our intuitions 
are misleading because of their being influenced by irrelevant biases. For instance, if I 
were to compare my life with that of a friend, I might consider my life to be better 
for me than his life is for him. However, despite this being a very realistic case and 
one that I have ample relevant experience of, I could never know if my intuitive 
evaluation was made misleading because of familiarity or self-serving biases. 
Introspecting my intuition would reveal nothing and attempting to reconstruct it 
would be unfruitful. For example, attempting a reconstruction, I could suggest to 
myself that my higher relative evaluation of my own life was based on my friend 
being recently divorced. Upon considering my friend’s life and then considering the 
concept ‘divorce’ one after the other, I might find that my moderately negative 
intuitive response was the same to each. Unfortunately, however, this correlation 
does not necessarily imply that it was my friend’s divorce that was the main cause of 
my intuition about his life. Furthermore, this correlation might be wholly 
inappropriate because my friend might consider his divorce as amongst the most 
well-being-enhancing things that had ever happened to him.  
 
Well-being is a subjective phenomenon such that, when we attempt a reconstruction 
from the outside, it is difficult not to import various biases and assumptions that 
corrupt the process. Even when experimenters attempt to isolate various features of 
scenarios in multiple control groups, the participants’ intuitive cognition will most 
likely add implicitly learned attitudes from their subjective experiences to the 
scenario, making the isolation of certain aspects very difficult. Furthermore, even 
reconstruction of our intuitions about our own well-being requires that our conscious 
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mind can reliably remember, interpret and forecast our happiness, which is simply 
not the case, as discussed at length by several leading cognitive scientists (Gilbert 
2006, Haidt 2006; Loewenstein & Schkade 1999). Indeed, the dogged pursuit of 
wealth by the majority of society, despite its minimal impact on their happiness 
(Hamilton 2003; Layard 2005) is amongst the best evidence to believe Gilbert’s 
(2006) claim that we are not nearly as good as we think we are at predicting what will 
make us happy. The evidence discussed earlier and directly above, clearly shows that 
we cannot introspect or reliably reconstruct our intuitions, which is a considerable 
obstacle to our intuitions being useful for evaluating unrealistic well-being-related 
thought experiments. 
 
While premise 3 of the argument (repeated below for convenience) might seem 
innocuous, Woodward and Allman (2007) appear to disagree. They admit that moral 
intuitions can be misleading and that there is no reliable method for knowing if they 
are misleading or not. However, Woodward and Allman (2007) claim that the moral 
intuitions of relevantly-experienced people about realistic scenarios can be 
normatively significant to use with any other relevant form of evidence because they 
might be accessing information that would otherwise be unavailable. When 
Woodward and Allman (2007) provide more detail about how such an unreliable 
phenomenon as moral intuition can have normative significance, they point to 
intuitive cognition’s sensitivity to the multiplicity of potential short and long-term 
consequences, something our more-cumbersome deliberative cognition cannot easily 
imitate.  
P3) If some form of evidence is often misleading and there is no reliable method for 
knowing when that form of evidence is or is not misleading, then that form of 
evidence is unreliable and should only be used when no other reliable form of 
evidence is available. 
 
Woodward and Allman (2007) are right about intuitive cognition having some design 
features that are better suited to processing very realistic and complex scenarios than 
standard deliberative cognition. However, intuitive cognition’s advantages can be 
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adequately emulated by the deliberative cognition of a moral philosopher taking full 
advantage of the resources available to her: by reasoning with others about potential 
consequences, writing down all of the relevant information and perhaps even running 
it through a computer programme. A moral philosopher’s ability to take the time to 
research and reason about a well-being-related thought experiment means that their 
intuition on the scenario is unlikely to be able to offer any privileged information that 
is relevant to the evaluation. Our intuitive cognition may always be faster than our 
deliberative efforts, but it is unlikely to be as reliable because of the many implicit 
biases intuitive cognition inadvertently incorporates. Indeed, just as a good researcher 
would not rely on the unverifiable testimony of a disreputable source (for fear of 
misinformation) if there was anything else to go on, a good moral philosopher should 
not rely on her immediate intuition about a thought experiment if she has the time to 
produce a well-reasoned judgement about it. Therefore, while it might be wise to at 
least partially rely on intuitions in current real life situations, the ample time and other 
resources available to moral philosophers makes their evaluations of unrealistic well-
being-related thought experiments an entirely different matter, one where moral 
intuitions are unreliable and certainly not the only form of evidence available.  
 
The conclusion of the argument follows deductively from the premises above. 
Naturally, the claim the conclusion makes (that intuitions about unrealistic well-
being-related thought experiments are unreliable and should only be used when no 
other reliable form of evidence is available) is only noteworthy if there are other 
forms of evidence that are reliable and relevant to well-being-related thought 
experiments. I have mentioned above and reiterate here that reason can make reliable 
evaluative judgements in unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments. Although 
this assertion is explained and supported in more detail below, the role of reason in 
moral judgements needs to be defended from the possible accusation of self-
delusion. Haidt (2001) provides good reason to believe that our moral judgements are 
often made by our intuitive cognition and then, when challenged to explain the 
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judgement, our conscious deliberative mind confabulates a reason. It could 
mistakenly be inferred from this finding that any attempt to use reason to evaluate a 
thought experiment would really just involve an intuitive judgement and a fabricated 
justification for it. Fortunately, moral philosophers are experienced in the use of 
reason and are subjected to various forms of peer review that endeavour to ensure 
that their use of reason is consistent.  
 
For example, if a hedonist was using Hurka’s (1993) Perfectionism to justify her 
evaluation of a thought experiment in an article, her peers would spot her 
inconsistent use of reason and she would be very lucky to be invited to ‘revise and 
resubmit’. Even if moral philosophers’ reasons for finding particular types of 
evidence, or moral principles, more reasonable than others might be initially formed 
by a process of reflective equilibrium,72 which takes intuition into account at an 
earlier stage, once philosophers begin to present an argument they must apply reason 
consistently or have their justification ignored. Those reasoned justifications of their 
evaluations of thought experiments are then able to be analysed for consistency, and 
compared with other competing justifications. Since the end result of reason is so 
easily subjectible to these checks and balances, we can be more confident that the 
justifications offered by most moral philosophers are not mere moral intuitions 
cloaked in confabulation, but predominantly the product of deliberative cognition. 
With the weight of the argument supported by the defences of its premises above and 
its purpose now also vindicated, its implications for evaluating theories of well-being 





                                                 
72
 As discussed in Chapter 1, reflective equilibrium is the endpoint of a process in which intuitions about 
cases and reasoned principles adjust in light of each other to form a judgement (Rawls 1971; c.f. 
Woodward & Allman 2007, p3). 
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The New Method for Assessing Theories of Well-Being 
Based on the above argument for intuitive evidence from unrealistic thought 
experiments being considered unreliable, the Old Method of Assessing Theories of 
Well-Being is clearly in need of amendment. The New Method of Assessing Theories 
of Well-Being, which follows, takes a better understanding of intuitive cognition into 
account by restricting the role that intuitive evidence can play in evaluating theories 
of well-being. 
 Theories of well-being should: 
i)  Produce intuitively pleasing results in realistic cases 
ii)  Have a compelling rationale, which can provide judgments in all relevant moral 
cases, while: 
a) Being internally consistent 
b) Producing results in realistic cases that fit with pervasive moral judgements 
(based on reflective equilibrium between our moral intuitions and other 
judgements) 
c) Providing good reason to believe the normative significance of the theory 
d) Being meta-ethically consistent 
e) Being consistent with science 
iii)  Be functional 
And the extent to which a theory of well-being achieves these criteria indicates how 
good that theory is.  
 
Although the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being only swaps two 
occurrences of a single word of the previous definition, the changes this new 
definition demands would revolutionise ethics as we know it. This is because, while 
unrealistic thought experiments have been ubiquitous in moral philosophy, their 
humble realistic counterparts are much harder to find. Indeed, consider the most 
influential thought experiments posed against Hedonism in the past, for example; 
Socrates’ Oyster thought experiment (c.f. Plato in Philebus, ii. p353) is utterly 
unrealistic.  
 
In the Oyster thought experiment, Plato’s Socrates asks Protarchus to imagine a life 
without much pleasure but full of the higher cognitive processes, such as knowledge, 
forethought and consciousness and compare it to a life that is the opposite. Socrates 
describes this opposite life as having perfect pleasure but the mental life of an oyster. 
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Any negative intuition about the pleasant life of an oyster is clearly not based on an 
understanding of what it would actually be like to be an oyster, since it is impossible 
for us to imagine what it would be like to be unconscious. Instead, our intuition 
would be based on imagining ourselves being stuck in one particular state (albeit a nice 
one, akin to being slightly drunk lying in a warm bath) for eternity, which would soon 
become torturous (not pleasurable) for beings with our conscious cognitive 
capacities.  
 
And what, then, of the thought experiments that are currently thought to refute 
Hedonism: the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine? Both of these 
thought experiments are clearly unrealistic. Do they hold any normative significance 
for Hedonism about Well-Being? Before delving deeply into these questions, a brief 
guide will be provided as to how the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-
Being should be applied and how arguments against established theories of well-being 
should be dealt with. 
 
To evaluate a theory of well-being using the New Method of Assessing Theories of 
Well-Being, the theory must be tested against the criteria mentioned above. If a 
theory of well-being can provide credible evidence to believe that it produces 
intuitively pleasing results in realistic cases, is rationally compelling, and is functional, 
then, according to the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, it is 
plausible. Furthermore, fulfilling the criteria past the point of plausibility (towards, 
say, being very convincing) is what determines if a theory is better than other 
plausible theories.  
 
With how to apply the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being in mind, it 
is pertinent to outline how to deal with objections to a theory once its plausibility has 
been established, since arguments against it will doubtless arise at some point. A 
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framework for dealing with objections to theories of well-being is discussed below 
and outlined as follows: 
When confronted with an objection to a theory of well-being: 
a. Assess how rationally compelling the argument (for the objection) is by checking for: 
i. Internal consistency 
ii. Relevance 
iii. Scientific consistency 
iv. Evidence (good reasons to believe it): 
1. Reason-based evidence 
2. Intuitive evidence  
b. Reject the objection if any of i, ii, iii, or iv can be sufficiently undermined 
c. If the objection is rejected, then the theory of well-being maintains its plausible 
status. However, if the objection cannot be rejected, then the theory of well-being 
loses its plausible status. The more un-rejected objections against a theory, the worse 
that theory is. 
 
Any objection against a theory of well-being should be assessed on how rationally 
compelling the argument it presents is. First of all, the argument should be internally 
consistent, that is, it must not contradict itself in anyway. The proposed argument 
against the established theory of well-being should also be relevant; it should be made 
clear exactly how the argument objects to the theory. Any objection to a plausible 
theory of well-being also needs to be at least consistent with current science and not 
based on un-falsifiable premises. If the objection is based on an implausible belief 
about science, then that objection will have no normative significance and not be able 
to make the theory of well-being in question implausible. Furthermore, if the 
objection is based on a premise that is un-falsifiable by science, such as ‘the word of 
God is truth’, then the objection will also fail to make the theory of well-being in 
question implausible. This is because un-falsifiable evidence has no identifiable 
‘weight’, or normative significance, and cannot, therefore, play the role of 
disconfirming evidence. Most arguments against theories of well-being tend to be 
able to comply with these three criteria fairly easily. However, fulfilling the final 
criterion will most often be a matter of substantial debate. 
 
When providing good reasons for believing an argument that objects to a plausible 
theory of well-being, the evidence that can be provided will either be reason-based or 
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intuitive. Reason-based evidence is often still tinged with intuitions about fairly 
fundamental aspects of the relevant theories involved. However, such evidence 
remains predominantly reason-based and generally allows for rational debate along 
logical lines. Because of this, reason-based evidence is preferential to intuitive 
evidence, which is subject to the various biases discussed above and does not easily 
lend itself to rational debate. Furthermore, unrealistic thought experiments are even 
more likely to produce intuitions that have no normative significance and should only 
be relied on in inescapable instances, such as when considering potential states of 
being that have not yet been experienced. However, even in such instances of 
attempting to assess relatively unknown states, our intuitions should play as small an 
evaluative role as possible. Indeed, based on the findings above, intuitions about 
unrealistic thought experiments alone should never play a more important role than 
that of a warning sign in assessing theories of well-being. It will be argued in the next 
chapter that this is the role that our intuitive responses to the Deceived Businessman 
and the Experience Machine thought experiments should play in assessing Hedonism 
about Well-Being.  
 
And, how should warning signs be treated? Warning signs call for further 
investigation. Acknowledged but still unresolved warning signs should tend to cast 
some (but not conclusive) doubt on the plausibility of the theory of well-being that 
gave rise to them. To begin to erase this doubt, proponents of a theory of well-being 
need just to provide a plausible but morally-irrelevant causal explanation for the 
intuition (Sobel 2002, p244). By casting doubt on the relevance of the intuition to the 
theory, the intuition is quickly heading towards losing its warning sign status. Reason-
based refutations of the normative significance of such intuitions are the most 
effective way to rule them out of consideration when assessing the theory of well-
being in question. However, the intuitions aroused by certain counter-thought 
experiments (even unrealistic ones) can also undermine intuitions that are claimed as 
evidence against a theory of well-being. It may seem hypocritical to allow the use of 
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intuitive evidence from unrealistic counter-thought experiments after arguing against 
the normative significance of intuitions about unrealistic thought experiments. 
However, if an unrealistic counter-thought experiment manages to produce the 
opposite intuition to that of the original thought experiment, then not only is that 
intuition’s credibility brought into doubt, but intuitions about all unrealistic thought 
experiments become a much more questionable source of evidence. 
 
To prevent this cancelling of their warning sign, opponents of the theory under 
scrutiny should attempt to provide morally-relevant reasons that justify the existence 
of the intuitive response that they are attempting to use as evidence. It would be next 
to impossible to prove that the reasons they provide cause the intuition, but the 
reasons themselves can be analysed and discussed to assess how rationally compelling 
they are. However, if no reason can be provided that could support the verdict of the 
intuition, then it can be assumed that the intuition is not in response to anything 
relevant.  
 
Naturally, such a post-intuitive justification is often given, and it is these justifications 
that proponents of besieged theories of well-being, such as Hedonism about Well-
Being, need to respond to. The best response that a proponent of Hedonism about 
Well-Being could hope for is a dual response that can refute his opponents’ reasoned 
justifications and their intuitive responses. Theoretically, refuting the reasoned 
justification should be sufficient, especially when a theory is only aiming for 
plausibility. However, a dual approach, which also encourages opponents to question 
their initial intuition, will be more persuasive. And, being more persuasive is essential 
when attempting to revive a philosophically dead theory by refuting thought 
experiments, such as the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine, which 
are widely thought to be conclusive objections. Indeed, such a complete refutation 
should be able to convince even those who still believe that moral intuitions about 
unrealistic thought experiments have some normative significance. With these 
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guidelines in mind, the contribution that the Deceived Businessman and the 
Experience Machine thought experiments could provide to the evaluation of 
Hedonism about Well-Being is discussed in the next chapter and the other 
implications of the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being are 
summarised below. 
 
The New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being is a fairly radical departure 
from the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being. The obvious difference 
between the views is the restriction of intuitive evidence from unrealistic thought 
experiments. In the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, intuitions 
from all sources were welcomed as evidence, but this was because moral philosophers 
were so confident that their intuitions (which they believed always reflected their 
wealth of life and ethical experience) must be correct (e.g. Lillie 1955, p17-20). This 
view overstates the benefits and understates the weaknesses of intuitive evidence 
from unrealistic thought experiments, showing an understandable lack of knowledge 
about the workings of intuitive cognition. In the New Method of Assessing Theories 
of Well-Being, moral intuitions about unrealistic thought experiments are demoted to 
the role of warning signs. If widely applied, the New Method of Assessing Theories 
of Well-Being will change many of the current views on theories of well-being, as 
shown by its application to Hedonism about Well-Being in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, any changes to current views on well-being will have flow on effects in 
moral philosophy generally because of well-beings’ fundamental role in normative 
ethics (Kagan 1998).73 Finally, it should also be noted that the New Method of 
Assessing Theories of Well-Being could easily be adapted so that it could be used to 
assess normative moral theories, thereby causing more implicative ripples in the wider 
area of moral philosophy. 
 
 
                                                 
73
 The role of well-being is certainly fundamental in standard consequentialist positions at any rate (Sobel 
1994). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed account of moral intuitive cognition and 
discussed and expanded on the role that Woodward and Allman (2007) recommend 
for intuitions in ethical theorising. First, Woodward and Allman’s (2007) description 
of moral intuitive cognition as a fast, unconscious probabilistic process that could 
compute large amounts of data in parallel and produce an intuition (a simple visceral 
sensation) was explained in detail and corroborated by other leaders in the field of 
cognitive science. Then, this greater understanding of moral intuitions was used to 
assess and mostly agree with Woodward and Allman’s (2007) recommendations for 
appropriate use of moral intuitions in ethics. One conclusion of theirs in particular 
was formulated into an argument that made it specifically relevant for evaluating 
theories of well-being. The argument concluded that intuitions about unrealistic well-
being-related thought experiments are unreliable and should only be used when no 
other reliable form of evidence is available.  
 
Based on this argument for intuitive responses to unrealistic thought experiments 
playing a considerably restricted role in evaluating theories of well-being, the New 
Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being was proposed. This new method was 
then discussed, including an explanation of how to deal with objections to a theory of 
well-being that had been established as plausible. Particular attention was paid to 
dealing with intuitive evidence against theories of well-being because that issue takes 
centre stage in Chapter 3, as the normative significance of the Deceived Businessman 
and the Experience Machine thought experiments for Hedonism about Well-Being is 
challenged. 
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 Chapter 3:                                               






With the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being sufficiently explained and 
supported in Chapter 2, the current chapter uses it to assess Hedonism about Well-
Being. A complete assessment is not possible within the space of this essay, so 
specific attention is focussed on the most popular argument against Hedonism about 
Well-Being: the Argument from False Pleasures. Indeed, after Hedonism about Well-
Being is briefly established as plausible, the rest of this chapter is dedicated to 
assessing the normative significance that the Deceived Businessman and the 
Experience Machine thought experiments supposedly hold for it. Each is analysed in 
turn, revealing that, even when interpreted as charitably as possible, neither proves to 
have the normative significance that the proponents of the Argument from False 
Pleasures suppose they do.  
 
The power of the Deceived Businessman thought experiment is found to rest purely 
on a strong but misguided intuition that should not have been consulted in the first 
place. It is also argued that any attempt to rework the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment would not avoid this criticism of irrelevance. The strength of the 
Experience Machine thought experiment is also found to rest on misguided 
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intuitions, although less obviously so. The Experience Machine is then reinterpreted 
into what must be its strongest reincarnation to date: the Pleasure Machine. Even 
when given this new look, however, the Experience Machine fails to provide any 
good reasons to think that Hedonism about Well-Being is implausible. Based on the 
irrelevance of the Deceived Businessman and Experience Machine thought 
experiments, it is concluded that the Argument from False Pleasures lacks the 
evidence it requires to refute Hedonism about Well-Being.  
 
Importantly, the process used to evaluate the evidence that the Deceived 
Businessman and the Experience Machine thought experiments are supposed to 
provide is so thorough that it is compatible with the New Method of Assessing 
Theories of Well-Being and approaches that would place much more importance on 
intuitive evidence, such as a reflective equilibrium-type method. This fact makes the 
conclusions of this chapter significant even if the arguments of Chapter 2 are not 
considered persuasive and the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being is 
not accepted.  
 
 
Evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being 
A thorough application of the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being to 
Hedonism about Well-Being, and all of the objections against it, would be a 
considerable task and one that would be too lengthy to accommodate in this essay. 
Due to this space limitation, only a very brief positive case will be made for the 
plausibility of Hedonism about Well-Being and only one argument against its 
plausibility will be dealt with. However, the argument against Hedonism about Well-
Being that will be refuted in this chapter, the Argument from False Pleasures, is of 
paramount importance because it currently convinces most moral philosophers that 
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Hedonism about Well-Being is an implausible theory.74 And, although not all of the 
conceivable evidence that could be used to support the Argument from False 
Pleasures can be discussed in this essay, the main evidence: the Deceived 
Businessman and Experience Machine thought experiments, will be. Because of the 
important role these two thought experiments play in Hedonism about Well-Being 
being considered implausible, this chapter will argue against their normative 
significance. And, if it can be shown that the Deceived Businessman and Experience 
Machine thought experiments do not provide good evidence to support the 
Argument from False Pleasures, then it will be assumed that the Argument from 
False Pleasures fails to provide a good reason to believe that Hedonism about Well-
Being is not a plausible theory. 
 
Many authors, including those who explicitly argue against Hedonism about Well-
Being, have stated that it appears plausible upon first inspection (as, for example, 
discussed between Plato’s Socrates and Protagoras).75 Hedonism about Well-Being 
will now be evaluated using the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being 
(repeated below for convenience) to show that it is at least prima facie plausible, 
thereby providing reason for Hedonism about Well-Being’s opponents to provide the 
arguments against it that they already have.  
 Theories of well-being should: 
i)  Produce intuitively pleasing results in realistic cases 
ii)  Have a compelling rationale, which can provide judgments in all relevant moral 
cases, while: 
a) Being internally consistent 
b) Producing results in realistic cases that fit with pervasive moral judgements 
(based on reflective equilibrium between our moral intuitions and other 
judgements) 
c) Providing good reason to believe the normative significance of the theory 
d) Being meta-ethically consistent 
e) Being consistent with science 
iii)  Be functional 
And the extent to which a theory of well-being achieves these criteria indicates how 
good that theory is.  
                                                 
74
 For example, Bagani & Fosl (2007, p74-76), Brink (1989, p223-224), Darwall (1997, p162, 178), Griffin 
(1986, p9-10), Kagan (1998, p34-36), Kymlicka (1990, p13-14), and Rachels (2005, p103-104). 
75
 See Nussbaum (2001, chapter 8) for discussion. 
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Hedonism about Well-Being plausibly provides intuitive results when evaluating well-
being in realistic cases by reducing all instrumentally well-being affecting experiences 
to the pleasurable and painful parts of mental states. For example, when we hear of 
the lives of others who suffer much pain, we often pity them for their poor well-
being. Furthermore, if we later hear that their life is no longer full of pain, but full of 
joy instead, then we are happy for them about their improved well-being. Consider 
also the case of a deserving student feeling very pleased after hearing that she was 
awarded a distinction for her thesis, but then becoming very upset when she 
discovers that there was an administrative mistake and that her thesis had not even 
been marked yet. The joy that the student first felt and the negative mental states that 
she was later experiencing are clearly good indicators of her well-being during those 
times. Examples of Hedonism about Well-Being producing unintuitive results are 
also fairly easy to come by. However, these examples tend to be more unrealistic, 
making them much less relevant in using the New Method of Assessing Theories of 
Well-Being to evaluate Hedonism about Well-Being. 
 
Hedonism about Well-Being also plausibly satisfies the New Method of Assessing 
Theories of Well-Being’s criteria for having a compelling rationale. As captured by 
the definition discussed in the introduction to this essay, Hedonism about Well-
Being, states that all pleasure, and only pleasure, intrinsically contributes positively to 
well-being and the opposite for pain. The rationale for this theory is that our well-
being is wholly and only dependant on the momentary and enduring mental states 
that we are aware of, that these mental states are always either neutral, painful, or 
pleasurable to some degree, and that the pleasurable mental states make our lives 
intrinsically better for us while the painful ones make them intrinsically worse.  
 
Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale is internally consistent because it does not 
contradict itself. Regardless of whether the mental states we are aware of are split into 
potentially simultaneous and overlapping specific feelings, or discrete moments of 
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total feeling, these mental states are on the whole exclusively positive, negative or 
neutral, thereby not allowing any contradiction. This rationale is also clearly relevant 
to Hedonism about Well-Being, as the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-
Being requires, and provides a plausible explanation for what the theory means and 
how it applies to well-being. Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale states that 
pleasurable and painful mental states (which we are aware of) intrinsically make our 
lives better or worse for us (respectively), thereby providing a plausible explanation of 
how it can be used to theorise about well-being.  
 
Implicit in Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale is the more detailed explanation 
supporting pleasure and pain being the only things that intrinsically contribute to well-
being. This explanation argues that many things instrumentally increase or decrease 
our well-being, but these effects are best measured by the pleasurable and painful 
feelings we have (that we are aware of), which intrinsically contribute to our well-
being. Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale is also determinately adequate because 
for any real or hypothetical case, for which the relevant factual information is 
available, Hedonism about Well-Being can provide a clear answer. For example, 
Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale claims that anything that occurs, but does not 
cause an individual to be aware of a pleasurable or painful feeling, does not affect that 
individual’s well-being. Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale also claims that 
anything that occurs, and does cause an individual to subjectively experience a 
pleasurable or painful feeling, does affect that individual’s well-being. Furthermore, 
Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale claims that an individual’s well-being can be 
evaluated solely by reference to that individual’s experiences of pleasure and pain. 
Using this explanatory system, and given the relevant factual data about pleasure and 
pain, Hedonism about Well-Being can provide an evaluation of the well-being of any 
individual and whether certain changes to their life would improve or worsen their 
well-being.  
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Furthermore, despite numerous historical allegations that there is no such unifying 
pleasurable component to all of our experiences of positive feelings,76 current science 
provides no evidence to support these claims. While we obviously experience 
different pleasurable feelings, there is no neurobiological evidence for there being 
different types of pleasure in the brain. Furthermore, neuroscientists have found that 
several types of supposedly different ‘pleasures’ are mediated by the same neural 
circuitry.77 Lieberman and Eisenberger (2006) also argue that the experience of social 
and physical pains is at least somewhat mediated by the same basic neural circuitry. 
Finally, when the fundamental components of Hedonism about Well-Being’s 
rationale are considered by themselves, and not via unrealistic thought experiments, 
they are at least plausibly intuitive. For example, the fundamental hedonistic claim 
that the subjective experience of pleasure is intrinsically good for the individual 
experiencing it must be intuitively plausible. If it were not, many authors would not 
bother to posit arguments against it (e.g. Kagan 1998, p30; Rachels 2005, p103). 
Although drastically brief, this discussion of Hedonism about Well-Being’s rationale 
should be enough to show that Hedonism about Well-Being is at least prima facie 
theoretically plausible. 
 
According to the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, a good all-round 
theory of well-being is also functional. Therefore, what follows is a brief account of 
how Hedonism about Well-Being could be useful for policy-making. To be useful for 
policy-making, a theory of well-being needs to be able to be at least approximately 
measured. Bentham (1789) and Mill (1861) struggled with the obvious practical 
difficulties of measuring of pleasure, but technology has dramatically improved since 
then. Recently, some cognitive scientists are measuring what they think might be 
                                                 
76
 For example: Anscombe (1957), Brentano (1969), Rawls (1971), and Sidgwick (1907). 
77
 See: Berridge (2003; 2007), Depue and Morrone-Strupinksy (2005), Kringelbach (2005), and Pecina, 
Smith, and Berridge (2006). 
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pleasure with neuroimaging78 and attempts are being made to find correlations 
between what we self-report about pleasure and pain and what is happening in our 
brains.79 These results have led some economists and philosophers to think that 
pleasure or happiness might be able to be measured accurately enough to be useful 
for public policy.80 Indeed, some economists have already used this kind of approach 
for real policy decisions (e.g. van Praag & Baarsma 2005). It is far from clear that 
pleasure or happiness will ever be able to be measured very accurately. However, it is 
more than plausible that it could be measured accurately enough, making Hedonism 
about Well-Being a potentially useful theory for both personal and public policy-
making.81  
 
The brief discussion above shows that Hedonism about Well-Being plausibly 
produces intuitive results in realistic cases, has a compelling rationale, and is 
potentially functional. These results mean that, according to the New Method of 
Assessing Theories of Well-Being, Hedonism about Well-Being is at least a prima facie 
plausible theory. With Hedonism about Well-Being’s plausibility established, the 
remainder of this chapter is dedicated to the refutation of the strongest argument 
against it: Argument from False Pleasures, which is repeated here for convenience: 
P1) Hedonism states that all pleasure, and only pleasure, intrinsically contributes 
positively to well-being and that all pain, and only pain, intrinsically contributes 
negatively to well-being. 
P2) Pleasure based on truth, or something like it, contributes more positively to well-
being than pleasure based on falsity. 
P3) Therefore, something other than pleasure (truth of some sort) must contribute  
positively to well-being. 
c) Therefore, Hedonism is false. 
                                                 
78
 See: Berridge (2003; 2007), Davidson (1992; 2000), Davidson, Jackson, and Kalin (2000), Depue and 
Morrone-Strupinksy (2005), Pecina, Smith, and Berridge (2006), Robinson and Berridge (2000; 2001), 
Tindell et al. (2006), and Wheeler and Carelli (2006). 
79
 See: Coghill, McHaffie, and Yen (2003), Derbyshire et al. (2004), Koyama et al. (2005), and Urry et al. 
(2004). 
80
 For example: Kahneman (2000), Kahneman and Sugden (2005), Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997), 
Layard (2005), Veenhoven (2004). 
81
 See: Dolan and White (2007) for an interesting review of the three types of well-being discussed in this 
essay and how they might be used in policy-making, in which mental-state accounts (such as Hedonism) 
play a central role. 
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And, following the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being discussed in 
Chapter 2, arguments against a theory of well-being that has been established as 
plausible can be assessed as follows: 
When confronted with an objection to a theory of well-being: 
a. Assess how rationally compelling the argument (for the objection) is by checking 
for: 
i. Internal consistency 
ii. Relevance 
iii. Scientific consistency 
iv. Evidence (good reasons to believe it): 
1. Reason-based evidence 
2. Intuitive evidence  
b. Reject the objection if any of i, ii, iii, or iv can be sufficiently undermined 
c. If the objection is rejected, then the theory of well-being maintains its plausible 
status. However, if the objection cannot be rejected, then the theory of well-being 
loses its plausible status. The more un-rejected objections against a theory, the worse 
that theory is. 
 
The Argument from False Pleasures will not be refuted on the grounds of internal 
consistency, relevance, or scientific consistency because it is a valid argument that 
would undermine the plausibility of Hedonism about Well-Being if its premises were 
true. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Premise 2 is the contentious premise and, therefore, 
proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures need to provide evidence to 
support it. The reason-based evidence for Premise 2 is limited to the statement itself; 
‘Pleasure based on truth, or something like it, contributes more positively to well-
being than pleasure based on falsity’. However, the intuitive evidence for this premise 
is generally considered to be very strong (e.g. Griffin 1986; Kagan 1998; Nozick 
1974). As discussed in Chapter 1, the intuitive evidence for Premise 2 of the 
Argument from False Pleasures is usually elicited by consideration of either or both 
of the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine thought experiments. For 
this reason, the remaining sections of this chapter will constitute a detailed refutation 
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Deflating the Deceived Businessman 
The Deceived Businessman thought experiment is simpler than the Experience 
Machine thought experiment and will, therefore, be tackled first. The Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment will be briefly explained again, including a 
discussion of what intuitive and reason-based evidence it supposedly provides for the 
Argument from False Pleasures. The intuitive evidence elicited by the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment is found to be prima facie strong. However, no 
compelling reason-based evidence is found to support those intuitions. Drawing on 
the findings of Chapter 2, reasons are then provided why intuitions about unrealistic 
thought experiments, and specifically the intuitions aroused by the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment, are unreliable. Intuitive evidence, in the form of 
counter-thought experiments, is then offered to weaken any stubborn belief that the 
moral intuitions elicited by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment are in fact 
based on the intrinsic badness of deception or untruthfulness. Part of Hedonism 
about Well-Being’s rationale is then used as a reason-based argument against the 
intuitions brought out by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment being 
relevant to Hedonism about Well-Being. It will be argued that proponents of the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment lack a good response to this challenge, 
having to rely on the already-shaky intuitions it arouses.  
 
One final reason-based argument against the relevance of the intuitions elicited by the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment is then posited, which provides a 
compelling alternate causal explanation for the intuitions. With the relevance of the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment in assessing the plausibility of Hedonism 
about Well-Being looking entirely negligible, reworking the thought experiment to 
help it overcome some of its problems is then considered. It is discovered, however, 
that the Deceived Businessman thought experiment cannot be reworked to avoid the 
criticisms against it without losing its initial intuitive force. Following the guidelines 
for dealing with objections to the plausibility of theories of well-being discussed in 
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Chapter 2, the arguments discussed in this section amount to a clear refutation of the 
relevance of the Deceived Businessman thought experiment in assessing the 
plausibility of Hedonism about Well-Being. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Deceived Businessman thought experiment is 
described most clearly by Shelly Kagan (1998, p34-36). Kagan (1998, p34) begins his 
discussion with the common saying: “what you don’t know can’t hurt you”, before 
going on to give reasons to doubt its wisdom. He asks us to imagine a successful 
businessman who died thinking that he had achieved everything he wanted: a loving 
wife, adoring children, and the respect of the community (Kagan 1998, p34). 
However, Kagan (1998, p35) then reveals that the businessman was completely 
wrong about his assessment of how things had gone: his wife was cheating, his 
children and the community at large were just using him for their own ends, and his 
business partner had been stealing from the business, which will soon be bankrupt.  
 
Kagan (1998, p35) asserts that the businessman’s life did not go as well as it could 
have and points out that if he had really been loved and respected like he thought he 
was, then his life would have gone better. This point requires the reader to consider 
the life of the Deceived Businessman, then the Non-Deceived Businessman and then 
to compare them. Indeed, the intuition that consideration of the Deceived 
Businessman’s life elicits is not a particularly pleasant one. Kagan (1998) suggests that 
the reason for this unpleasant intuition is that the Deceived Businessman was not 
really living the life that he had wanted to: his preferences were not being satisfied 
(Kagan 1998, p36). Kagan (1998) concludes that, since we value a life where our 
preferences are really satisfied over one in which we only think they are, the truth or 
reality of our experiences affects the value of them. Clearly, this conclusion, if correct, 
supports the controversial premise from the Argument from False Pleasures because 
it claims that the subjective experience of pleasure is less valuable if based on falsity 
or something like it. 
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To be painstakingly clear about the evidence that the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment is supposed to provide for the Argument from False Pleasures, the 
intuitive and reason-based evidence will be discussed in more detail here. It is clear 
that the intuition raised by consideration of the Deceived Businessman’s life is a 
negative one and that the one elicited by consideration of the Non-Deceived 
Businessman’s life is not. Since Kagan (1998, p13) believes that generally agreed 
upon, and fairly un-reflected upon, moral intuitions that arise from consideration of 
abstract thought experiments have normative significance, he also believes that our 
intuitive responses to the Deceived and Non-Deceived Businessmen’s lives are 
compelling evidence. Kagan (1998, p36) also suggests that the reason for our 
intuitions in this case is that the Deceived Businessman had a bad life and certainly a 
worse life than if he had not been deceived.  
 
Kagan (1998, p36) goes on to provide the following reason-based evidence for the 
common intuition that the Deceived Businessman’s life would have been better for 
him if he were not deceived: individual’s lives go better for them if they really get what 
they want, as opposed to just experiencing getting what they really want in their lives. 
This reason-based evidence appears to provide a prima facie good explanation for the 
intuitions raised by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment. However, recall 
that Kagan (1998, p34) began this argument by stating that he would provide reasons 
to believe that the “common saying that what you don’t know can’t hurt you”, is 
false. If we interpret this common saying as part of Hedonism about Well-Being’s 
rationale, then it can be stated as: states of the world only affect an individual’s well-
being if it leads to them having a positive or negative subjective experience. Now, 
compare this with Kagan’s (1998, p36) reason why the Deceived Businessman’s life 
could have gone better. Both propositions are prima facie plausible and yet they 
contradict each other. It should also be noted that Kagan’s (1998, p36) proposition is 
a fundamental part of the rationale of desire-fulfilment accounts of well-being: that 
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getting what we desire intrinsically contributes positively to our well-being. Despite 
both of these propositions being plausible, because they contradict each other and 
each of them is vital for the plausibility of their respective theory of well-being, then 
at least one of the propositions must be false and, therefore, at least one of the 
theories must be wrong. To resolve this apparent stalemate, the evidence for and 
against each proposition must be considered.  
 
The evidence used to defend the desire-fulfilment theorists’ proposition that 
individuals’ lives go better for them if they really get what they want, as opposed to 
just experiencing getting what they really want, and also to attack the hedonistic 
experiential proposition, is ultimately circular and rests solely on intuitions. The 
intuitions elicited by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment lead to the 
general preference for the Non-Deceived Businessman’s life over the Deceived 
Businessman’s life. This preference itself is not compelling evidence to believe that 
having our preferences fulfilled improves our well-being because it begs the question 
why we might desire things in the first place. Indeed, whether or not that preference is 
reliable is the question that we are trying to answer. Therefore, to have the force to 
contradict the hedonistic proposition, the proposed reason for this preference: that 
getting what we desire intrinsically contributes positively to our well-being, still 
requires evidence. And, the only evidence that the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment provides for the desire-fulfilment theorists’ proposition is the intuition it 
arouses.82  
 
Similarly, the evidence that supports the hedonistic proposition that only states of the 
world, which an individual subjectively experiences at some point can affect their 
well-being, is also intuitive. Furthermore, the attack the hedonists can make against 
the desire-fulfilment theorists: exactly how does something that we do not 
                                                 
82
 As will be discussed, the intuition is matched with an inference to the best explanation (getting what we 
desire (regardless of if we are aware of it) intrinsically contributes positively to our well-being) which is 
refuted below. 
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subjectively experience affect our well-being?, can be answered by their proposition: 
that getting what we desire (regardless of if we are aware of it) intrinsically contributes 
positively to our well-being. Therefore, how compelling the answer given by the 
desire-fulfilment theorists is, in this case, rests entirely on how compelling the 
evidence for their claim (the intuitions aroused by the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment) is. If these intuitions are found to be compelling evidence to believe the 
desire-fulfilment theorists’ proposition, and disbelieve the hedonistic one, then the 
Argument from False Pleasures (with evidence from the Deceived Businessman 
thought experiment) will undermine Hedonism about Well-Being’s plausibility. For 
this reason, the rest of this section is dedicated to providing reason-based and 
intuitive evidence against the normative significance of the intuitions elicited by the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment for evaluating Hedonism about Well-
Being. 
 
As discussed at length in Chapter 2, our intuitions about unrealistic well-being-related 
thought experiments are often misleading and, because there is no way to know 
whether or not they are misleading, unreliable. Indeed, because we cannot introspect 
or reliably reconstruct our moral intuitions, there is no way to know what our 
intuitions about the Deceived Businessman’s life are in response to and if they are 
responding in a reasonable way. Therefore, it is not clear what exactly, if anything, the 
intuitions aroused by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment are providing 
evidence for. Furthermore, because, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment is drastically unrealistic, the intuitions it elicits are 
even less likely to be reliable. In fact, one aspect of the thought experiment is so 
unrealistic that, because of the way our intuitive cognition works, it alone is enough to 
prevent the intuitions the Deceived Businessman thought experiment arouses from 
being relevant for assessing Hedonism about Well-Being. That aspect is the ruling out 
of the Deceived Businessman being caused to suffer any pain from the deceptions 
that riddled his life – after we have heard about them.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, expecting our intuitive cognition to receive the 
information about all of the deceit involved in the Deceived Businessman’s life and 
then to compute that he never finds out or suffers from it in any way is asking far too 
much from a probabilistic process that cannot always follow verbal rules. The 
resulting intuition in this case will be based on our past experiences of deceit, 
including how it generally made life worse for the person being deceived and 
everyone involved regardless of when, if, and how they found out about it. Even 
though Kagan (1998, p34) clearly stipulated that the Deceived Businessman was 
considering his life on his death bed (and so would have no chance of finding out 
about the deception) that is not the way that our intuitive cognition processes the 
scenario. Since most of us have no experience of being on our death beds, then our 
intuitive cognition will not be able to take that ‘no possible future’ stipulation about 
the Deceived Businessman’s current state into account. Since the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment asks us to accept such aspects of the scenario in a 
way that our cognitive intuition is not capable of doing, the intuitions that arise in 
response to it are very likely to be misleading.83 
 
Furthermore, because we cannot introspect or reliably reconstruct our intuitions, 
there is no way to rule out the fact that the intuitions elicited by the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment are probably unreliable. Therefore, the intuitions 
aroused by consideration of the Deceived Businessman thought experiment are not 
reliable enough to play a normatively significant role in assessing Hedonism about 
Well-Being. However, as per the guide for applying the New Method of Assessing 
Theories of Well-Being, discussed in Chapter 2, the intuitions can be viewed as a 
warning sign for further investigation. To allay this warning sign, intuitive and more 
reason-based evidence against the relevance of the intuitions elicited by the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment follow. 
 
                                                 
83
 The unrealistic nature of the Deceived Businessman thought experiment is discussed in more detail 
below. 
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Although the normative significance of intuitive evidence from unrealistic thought 
experiments has been dramatically down-graded in the New Method of Assessing 
Theories of Well-Being, some such evidence will be provided here for two reasons. 
Firstly, by providing thought experiments that elicit intuitions which appear to 
contradict previously held intuitions, the case for the reliability of intuitions has 
further doubt cast upon it. Importantly, this doubt of the reliability of intuitions 
provides further motivation for accepting the New Method of Assessing Theories of 
Well-Being. Secondly, the thought experiments below are designed to cast doubt on 
the normative significance of the specific intuitions aroused by the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment to show that those particular intuitions are 
unreliable. This specific doubt thereby further undermines the so-called evidence that 
the Deceived Businessman thought experiment is thought to provide for the 
Argument from False Pleasures. For example, if a thought experiment can arouse 
equally good or bad intuitive evaluations of experiences based on falsity and truth, 
then we can ask why the falsity of the pleasure does not matter in this case but it does 
in the Deceived Businessman thought experiment. Indeed, this is the question that 
the reason-based evidence below provides a compelling answer for. Before answering 
that question, however, three thought experiments will be discussed: first one 
designed to show that false pleasures can contribute more to well-being than the 
truth, then one designed to show that false pleasures and pleasures based on truth can 
be equally valuable, and then one designed to show that false pains are equally as bad 
as real pains. 
 
The following thought experiment is based on the character Amelie, from the 2001 
movie of the same name,84 and is designed to show that, intuitively, false pleasures 
contribute more to well-being than the truth does in at least some instances. Imagine 
that Amelie decides to become a ‘do-gooder’ and dedicates her life to promoting the 
well-being of others. Amelie’s landlady is a widower whose only source of happiness 
                                                 
84
 See <http://movies.yahoo.com/movie/1807565371/info> (accessed on 4/03/2008) for more information 
on the movie Amelie. 
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appears to be from reminiscing about the amazing romance that she had shared with 
her husband by rereading the many exquisite love letters that he had written to her 
before he died 10 years ago in a tragic accident while on a business trip abroad. 
Amelie was going to visit the far off place where her landlady’s husband died and so 
her landlady asked if Amelie could find out anything about her husband’s death while 
she was there. Naturally, Amelie, the do-gooder, agreed. However, Amelie’s extensive 
investigations revealed good reason to believe that her landlady’s husband was having 
an affair while on the business trip. Amelie considered telling her landlady the truth 
but decided against it because she knew that it would take away the only thing of 
value to the old woman: her cherished memories about her loving husband, thereby 
devastating her life. Instead Amelie, a master forger who had had exposure to the 
original love letters, wrote a wonderfully tender final letter of unyielding love and 
devotion to the landlady from her husband, dated just before the accident. Amelie 
knew the letter would bring great joy to her landlady and knew that she would never 
find out the truth. She was right.  
 
When imaging this thought experiment, it is hard not to cringe at the thought of 
Amelie telling her landlady the sordid truth and watching her spiral into depression – 
our intuition about telling the landlady the truth is certainly not a pleasant one. 
Furthermore, the intuition that most of us have about Amelie giving her landlady a 
letter that will make her ecstatically happy is a positive one; certainly more positive 
than the intuition about telling the truth in that situation. Therefore, Amelie had, and 
most of us have, ‘the intuition’ that false pleasures are better for Amelie’s landlady’s 
well-being than the truth in this scenario. It should be clear that this thought 
experiment does not directly argue against the claim that pleasures based on truth 
contribute more to well-being than false pleasures. Rather, it is meant to raise doubts 
about the strength of the connection between truth and well-being, especially when 
compared to the strength of the connection between pleasure and well-being. 
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The following example, henceforth referred to as the Deceived Anthropologist 
thought experiment, aims to provide more direct intuitive evidence that false 
pleasures can be equally as good as pleasures based on truth or reality. Imagine an 
anthropologist looking back at her life from her death bed. She holds herself to have 
had an excellent life. She had a hugely rewarding career as the much-esteemed head 
of the International Anthropologists Society. And, it was there that she met and 
married her loyal husband, with whom she raised three lovely children. Her 
remarkable academic career was entirely based on her ground-breaking work 
explaining the demise of an ancient culture, the Lokians. Indeed, all of the joys of her 
career: the high position, the world travel, and the large and attentive audiences, and 
indeed all of the joys of her whole life, resulted from her well-received account of the 
Lokians’ demise. This anthropologist certainly had a life full of positive well-being.  
 
Now imagine that the great pleasures of the anthropologist’s life were all the result of 
an ancient deception. The Lokians were a mischievous culture who lived on an 
isolated island, which they steadily deforested, resulting in the wind and rain 
removing all of their remaining food sources. They knew that they had to relocate 
quickly if they were to survive. But, before they left, they perfectly planted many fake 
clues to make any future visitors think that the Lokians had all perished on the island 
as a result of some bizarre accident. Unfortunately, a few days into the Lokians mass 
emigration a huge storm scuttled all of their ships. The remains of the Lokians and 
their escape vessels sank to the bottom of the ocean where they were completely 
devoured by giant deep-sea spiders. 85 Since the only evidence left of the Lokians’ 
demise was the fake evidence they planted on their isolated island, no one would ever 
discover the real truth of the matter. Indeed, even if someone knew the truth of this matter, 
they would be ridiculed if they ever asserted it because of the complete lack of 
evidence for it and the considerable evidence against it.  
 
                                                 
85
 For more information on Giant deep-sea Sea Spiders, which devour sessile organisms through their long 
proboscis, see <http://www.deepseaphotography.com/data.php?id=29400> (accessed on 4/03/2008). 
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In her youth, the anthropologist fell for the Lokians’ trick, producing several studies 
which took the false evidence planted by the Lokians at face value. Despite being 
based on (completely undiscoverable) falsity, these studies went on to be published 
and led to the rest of her most-enjoyable personal and work lives. Now imagine a life 
exactly the same in all respects, except that the anthropologist in this case was not 
tricked by any mischief on the part of the Lokians, since those ancient tricksters were 
wiped out before they had the chance to play any practical jokes. So, both 
anthropologists experienced very rewarding personal and work lives but one of them 
owes all of the great pleasures in their life to an undiscoverable deception that she 
had fallen for.  
 
Did the life of the Deceived Anthropologist have any less well-being than the Non-
Deceived Anthropologist? Intuitively, the Deceived Anthropologist had a life full of 
well-being and so too did the Non-Deceived Anthropologist.86 Indeed, this seems 
correct even though all of the good things in the Deceived Anthropologist’s life were a 
result of deception. Therefore, this case provides intuitive evidence that whether 
pleasures are based on truth or on deception seems to have no bearing on the extent 
to which those pleasures contribute to well-being. As it stands, then, the Deceived 
Anthropologist thought experiment provides intuitive evidence that pleasure can 
contribute to well-being regardless of its basis in truth or falsity. Furthermore, when the 
                                                 
86
 At this point, Kagan might respond with a reason-based, rather than intuitive, response to the thought 
experiment. He might claim that the Deceived Anthropologist really desires not to be deceived in the way 
she is, that she really desired to know the truth about the demise of the Lokians. If this is true, which we 
can assume it to be so, the desire-fulfilment account of well-being would hold the Deceived 
Anthropologist’s life as worse than the Non-Deceived Anthropologist’s life. However, we could imagine 
that if the Deceived Anthropologist’s desire to really know what happened to the Lokians was fulfilled 
when she first encountered the Lokians’ isolated island, that her life would have been very different and 
presumably worse for her. Since there was no evidence at all to support the real account of the Lokians’ 
demise, any attempt to publish such a tall story would be ridiculed. This would most likely have resulted in 
her never becoming an anthropologist (let alone the head of the International Anthropologists Society), 
never meeting her loyal husband and perhaps never having three loving children. Considering the moment 
where the Deceived Anthropologist first thinks about the demise of the Lokians, it seems that getting what 
she really wanted in that moment would be bad for her well-being, while being deceived bodes very well 
for her future life. This result provides intuitive evidence that appears to undermine Kagan’s potential 
response and the notion that getting what you really want is good for you, which, since Kagan puts 
normative stock in intuitive responses, should be enough to prevent him from raising such a response.  
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intuitions aroused by the Deceived Anthropologist thought experiment are compared 
with the intuitions produced by contemplation of Kagan’s (1998) Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment, it is clear that they contradict each other. This 
contradiction gives even further reason to believe that intuitions elicited by unrealistic 
thought experiments are unreliable, since only one of the two can be correct, thereby 
casting doubt on the so-called intuitive evidence aroused by the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment. Indeed, such a contradiction calls for closer 
analysis because, if these two intuitions contradict because the one aroused by the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment is shown to be more likely to be 
misleading, then one of the two major pieces of so-called evidence for the 
controversial premise of the Argument from False Pleasures should be deemed too 
unreliable to use for that purpose. 
 
The best method for discovering which intuition is most appropriate in this case is to 
analyse the differences between the scenarios in an attempt to find any discrepancies 
in the ‘facts’ that might affect the resultant intuitions. While the Deceived 
Anthropologist thought experiment seems to be quite unrealistic (a whole culture of 
practical jokers!), it is no more so than Kagan’s (1998) Deceived Businessman 
thought experiment, which asks that we imagine that someone is detested by his 
family and colleagues without that having any negative effects on their behaviour 
towards him. However, there are discrepancies between the two scenarios regarding 
various issues with the deceptions in the protagonists’ lives, including: the amount of 
deceptions, the distance between the deceivers and the deceived, and the plausibility 
of the complete concealment of the deceptions. These differences are discussed 
below. 
 
It could be argued that because the Deceived Anthropologist thought experiment 
contains only one deception and because that deception happens in the distant past, 
attention is sufficiently drawn away from the deception, making it difficult for our 
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intuitive cognition to ‘pick up on it.’ However, it is clearly stated in the Deceived 
Anthropologist thought experiment that all of the great pleasures in her life were a 
result of the deception, providing good reason to think that the author has no 
intention of ‘hiding’ the deception. Both thought experiments make all of their 
protagonist’s great pleasures to be the result of deception. Having said this, it is true 
that the deception seems slightly removed from the Deceived Anthropologist while it 
is all around the Deceived Businessman.87 In fact, the very reason for putting some 
distance between the Deceived Anthropologist and her deception was to make two 
important facts of the thought experiment more plausible.88  
 
Firstly, in the Deceived Anthropologist thought experiment it is entirely plausible that 
she would never know of the deception that led to her many pleasures. Secondly, it is 
also abundantly clear that even if the deception were never revealed, the Deceived 
Anthropologist would not have a worse life because of the way her deceivers would 
treat her. This stands in stark contrast to the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment, in which it seems impossible to believe that the Deceived Businessman 
did not know about the odious opinions his loved and liked ones harboured of him 
and that, even if he did not know about it, that their malice for him would not be 
reflected in worse experiences for him. This inherent intuitive imaginative resistance 
that the Deceived Businessman thought experiment elicits far outweighs any that the 
Deceived Anthropologist thought experiment does.89 This shows that the intuitions 
aroused by the Deceived Anthropologist thought experiment are more likely to be 
                                                 
87
 It has been suggested (e.g. by Unger 1996) that we have an intuitive social distance bias that influences 
our unconscious moral evaluations, which might help to explain why the deception in the Deceived 
Anthropologist thought experiment is considered to have less effect on the well-being of the Deceived 
Anthropologist. However, it would not explain why the deception is not considered important at all. 
Furthermore, the extent to which social distance bias is an influencing factor in these two thought 
experiments would provide further evidence that our intuitions about moral issues can be, as Unger (1996) 
suggests, irrational and, therefore unreliable. 
88
 Note that these facts are implied in the Deceived Anthropologist thought experiment and stipulated in the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment. However, this makes little difference because while the facts 
are obvious in the Deceived Anthropologist thought experiment without needing to be explicitly stated; 
they are not obviously accepted in the Deceived Businessman thought experiment despite being stipulated! 
89
 The problem of intuitive imaginative resistance to the Deceived Businessman thought experiment is 
taken up in more detail below. 
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appropriate than those that arise in response to consideration of the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment. Therefore, it is more likely that the common 
intuitive response to the Deceived Businessman thought experiment: that pleasure 
based on truth contributes more positively to well-being than pleasure based on 
falsity, is probably wrong.  
 
This final piece of intuitive evidence is designed to show that pains based on falsity 
are equally as bad as pains based on truth, in order to further evidence the same kind 
of claim for pleasures. Imagine that you are suffering physical and psychological pain 
based on falsity, such as feeling pain from a phantom limb and being upset about the 
(faked) death of the person you love stalking. The falsity that underlies these pains 
seems to have no bearing whatsoever on how bad they are for the well-being of the 
person suffering them. Concluding that false pains can be just as bad as real pains 
should lead us to ask why this should be any different for pleasures. Hedonism about 
Well-Being informs us that there is no important difference and that the experience 
of pleasure contributes positively to well-being just like the experience of pain 
contributes negatively to well-being. That is, experiences of pleasure and pain 
intrinsically contribute to well-being regardless of what caused them, at least in the 
cases where we cannot know of or be otherwise affected by those causes. 
 
Consideration of these three counter-thought experiments elicits intuitive evidence 
that pleasures based on truth are just as good for our well-being as pleasures based on 
falsity (that we never experience). This evidence achieves two of the goals of this 
essay. First, the fact that the intuitions elicited contradict the intuitions aroused by the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment undermines the reliability of intuitive 
evidence from unrealistic thought experiments generally. Secondly, these three 
counter-thought experiments all undermine the so-called intuitive evidence from the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment, which purports to support Premise 2 
from the Argument from False Pleasures: that ‘pleasure based on truth, or something 
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like it, contributes more positively to well-being than pleasure based on falsity’. 
Indeed, the weight of these three counter-thought experiments provides a compelling 
reason to hear both reason-based evidence against the intuitions raised by the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment and potential alternate causal 
explanations for those intuitions being misleading in this case. 
 
There is a strong reason-based argument that the lives of the deceived and the non-
deceived businessmen went just as well for each of them. In Kagan’s (1998, p34) 
words, the argument is: “what you don’t know can’t hurt you”, which mirrors part of 
Hedonism about Well-Being’s fundamental rationale: that states of the world only 
affect an individual’s well-being if it leads to them experiencing a positive or negative 
mental state. The challenge posed by this argument is: how it is possible that the 
deception in the Deceived Businessman’s life affected his well-being in any way if he 
never experienced anything bad whatsoever because of it? 
 
To meet this challenge, proponents of the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment must provide good reason to believe that something which is not 
experienced in any way can affect a person’s well-being. The only recourse for 
proponents of the Deceived Businessman thought experiment at this stage is to posit 
a fundamental rationale of desire-fulfilment accounts of well-being and attempt to 
support it with intuitive evidence. They would respond by claiming that a person 
getting what they really want makes their life go better, regardless of if they know about 
or experience it in any way. And, they would support this with the intuitions aroused 
by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment. Again, the debate seems to reach 
the same stalemate of fundamental rationales discussed above. However, the intuitive 
support for the rationale that a person getting what they really want makes their life go 
better, regardless of if they know about or experience it in any way has been 
comprehensively scrutinised in this chapter so far. Furthermore, the aim of this essay 
is to take steps towards reviving Hedonism about Well-Being to the level of plausibility, 
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which means that a stalemate with a theory of well-being that is considered plausible 
would not be such a bad result. However, the case against the intuitive evidence 
provided by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment can be continued with 
further reason-based arguments demonstrating that it is irrelevant in assessing 
Hedonism about Well-Being. 
 
The final attack on the relevance of the intuitive evidence elicited by the Deceived 
Businessman thought experiment in evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being, and why 
this strike is fatal, will now be explained. Intuitions in general and the specific 
intuition raised by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment have already been 
brought into disrepute by the preceding arguments. Now, an alternative causal 
explanation of the intuition aroused by contemplation of the Deceived Businessman 
thought experiment will be posited and shown to be more plausible than the causal 
explanation offered by Kagan (1998).  
 
Kagan’s (1998) argument clearly implies that the negative intuition that arises upon 
contemplation of the Deceived Businessman’s life is caused by his pleasures seeming 
to contribute less to his well-being because they are based on falsity. The argument 
runs as follows: since the falsity is the only difference between the Deceived and the 
Non-Deceived Businessman’s pleasures in the thought experiment, then falsity must 
be the cause of the negative intuition that the Deceived Businessman’s life elicits. 
However, this argument overlooks the possibility that the thought experiment might 
not be processed by our intuitive cognition exactly as it is written. As mentioned 
above, the probabilistic processing that creates our intuitions makes predictions based 
on how our prior experiences allow us to unconsciously interpret the stimuli we are 
currently experiencing. This feature of our intuitive cognition makes it virtually 
impossible to process all aspects of the Deceived Businessman thought experiment 
exactly as it is stipulated. In particular, our intuitive cognition will fail to accurately 
process the stipulations that the Deceived Businessman is on his deathbed and that 
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he could be constantly deceived without that affecting how others would behave 
towards him. These two factors of the Deceived Businessman thought experiment 
will be explained in more detail below and will be used to show why it is much more 
plausible that the negative intuition elicited by contemplation of the Deceived 
Businessman’s life is caused by the fear of finding out about the deceptions and of 
suffering because of the deceptions even if we never found out about them. 
 
First, our intuitive cognition will fail to accurately process the stipulation that we are 
on our deathbed because almost all of us (currently living people) have never 
experienced the feeling that we are just about to die. Since our intuitive cognition 
cannot process from this particular vantage point, then we are likely to evaluate the 
predicament of the Deceived Businessman as if he had a future of an at least short, if 
not indeterminable, length. From this vantage point, the possibility that the Deceived 
Businessman would never discover the deceptions of all those around him seems 
extremely unlikely. All of our experience of mass deception, which is unlikely to be 
nearly as mass as in the thought experiment, tells us that the deceived will find out. If, 
as I have argued, our intuitive cognition cannot take account of the stipulation that 
the Deceived Businessman will never find out about the deception all around him, 
then it seems plausible to think that the negative intuition is more likely to be caused 
by our intuitive forecast that the deceptions will be discovered and that negative 
experiences will result.  
 
Secondly, regardless of if our intuitive cognition can properly process the idea that 
the Deceived Businessman would never find out about all of this deception, it is still 
practically impossible for our intuitive cognition to process the stipulation that none 
of the mass deception results in negative experiences for the Deceived Businessman. 
Indeed, it is particularly difficult to consciously imagine being deceived and yet never 
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experiencing this deception.90 Typically, when people loathe us, we can tell. 
Furthermore, our experiences of interactions with people who detest us are usually 
much less pleasant than those with people who love and respect us. For these 
reasons, our probabilistic intuitive cognition would not be able to compute the 
businessmen having equally pleasurable experiences when one businessman’s 
experiences are with a group of people who abhor him and the other’s are with a 
group of people who admire him. This means that the intuitions that arise in 
response to the Deceived Businessman thought experiment cannot follow a vital 
stipulation of the scenario. If we cannot intuitively process the stipulation that the 
Deceived Businessman never experiences anything different to the Non-Deceived 
Businessman, despite being deceived by everyone around him, then we cannot 
intuitively ‘isolate’ the unknown and un-experienced deception like we are supposed 
to. The result of this is that it seems much more plausible to think that the negative 
intuition that the Deceived Businessman thought experiment elicits is caused by our 
experiences of people having negative mental states when they are deceived. 
 
Therefore, while proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures would assert that 
the cause of the negative intuition that arises from contemplation of the Deceived 
Businessman’s life is that false pleasures are worse than pleasures based on truth, an 
alternative causal explanation is more plausible. Because of the way our intuitive 
cognition processes information it is more plausible to think that the negative 
intuition arises from our past encounters of having negative experiences when we are 
                                                 
90
 Consider all of times you have experienced being deceived (which necessitates that you found out about 
them). Now consider having the chance to repeat those experiences. Presumably, the thought of reliving 
some of your worst experiences arouses a negative intuition. Now consider all of the times that you have 
been deceived but never experienced in anyway (which necessitates that you did not find out about them). 
Now consider having the chance to repeat those experiences. Presumably, the thought of reliving these 
moments would be the same as reliving any particular moment in your life (in which you were not 
experiencing being deceived). How would you say each of these two types of events have affected your 
well-being? Obviously, your experiences of deception were bad, but assessing the impact of the latter type 
of deception is much more difficult. First of all, you cannot know that any unknown and un-experienced 
deceptions have ever happened to you. Secondly, even if they had happened to you, they have no 
phenomenology whatsoever, which means that you would not know what it was like when they did happen. 
For these reasons it seems hard to imagine how unknown and un-experienced deceptions can negatively 
contribute to our well-being. 
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deceived (regardless of if we know about the deception) and our intuitive forecast 
that the deceptions will be discovered and more negative experiences will result. Since 
this more plausible alternative causal explanation can ground all of the negativity in 
mental states, it can be explained within a hedonistic framework and, therefore, does 
not constitute an objection to Hedonism about Well-Being. Indeed, this discussion 
has shown that the negative intuition elicited by the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment is irrelevant in supporting the premise that pleasures based on falsity do 
not contribute as positively to well-being as pleasures based on truth. The corollary of 
this is that the intuition aroused by the Deceived Businessman thought experiment, 
as presented by Kagan (1998), is too unreliable to support the Argument from False 
Pleasures and so is irrelevant for assessing Hedonism about Well-Being. 
 
Is it possible to adjust the Deceived Businessman thought experiment in any way so 
that it can avoid this last and most telling objection to its relevance for assessing 
Hedonism about Well-Being? It seems not. Since the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment makes it clear to the reader that the Deceived Businessman is deceived, it 
is impossible for our intuitive cognition to forget that fact. The only possible way to 
avoid this problem of intuitive imaginative resistance would be to restate the thought 
experiment without any mention of the deception and ask which life seems better. If 
we did this, though, our intuitions about the two lives would be exactly the same, 
since each businessman’s life would be described as the same from their perspective. This 
is important because this essay concerns the concept of well-being: the good life for 
the one living it.  
 
Proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures might protest at this point that 
this essay is denying other theories of well-being the chance to compete in the 
Deceived Businessman thought experiment by limiting it to what is experienced by its 
protagonists. However, this is not the case. This essay is only insisting that, given 
internalism about pleasure and for the purposes of gathering intuitive evidence only, this is how 
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the thought experiment must run if it is not to arouse inappropriate intuitions caused 
by the natural limitations of intuitive cognition. If the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment were to be analysed by reason alone, then it could remain in its original 
form. When reason alone is used to assess the Deceived Businessman thought 
experiment, the fundamental rationales of hedonism and desire-fulfilment clash head-
on, which as mentioned above results in something of a stalemate. The implications 
of such a stalemate are that the Deceived Businessman thought experiment offers no 
decisive evidence that pleasures based on falsity contribute any less positively to well-
being than pleasures based on truth and, therefore, that the Argument from False 
Pleasures must be supported by stronger evidence if it is to render Hedonism about 
Well-Being implausible.  
 
 
Extinguishing the Experience Machine  
Those who argue that Hedonism about Well-Being is a fundamentally flawed theory 
most frequently use The Experience Machine thought experiment as evidence. 
Therefore, this thought experiment is the most important thorn to remove from 
Hedonism about Well-Being’s side. In this section, the Experience Machine thought 
experiment is briefly explained again, including a discussion of what intuitive and 
reason-based evidence it supposedly provides for the Argument from False Pleasures. 
It is argued that if the Experience Machine thought experiment provides any 
evidence at all in support of the Argument from False Pleasures, then that evidence is 
purely intuitive. This intuitive evidence (the intuition that pleasures based on reality 
contribute more to our well-being than those which are not) is then shown to be 
unreliable and irrelevant for the purposes of supporting the Argument from False 
Pleasures.  
 
First, it is explained how the Experience Machine thought experiment is argued to 
support the Argument from False Pleasures. Then, intuitive and reason-based 
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evidence is used to show that it is highly improbable that our negative intuition about 
getting into the Experience Machine is caused by the fact that pleasures based on 
reality contribute more to well-being than those which are not and to provide further 
reason to mistrust our intuitive responses to unrealistic thought experiments 
generally. An attempt to adjust the Experience Machine thought experiment to avoid 
this problem is then attempted on behalf of the proponents of the Argument from 
False Pleasures. And, although the result of this adjusting: the Pleasure Machine 
thought experiment, avoids some of the problems plaguing the Experience Machine 
thought experiment, it too is ultimately found to have no normative significance for 
evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being. These points lead to the conclusion of this 
section: that the only potential evidence that the Experience Machine thought 
experiment might provide in support of the Argument from False Pleasures has no 
normative significance for evaluating of Hedonism about Well-Being and, therefore, 
should be discounted from any such assessment. 
 
In the Experience Machine thought experiment, Nozick (1974, p42) asks us to 
imagine a machine built by “superduper neuropsychologists” that can provide us with 
any experience we desire, such as the pleasure of publishing an award-winning novel. 
The machine can also provide a comprehensive range of other amazing experiences 
that we might never have thought of, such as the pleasure of having all of your meals 
cooked to perfection by the world’s best chefs. Nozick invites us to plug into the 
Experience Machine, but expects that, even after a two-year test run, we will not 
accept his invitation (1974, p42). Indeed, when posed with this choice, most people 
tend to forgo a life of endless pleasure in the Experience Machine for what they 
currently have, a presumably less pleasurable but more real life. This choice appears 
to be based on the “firmly held” negative intuitions aroused by considering a life 
plugged in to the Experience Machine (Sobel 2002, p244). Indeed, Nozick devised 
the Experience Machine thought experiment to prove that more than just how our 
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“experiences feel from the inside” matters to us (Nozick 1974, p42).91 In standard 
form, the argument would look something like this: 
P1) The Experience Machine could give us any experiences, including all of the best 
experiences. 
P2) If all that matters to us is how our experiences feel from the inside, then we would 
want to get into the Experience Machine. 
P3) People do not want to get into the Experience Machine. 
c) Therefore, more than just how our experiences feel from the inside matters to us.92 
 
Although Nozick did not claim to have all the answers to the question of what, 
“other than how our lives feel from the inside”, is important to us, he did have some 
suggestions. Nozick (1974, p43-44) briefly considered being a certain kind of person 
and achieving certain things as possible reasons for our not wanting to get into the 
Experience Machine. However, he quickly dismissed these possibilities, noting that 
more specific machines could offer such experiences and we would still not want to 
plug into them.93 Nozick then proposed that our wanting to really experience the 
limitless reality of living our own real life, as opposed to having a machine live it for 
us, is what prevents us from plugging in to the Experience Machine (1974, p43-45). 
Furthermore, it is clear from his writing94 that Nozick believed that more than just 
how our experiences feel from the inside matters to us because a life in which we 
experience reality is better than a life in which our experiences seem real but are not.95 
                                                 
91
 Nozick wanted to make this point so that he could extend it to animals (1974). 
92
 This argument is valid and could easily be made sound by softening P3 and the conclusion to 
acknowledge that not all people choose not to get into the Experience Machine. Nevertheless, the majority 
of people do not want to get into the experience machine and that majority is probably vast enough to 
ignore the few dissenters. 
93
 Nozick (1974, p43) also states that getting in to the Experience Machine is kind of like committing 
suicide. However, getting in to the Experience Machine would only be like committing suicide in that you 
would no longer get to experience reality. Indeed, it is markedly different in some ways. For example, 
compare not being conscious at all to consciously experiencing the most amazing pleasures that life has to 
offer (that seem real but are not). Clearly, death is much worse than being in the Experience Machine. 
94
 See for example: “[In the Experience Machine] there is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though 
the experience of it can be simulated” (Nozick 1974, p43). And: “What is most disturbing about 
[Experience Machines] is their living of our lives for us” (Nozick 1974, p44). And: “what we desire is to 
live (an active verb) ourselves, in contact with reality” – his brackets (Nozick 1974, p45). 
95
 Note that I am not surreptitiously slipping in the word ‘experience’ in my paraphrase of his position. 
Indeed, Nozick does seem to have carefully avoided using the word ‘experience’ when explaining why 
being “in contact with reality” matters to us (Nozick 1974, p45). However, being in contact with reality but 
not experiencing it is clearly not what Nozick was getting at. Imagine a man with no sense organs. He is 
living a real life and is in contact with reality but not in a meaningful way because he does not experience it 
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It is imperative to note here that Nozick provided the importance to us of real 
experiences as the reason for our intuitive response to the Experience Machine 
thought experiment. However, he provided no direct evidence for why experiences 
based on reality should matter more to us than those that are not.  
 
It appears that Nozick (1974), like many other writers on this topic, assumed that it is 
self-evident that experiences based on reality matter more to us than those that are 
not. Indeed, all Nozick has done in his passage about the Experience Machine 
thought experiment is to state the proposition and hope that readers agree with him 
about its self-evidence. If this approach provides any evidence at all for the 
proposition that experiences based on reality matter more to us than those that are 
not, then that evidence is purely intuitive. 
 
Proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures take a similar approach when they 
refer to the Experience Machine thought experiment in order to provide evidence 
that pleasurable experiences based on reality matter more to us than those which are 
not. By replacing ‘experiences’ with ‘pleasurable experiences’, advocates of the 
Argument from False Pleasures can make the Experience Machine thought 
experiment more specific to their cause against hedonists without losing anything 
important. (Nothing important is lost in this transition because hedonists assert that 
the only valuable experiences are pleasurable ones anyway). Sobel (2002, p244) 
discusses such an argument for why the Experience Machine thought experiment 
shows us that Hedonism about Well-Being is “wildly implausible”,96 which is 
paraphrased below. It should be noted that Sobel focuses more on real achievements 
(2002, p244)97, as opposed to real experiences as the reason for why we have a negative 
                                                                                                                                                 
at all. When we are in contact with something in any kind of meaningful way, then presumably we will 
experience it.  
96
 Sobel (2002, p240) classifies the type of hedonism discussed in this essay as “quantitative hedonism”, 
following Frankena’s (1963, p68-69) terminology for distinguishing between Bentham’s and Mill’s 
versions of hedonism. 
97
 There will not be a lengthy case against the value of real achievements (above the pleasure they provide) 
in this essay because it only aims to defend hedonism about well-being against the Argument from False 
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intuition when we consider getting into the Experience Machine thought experiment. 
This difference is irrelevant though, because Sobel (2002) believes that our negative 
intuition about getting into the Experience Machine is sufficient to make it bad for 
our well-being. Sobel would be a staunch supporter of P6,98 the most important 
premise of the argument below, the premise that this essay goes on to argue is false. 
P1) A normal life would have some pleasurable experiences and they would be based on 
reality. 
P2) A life in the Experience Machine would give us a life full of pleasurable experiences 
but they would not be based on reality. 
P3) If we prefer a normal life over a life in the Experience Machine, then pleasurable 
experiences based on reality matter more to us than those which are not. 
P4) We prefer a normal life over a life in the Experience Machine. 
P5) Therefore, pleasurable experiences based on reality matter more to us than those 
which are not (from P1-P4). 
P6) If X matters more to us than Y, then X contributes more positively to well-being  
than Y. 
c)  Therefore, pleasurable experiences based on reality contribute more positively to 
well-being than those which are not (from P5-P6). 
 
The above argument is supposed to show how the Experience Machine thought 
experiment provides reason to believe that pleasurable experiences based on reality 
contribute more positively to well-being than those which are not. However, it will 
now be argued that Premise 6 of the argument is false. Just because X does matter to 
us more than Y, does not entail that X should matter to us more than Y or that X 
contributes more positively to our well-being than Y. This fact remains true, even if 
X matters more to everyone than Y. Indeed, universal agreement in intuition does not 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pleasures. However, the objection might be able to be rejected quite quickly. Achievements come in many 
forms. An academic would probably consider becoming a professor an achievement, Hitler would probably 
have considered annihilating millions of Jews an achievement and a pebble collector would probably 
consider her 1,000+ pebble collection as an achievement. Consider working hard to attain an unknowable 
but great achievement. You have no idea what you will have achieved at the end of your toil but you know 
it will be great. For example, you might have written the best novel of all time or you might have managed 
to orchestrate the slaughter of millions of innocent people. If you would happily work hard for an 
unknowable but great achievement, then we have reason to think that achievement matters to us and, 
therefore, might have some value. However, we do not like the idea of working towards an unknowable but 
great achievement because the outcome might not please us. Therefore, while certain achievements may be 
valuable because of what they achieve, they are not valuable because they are achievements. 
98
 As shown by the quote: “our intuition that the person hooked up to electrodes is not experiencing the 
most value a person could experience is firmly held and strikes at the heart of hedonism.” (Sobel 2002, 
p244). 
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guarantee reliability of that intuition (Liao 2007, p9). The reasons for why X matters 
to us are very important here. There are many potential reasons for X mattering more 
to us than Y. However, some of these reasons will have no relevance for well-being, 
which would make the fact that X matters to us have no significance to any 
evaluation of well-being we might make. For example, I might judge that having 
another Long Island Iced Tea is a really good idea and it might matter to me a lot that 
I get another one. Indeed, I might be very angry if I was refused another one. But this 
in no way entails that it would positively contribute to my well-being to actually have 
another Long Island Iced Tea.  
 
Faced with such counter-examples, the only means to make Premise 6 true is to 
assume that a desire-fulfilment account of well-being is true. Making this assumption 
would allow for everything that matters to us being something that we desire to be a 
certain way, which directly links all the things that matter to us to our well-being. This 
strategy will not work, however, because assuming an opposing account of well-being 
to be true does not allow Hedonism about Well-Being a fair trial. Proponents of 
other views about well-being need to show why Hedonism about Well-Being is 
implausible without using their own fundamental rationales as self-evident premises. 
So, Premise 6 is false, but we still need to understand what the reasons are for it 
mattering that pleasurable experiences are based on reality (in the case of the 
Experience Machine thought experiment) and whether or not those particular 
reasons are relevant to evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being. 
 
All that the proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures can say at this stage is 
that the reason pleasurable experiences based on reality matter more to us than those 
which are not is simply because pleasurable experiences based on reality contribute 
more positively to our well-being than those which are not. Furthermore, the only 
evidence available for this claim in the Experience Machine thought experiment is 
just the supposed intuition that our negative intuitive response to the idea of getting 
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into the Experience Machine is caused by the fact that pleasures based on reality 
contribute more positively to well-being than those which are not.99 It should be clear 
that the Experience Machine thought experiment fails to provide substantial reason-
based support for the Argument from False Pleasures, and that intuitive support is all 
it has to offer. Consequently, the remainder of this section is dedicated to arguing 
that our intuitive response to getting into the Experience Machine is not caused by 
the so-called fact that pleasures based on reality contribute more positively to well-
being than those which are not. The success of the forthcoming arguments shows 
that even if it were a fact that pleasures based on reality contribute more positively to 
well-being than those which are not, the Experience Machine thought experiment 
certainly provides no evidence to reliably support such a conclusion. 
 
While evaluating the supposed intuition that our negative intuitive response to the 
idea of getting into the Experience Machine is caused by the fact that pleasures based 
on reality contribute more positively to well-being than those which are not, intuitive 
and reason-based criticisms will be made. These intuitive and reason-based criticisms 
should be sufficient to convince even the most intransigent fans of intuitive evidence, 
such as Sobel (2002), that intuitive evidence from thought experiments is unreliable 
and that the specific intuition supposedly elicited by the Experience Machine thought 
experiment has no normative significance to the Argument from False Pleasures. 
First, the reason-based conclusions of Chapter 2 are applied to the Experience 
Machine thought experiment to show that intuitive responses to thought experiments 
are unreliable generally and indeed specifically in this case. Then, intuitive evidence in 
the form of the Trip to Reality thought experiment is provided to show that 
imagining pleasurable experiences that are not based on reality does not necessarily 
                                                 
99
 A problem with the argument used by the proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures here is that 
they are claiming a causal relationship between the reality of our experiences and our intuitive response to 
getting into the Experience Machine despite it being clear that there is no evidenced deductive or inductive 
argument offered to show any relationship at all. Indeed, all of the power of the argument used by the 
proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures is a correlation between our intuitions about getting into 
the Experience Machine and our intuitions about having false experiences. Nevertheless, evidence will be 
provided to show that there is no such causal relationship between our intuitions about the Experience 
Machine and the reality of our experiences, so proving that the two are merely correlated. 
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cause us to have negative intuitions. Following this, the Trip to Reality thought 
experiment is compared to the Experience Machine thought experiment to provide 
evidence to believe that the negative intuitive response we have to getting into an 
experience machine is based on several other factors, all of which are completely 
irrelevant to the Argument from False Pleasures’ attack on Hedonism about Well-
Being. 
 
The reason-based arguments of Chapter 2 showed that intuitions about thought 
experiments are not very reliable for evaluating theories of well-being because we 
cannot find out exactly what caused them. It was argued that it is impossible to 
discover the cause of our intuitions through introspection and that we should not be 
confident about any attempt to reconstruct the cause of the intuition. It was also 
argued that our intuitions about unrealistic thought experiments are especially likely 
to be unreliable because our intuitive cognition uses probabilistic processing based on 
similarities between what we are imagining and what we have experienced. And, since 
we do not always have appropriate experiences to be matched with unrealistic 
scenarios, the intuitive response is likely to be based on irrelevant factors and, 
therefore, it will probably be unreliable. The Experience Machine thought experiment 
is unrealistic in two ways: it is overly demanding of our intuitive cognition and it 
involves situations that we have had no experience of.  
 
The Experience Machine thought experiment is unrealistically over demanding in that 
it requires our intuitive cognition to be able to properly take into account a stipulation 
that it simply cannot. It stipulates that while we are in the Experience Machine, we do 
not realise that our pleasurable experiences are not based on reality after the 
stipulation that our experiences in the Experience Machine are all fake (Nozick 1974, 
p43). Since our intuitive cognition processes the available data probabilistically and 
not deliberatively, it cannot follow some verbal rules, such as forgetting something 
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that it is already aware of (under normal circumstances).100 The correct way to gauge 
our intuitive response to what a life in the Experience Machine would actually be like 
for the one inside it would be quite different to Nozick’s (1974) thought experiment. 
Instead, the thought experiment should make no mention whatsoever about 
machines or fake experiences, while providing lots of descriptions of pleasurable 
experiences.  
 
The Experience Machine thought experiment is also unrealistic in that it is based on a 
fantastical contraption the likes of which no one has ever had any direct experience 
of.101 Indeed, humankind may never experience anything like a perfectly working 
Experience Machine because it may not even be possible. Importantly, because we 
have no experience with anything like the Experience Machine, our intuitive 
cognition is likely to have difficulty evaluating what being in the Experience Machine 
would actually be like. Indeed, any intuitive evaluation of being inside the machine is 
likely to be based on movies and real life experiences that are unlikely to do the 
machine justice. 
 
Since intuitions about thought experiments are generally unreliable and especially 
unreliable when the thought experiment is unrealistic, our intuitive response to the 
Experience Machine thought experiment should be considered so unreliable that it 
constitutes no normatively significant evidence. However, strong intuitions, like our 
response to the Experience Machine thought experiment, constitute a warning sign 
that should be investigated further. This conclusion is somewhat opposed to Sobel’s 
(2002, p244) view that our intuitive response to the Experience Machine thought 
experiment is normatively significant evidence that puts the onus onto the hedonists 
to explain away the intuition by undermining its credibility. Indeed, Sobel (2002, 
                                                 
100
 A relevant abnormal circumstance that might help our intuitive cognition to forget some information 
might be the timely intervention of copious amounts of alcohol. 
101
 Even if you were thinking of the last news report you have seen about virtual reality, you are probably 
still no where near having an idea of what being inside the Experience Machine would actually be like 
phenomenologically. 
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p244-245) believes that any attempt to explain away this intuition is doomed to 
failure. Nevertheless, the remainder of this section investigates the intuition further 
and in doing so will successfully rise to Sobel’s (2002) challenge. 
 
If it is true that our negative intuitive response to getting into the Experience 
Machine is caused by the fact that pleasures based on reality contribute more 
positively to well-being than those which are not, then we would expect that anyone 
in the Experience Machine would want to go back to reality and stay there if they 
could. As the following thought experiment, the Trip to Reality, shows, however, our 
negative intuitive response to the Experience Machine thought experiment is clearly 
not caused by the difference in how real the pleasurable experiences are because in 
this thought experiment we are much less inclined to choose reality over a life in an 
experience machine.  
 
Imagine that your life is much like it is for you right now, except that it contains 
much more pleasure and less pain. To help yourself do this, imagine all of the most 
pleasurable experiences you have ever had and try to multiply them. For example, 
perhaps your job is challenging but also very interesting and rewarding. And, imagine 
that your outrageously good-looking spouse is a qualified masseuse who loves 
nothing more than giving you a daily after-work massage while one of your talented 
children prepares you a delicious dinner. You still have ups and downs, but 
everything generally feels much more like those amazingly pleasurable moments. 
Imagine that you leave your wonderful and loving family for a weekend to attend a 
conference on the Experience Machine thought experiment. While you are there, 
someone informs you that you are actually in an experience machine. She offers you a 
red and a blue pill. She explains that taking the blue pill will take you back to reality 
and taking the red pill will bring you back into the machine and totally wipe any 
memories of having being in reality. Being a curious philosopher you swallow the 
blue pill (something that most people probably would not do).  
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It turns out that reality is fairly similar to the world you have been experiencing inside 
the machine. The main difference, however, is that you do not feel as happy and 
pleased as you used to. You experience similar things in reality, it is just that none of 
them feel as good or are as enjoyable as before. You also often find yourself with 
strange aches and pains that you never used to experience, such as toothache. 
Exploring reality, you notice that lots of people are in experience machines. Those 
who are not in a machine claim to prefer not to be in an experience machine because 
they just do not like the idea of it. While exploring, you find out that all of your 
immediate family members, except for your father, are in experience machines. You 
spend time with him but you cannot help but feel like your interactions with him in 
reality pale in comparison to the amazing relationship you used to have with him. In 
fact you fight with your father in reality and it feels terrible. You consider trying to 
make friends with other real people but you can imagine that any friendship you can 
make will not be nearly as enjoyable as those you have in the machine. In fact, even 
though you know that they are not actually real, you miss your friends and family in 
the machine terribly. You have now experienced enough of reality to know that a life 
there would be brutish and full of suffering, especially when compared with your life 
in the machine, in which every day brought new pleasant experiences. It is time to 
make the choice. Will you take the red pill so that you can go back to your 
pleasurable life with no idea that it is not in fact real? Or will you throw the red pill 
away and try to make the best life you can in the harsh surrounds of reality? 
 
In the Trip to Reality thought experiment, the thought of getting into an experience 
machine does not elicit the same intuition that exactly the same act does in the 
Experience Machine thought experiment. Indeed, when considering the Trip to 
Reality thought experiment, dramatically more people choose a life in an experience 
machine than when considering the Experience Machine thought experiment.102 This 
essay goes on to argue that this is mainly because in the Trip to Reality thought 
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experiment it is easier to see how much better our lives would be for us in an 
experience machine.  
 
There are some important differences between the Trip to Reality and the Experience 
Machine thought experiments that can explain why they elicit such diverse intuitions. 
Significantly, however, they both involve exactly the same decision about getting into 
an experience machine: choosing a more pleasurable life over a more real life. This is 
important because it means that it would be incredibly unlikely that how real the 
pleasurable experiences in each life will be has anything to do with our intuitive 
responses to either scenario. Indeed, in light of this evidence, anyone claiming that 
our negative intuition about getting into the Experience Machine is caused by the 
difference in how real the pleasures would be in each life needs to provide an 
explanation for the different intuition raised by the Trip to Reality thought 
experiment. This result casts more doubt on the reliability of our intuitions about 
unrealistic thought experiments generally because it shows again how intuitions can 
be so easily misguided. This result also gives very good reason to believe that our 
intuitive response to the Experience Machine thought experiment in particular is 
unreliable because we no longer have a good candidate causal explanation for it. 
However, several other factors can adequately explain the different intuitive 
responses we have to getting into an experience machine in each of the thought 
experiments. These factors are discussed below. 
 
One important difference between the Trip to Reality and the Experience Machine 
thought experiments is that the Experience Machine thought experiment taps into a 
group of overlapping psychological biases: risk or loss aversion and endowment, 
status quo or familiarity bias.103 These biases are importantly linked by our valuing 
gains only about half as much as we value avoiding equivalent losses of things we 
already have or know – the status quo (Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman 2002; 
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Kahneman & Tversky 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler 1991; Tversky & 
Kahneman 1991). In the Experience Machine thought experiment the choice to get 
into the machine involves giving up something valuable that you have and are familiar 
with (your current life) for something that is supposedly more valuable but fairly 
unknown to you (a life in the machine). It is scary to consider swapping our whole 
life for another one if we are unsure what the new life will be like. This fear of the 
unknown that could be affecting our intuitions in the Experience Machine thought 
experiment is removed in the Trip to Reality thought experiment because being in the 
machine is linked much more directly to our current life and experiences. Indeed, the 
life in an experience machine that we imagine when considering the Trip to Reality 
thought experiment is much less scary than the life we imagine when considering the 
Experience Machine thought experiment. Even though Nozick (1974, p42) explains 
that we will experience great things in the Experience Machine, he describes it in a 
particularly unsettling way: as “floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your 
brain.” However, if our intuitive cognition is picking up on risks in the Experience 
Machine thought experiment but not in the Trip to Reality thought experiment, is 
there a good reason for this? 
 
In Sumner’s (1996, p95) discussion of the Experience Machine thought experiment, 
he raises the idea that we might be afraid that the machine will malfunction or be 
sceptical that a machine could really do what Nozick (1974, p42) claimed that it can. 
Silverstein (2000, p284) thinks this fear can be avoided by being “diligent in the use 
of our imagination” and exercising “a bit of mental dexterity”. However, I will argue 
that a better understanding of how our intuitive cognition works shows that Sumner’s 
(1996, p95) worries are valid. If we consider the Experience Machine thought 
experiment with just our deliberative cognition, then it is not so hard to accept the 
conceptual possibility of a perfectly reliable and functional experience machine. 
However, it was shown above that the Experience Machine thought experiment only 
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provides intuitive evidence to support the Argument from False Pleasures and 
intuitive evidence comes from intuitive cognition.  
 
With the fact that our intuitive cognition is a probabilistic process that draws on our 
current and past experiences in mind, consider the amount of machines that you have 
experienced never having a fault and the amount that you have experienced having 
some fault. The overwhelming majority of machines that you have had experience of 
have had some functional deficit or have been in need of some sort of repair at some 
time during your lifetime. Now consider that the Experience Machine would have to 
be an extremely complicated contraption, involving a powerful computer. How many 
computers have you experienced that have never crashed? It is no wonder that our 
intuitive cognition cannot accept the stipulation that the machine will work perfectly. 
Where there is a risk to our whole life involved, it makes sense to be intuitively 
cautious. Now notice that, in the Trip to Reality thought experiment, the life in the 
machine is made to seem like the best parts of the life you are currently living. This 
encourages our intuitive cognition to infer that a life in an experience machine would 
not be effected by any machine failure because it is basing its projections on the life 
we have already experienced, which has never been effected by a machine failure in 
that way. It should be clear then, that a better understanding of how our intuitive 
cognition works reveals that the risk of machine failure or underperformance 
probably does have an effect on our negative intuitive response to getting into the 
Experience Machine in Nozick’s (1974) thought experiment.104 
 
The way our intuitive cognition works also prevents us from being able to fully 
appreciate what life in an experience machine would really be like. This is especially 
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 It is also possible that our intuitive aversion to getting into the Experience Machine is mainly because it 
is different and unknown (even when there are no obvious sources of risk). Imagine if the thought 
experiment asked instead for readers to choose between their current life and a much more pleasurable life 
in another (culturally similar) part of the (real) world. The thought experiment could also stipulate, like 
Nozick (1974, p43) does, that your loved ones can go with you. It seems like any intuitive resistance to 
choose the new, more pleasurable life would be mainly based on a status quo bias that overvalues the 
familiar and undervalues the unknown. 
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the case in Nozick’s (1974) Experience Machine thought experiment but also affects 
our intuitive response to the Trip to Reality thought experiment. As discussed at 
length above, because our intuitive cognition is grounded in our experiences, 
intuitions about aspects of unrealistic thought experiments that we have never 
experienced are presumably created by probabilistically processing any experiences 
that we have had that are most similar to those un-experienced aspects. In his 
description of the Experience Machine, Nozick (1974, p42) does not go out of his 
way to describe the true extent of the pleasurable experiences that an experience 
machine could offer. He lists writing a novel, “making a friend” and “reading an 
interesting book” as examples of the amazing opportunities available to us in the 
Experience Machine (Nozick 1974, p42). More expressive language is used in the 
Trip to Reality thought experiment, in which readers are urged to imagine their most 
pleasurable experiences and to multiply them. The problem remains, however, that it 
is very hard to imagine what our most pleasurable experiences multiplied by ten, or 
even two, would be like. Our intuitive cognition simply cannot do justice to the 
experiences that an experience machine could offer and this causes our intuitive 
response to getting into an experience machine in either scenario less positive than it 
should be according to the stipulations of both thought experiments. Our intuitive 
inability to appreciate the amount of pleasure on offer from a life in the Experience 
Machine, just like our intuitive fear of machine failure, could explain our negative 
intuitive response to Nozick’s (1974) Experience Machine thought experiment. 
 
Finally, the way that our intuitive cognition works also means that Nozick’s (1974, 
p43) attempts to unrealistically rule out moral obligation as a contributing factor to 
our intuitive response to the Experience Machine thought experiment will not work. 
A good reason for not wanting to get into an experience machine is that, in doing so, 
you would violate your moral obligations to others. Nozick (1974, p43) attempts to 
rule this out by saying that any significant others “can also plug in” to an experience 
machine so that you do not have to feel bad for leaving them behind. Putting it like 
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that seems to affect our intuitive response because it puts us in the position of having 
to encourage the people we have moral obligations towards to get into an experience 
machine just because we want to plug in and do not want to feel bad about it for the 
few minutes before we do. Treating other people as a mere means like this certainly 
seems intuitively immoral to us. So, it seems that Nozick’s (1974) attempt to do away 
with interfering moral intuitions has failed in the Experience Machine thought 
experiment and that our moral obligations to others probably do help cause the 
negative intuition we have about getting in to the Experience Machine.  
 
This effect that moral obligations could have on our intuitive response could be 
diminished by stipulating that everyone you know has already decided to get in an 
experience machine and that you can get in at the same time as them if you want. 
This stipulation might be difficult for our intuitive cognition to deal with, which is 
why it would only diminish and not eliminate this bias on our intuitive response. It 
should also be pointed out that any moral obligations which affect our decision to get 
into an experience machine should be eliminated if possible because we are assessing 
whether we can use the resulting intuitions as evidence for evaluating theories about 
subjective well-being, not moral theories generally. Indeed, it is perfectly compatible 
with Hedonism about Well-Being for some one to choose not to get into an 
experience machine for moral reasons. For instance, a hedonist could believe that a 
life in an experience machine is much better than a real one but they may choose to 
remain in reality so that they can perform some moral task. Acting rationally is often 
thought of as acting prudentially, or so as to achieve well-being. However, we also 
want to allow for non-prudential but morally good acts as rational in some cases 
(Gert 2004), such as foregoing a life of amazing pleasure so that we can help others.  
 
The influence of moral responsibility is somewhat limited in the Trip to Reality 
thought experiment because moral obligations are limited to fake people in your 
machine life and one grumpy family member (who you do not feel particularly 
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attached to) in reality. This difference between the Experience Machine and the Trip 
to Reality thought experiments also helps to explain the different intuitive responses 
they elicit to the thought of getting in to an experience machine. 
 
When all of these important contextual differences between the Experience Machine 
and the Trip to Reality thought experiments are considered together, there is good 
reason to think that they were the cause of our differing intuitive responses to getting 
into an experience machine in each scenario. Even if some other contextual 
differences between the two thought experiments were partly responsible for causing 
the differing intuitions, only an inference to the worst explanation would conclude 
that the reality of the pleasurable experiences is doing any work in either scenario. 
Whether or not the pleasure is based on reality clearly has no effect on our intuitive 
response to the Trip to Reality thought experiment, which means that there is also 
good reason to think that it has no effect on our intuitive response to the Experience 
Machine thought experiment.  
 
If proponents of the argument from False Pleasures wish to continue using the 
Experience Machine thought experiment as evidence to support the claim that 
pleasures based on truth or reality are better than those which are not, then they need 
to provide a good reason for why reality affects our intuitions about Experience 
Machine thought experiment but not the Trip to Reality thought experiment. Indeed, 
considering the aforementioned other important differences between the two thought 
experiments, which are much more likely to cause different intuitive responses, it 
seems very doubtful that any such reason exists. Therefore, unless there is some way 
that the Experience Machine thought experiment can be tweaked to avoid these 
biases, the intuitions it provides should be considered unreliable and irrelevant in 
supporting the Argument from False Pleasures and, therefore, to hold no normative 
significance for evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being. 
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If the Experience Machine thought experiment were going to be tweaked in an 
attempt to offer normatively significant evidence to the Argument from false 
Pleasures, it should be made more specific and attempt to remove all potential 
intuitive biases. The following attempt to tweak the Experience Machine thought 
experiment: the Pleasure Machine thought experiment, stipulates a more specific and 
less intimidating machine and reduces the influence of some of the contextual factors 
on the intuitive response it elicits.  
 
The Pleasure Machine is like a large comfortable hat that triangulates electromagnetic 
waves to stimulate various areas of the brain. When you have a pleasure machine on, 
its functions prevent your senses from sending information to your conscious mind 
like they normally do. Furthermore, while blocking your external senses, it stimulates 
the pleasure centre of the brain continuously. The result is total sense deprivation, 
you cannot see, hear, taste, smell or feel anything, except for an overwhelming 
sensation of pleasure. Your body will be well looked after so that it remains in perfect 
health while you have a pleasure machine on. Pleasure machines have been 
successfully used by thousands of people for more than one hundred years and you 
have already thoroughly enjoyed every second of several extended ‘pleasure holidays’ 
with a pleasure machine on. You have also just heard that all of the people that you 
know have decided to spend the rest of their life with a pleasure machine on. Would 
you put on a pleasure machine for the rest of your life so that you could experience 
constant pleasure? Or would you prefer to remain in reality and experience real 
pleasures and pains? 
 
Like the Experience Machine thought experiment, the Pleasure Machine thought 
experiment elicits a negative intuitive response to the thought of spending the rest of 
our lives in a machine, although, for most people, a weaker one. However, because of 
its specificity and avoidance of some irrelevant biases, the Pleasure Machine thought 
experiment has more chance of providing evidence to support the Argument from 
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False Pleasures. Unfortunately for the proponents of the Argument from False 
Pleasures, however, the Pleasure Machine thought experiment still only provides 
intuitive evidence and, as argued several times above, intuitive evidence is unreliable 
and should only be used as a warning sign. All that a hedonist has to say is: even if 
she has a negative intuition about it her reason tells her that choosing to live the rest 
of her life with a pleasure machine on would be much better for her well-being than 
remaining in reality. If Hedonism about Well-Being is considered plausible before this 
thought experiment’s normative significance is investigated, then an unsupported 
intuition should not be considered evidence enough to undermine that plausibility. 
Regardless, the intuition that the Pleasure Machine thought experiment elicits still 
fails to be compelling because of the problem raised by considering the Trip to 
Reality thought experiment, in which how real our pleasures were had no effect on 
our intuition in that case.  
 
If proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures wished to use the Pleasure 
Machine thought experiment as evidence, then they would have to provide a good 
reason for why reality matters in the case of the Pleasure Machine thought 
experiment but not in the Trip to Reality thought experiment. Indeed, it seems 
unlikely that there is such a reason, especially when it is considered that the negative 
intuitive response to putting on a pleasure machine for the rest of our lives is more 
likely to be caused by our inability to imagine what pleasure without other sensations 
would be like. Since we have no experience of extreme pleasure without obvious 
cause or stimuli to associate it with, our intuitive cognition cannot accurately evaluate 
what having a pleasure machine on would really be like.105 Concerns about boredom 
and the pleasure machine not being able to make us continuously feel pleasure may 
also make our intuition about getting in to it more negative. However, that only 
reinforces the point that our intuitive cognition cannot properly evaluate a life with a 
pleasure machine on. For these reasons, tweaking the Experience Machine thought 
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graphical display when attempting to imagine pleasure decoupled from all other sensations. 
Dan Turton                                      Reviving Hedonism about Well-Being                           MA Thesis 2008 
- 123 - 
experiment into the Pleasure Machine thought experiment could make it more 
specific to the needs of the proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures. 
However, there would be little point, since both thought experiments still fail to 
produce any evidence that has normative significance for Hedonism about Well-
Being. 
 
This section has argued that, at least in terms of the Argument from False Pleasures, 
the Experience Machine thought experiment provides no evidence that is reliable or 
relevant for evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being. The argument began by showing 
that if the Experience Machine thought experiment provides any evidence at all in 
support of the Argument from False Pleasures, then that evidence is intuitive. The 
supposed evidence was identified as the intuition that pleasures based on reality 
contribute more to our well-being than those which are not. The exposing of this 
supposed evidence began by discussing the reasons to think that intuitions about 
unrealistic thought experiments are unreliable generally and especially in this case. 
This was followed by an explanation of the trip to Reality thought experiment, which 
produced exactly the opposite intuition and, thereby, had the effect of undermining 
the reliability of intuitions from unrealistic thought experiments generally and 
specifically the intuition that pleasures based on reality contribute more positively to 
well-being than those which are not.  
 
Subsequently, several differences between the two thought experiments were 
discussed and it was argued that these differences were much more likely to be 
causing the differing intuitions in each scenario. These differences included intuitive 
fear of machine failure, our intuitive cognition not being able to properly evaluate a 
life in an experience machine and our moral obligations to others. Brief consideration 
was then given to how the proponents of the Argument from False Pleasures might 
alter the Experience Machine thought experiment in an attempt to overcome the 
problems raised in this section. The Pleasure Machine thought experiment was 
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suggested as an improvement on the Experience Machine thought experiment but it 
too failed to avoid all of the criticisms raised in this section and so proved ultimately 
unsuccessful in providing any normatively significant evidence to support the 




This final chapter used the insights from Chapter 2 and the resulting New Method of 
Assessing Theories of Well-Being to explain how supposed intuitive evidence from 
thought experiments should be assessed. It was argued that intuitions should just act 
as warning signs, especially when they are elicited by unrealistic thought experiments 
and when there is reason-based evidence to use instead. A brief case was then made 
for the plausibility of Hedonism about Well-Being, before it was shown that 
Hedonism about Well-Being remains at least plausible in the face of the reason-based 
evidence that the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine thought 
experiments are widely considered to provide.  
 
The intuitive evidence that each thought experiment is supposed to provide was then 
clearly articulated and challenged with both intuitive and reason-based arguments. 
Because the intuitive evidence raised by each of these thought experiments was taken 
seriously, the conclusions made about them will be significant both for readers who 
accept the New Method of Assessing theories of Well-Being and, importantly, those 
who do not. Even proponents of reflective equilibrium, who might value our intuitive 
responses to unrealistic thought experiments more highly than Chapter 2 argued that 
they should be, must heed the conclusions of this chapter because of the thorough 
way it refuted the intuitive evidence.  
First, the negative intuition aroused by considering the Deceived Businessman’s life: 
that false pleasures do not contribute as positively to well-being as pleasures based on 
truth, was shown to be both unreliable and irrelevant in assessing Hedonism about 
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Well-Being. Then, the negative intuition aroused by considering getting into the 
Experience machine, that pleasures based on reality contribute more positively to 
well-being than those which are not, was also shown to be both unreliable and 
irrelevant to assessing Hedonism about Well-Being. For both the Deceived 
Businessman and the Experience Machine thought experiments, attempts were made 
to adjust them to avoid some of the intuitive biases that they trigger. However, these 
attempts failed to avoid the major problems with each thought experiment, resulting 
in the strong conclusion that neither the Deceived Businessman nor the Experience 
Machine thought experiments provide any reliable support for the Argument from 
False Pleasures. 
 
Since this chapter has shown that neither the Deceived Businessman nor the 
Experience Machine thought experiments provide any support for the Argument 
from False Pleasures, regardless of exactly how highly intuitions are valued as a 
source evidence for assessing theories of well-being, the Argument from False 
Pleasures becomes much less persuasive. As discussed earlier, the Deceived 
Businessman and the Experience Machine thought experiments are the most used 
sources of evidence to support the controversial premise of the Argument from False 
Pleasures. However, now that the evidence that they supposedly provide has been 
shown to hold no normative significance for evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being, 
the Argument from False Pleasures sorely lacks evidence to support the premise: that 
pleasure based on truth, or something like it, contributes more positively to well-
being than pleasure based on falsity. Proponents of the Argument from False 
Pleasures, therefore, need to provide some other evidence to support their 
controversial premise if they desire to see their argument revived.  
 
Furthermore, any new evidence that they do concoct will need to escape the 
criticisms brought against the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine 
thought experiments in this essay. It is not clear that this will be possible, especially if 
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the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-being is accepted. Regardless, at this 
stage the Argument from False Pleasures is left with no good evidence to support its 
controversial premise and, therefore, provides no good reason to believe its 
conclusion: that Hedonism about Well-Being is false. This result is a very positive one 
for Hedonism about Well-Being, which has long been considered implausible because 
of the Argument from False Pleasures. Although the Argument from False Pleasures 
has often been used as a quick and easy way to dismiss Hedonism about Well-Being, 
there are other popular arguments against its plausibility. However, perhaps with the 
main objection to Hedonism about Well-Being refuted, more effort will be directed 
towards a complete revival of its plausibility by refuting the other arguments against 
it. Indeed, with the main argument against Hedonism about Well-Being refuted, now 
is the perfect time for a full-scale revival of Hedonism about Well-Being and perhaps 
hedonism generally. 
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This essay took positive steps towards reviving Hedonism about Well-Being, a theory 
that has been perennially unpopular (Blake 1926; Crisp 2006a; Feldman 2004; Savery 
1934; Silverstein 2000).106 The most important step taken by this essay, to refute the 
Argument from False Pleasures, was vital for reviving Hedonism about Well-Being 
because it was the argument most frequently used to reject its plausibility. Another 
important step taken in this essay was to criticise the methods currently used to 
evaluate theories of well-being and to propose an alternative. It was argued that too 
much importance had been given to intuitive evidence from unrealistic thought 
experiments, despite their dubious epistemic credentials. For this reason, the alternate 
method proposed, the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, restricted 
the role of intuitive evidence from unrealistic thought experiments in evaluating 
theories of well-being. This step was important for strengthening the main argument 
of this essay against the normative significance of the Argument from False Pleasures 
in evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being. 
 
The refutation of the Argument from False Pleasures was based on ruling out the 
normative significance of the so-called evidence provided for it by Nozick’s (1974) 
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Experience Machine and Kagan’s (1998) Deceived Businessman thought 
experiments. The evidence supposedly provided by these two unrealistic thought 
experiments was argued to be mainly intuitive. And, while this essay averred that 
intuitive responses to unrealistic thought experiments do not constitute reliable 
evidence for evaluating theories of well-being, this intuitive evidence was nevertheless 
analysed in great detail. Then, bolstered by a better understanding of intuitive 
cognition, the intuitive evidence from the Experience Machine and Deceived 
Businessman thought experiments was challenged with both intuitive and reason-
based evidence. The challenges showed that the intuitions elicited by each thought 
experiment were unreliable and irrelevant in supporting the Argument from False 
Pleasures. The result of this discussion was the conclusion that the Argument from 
False Pleasures lacks sufficient evidence to pose any challenge to Hedonism about 
Well-Being’s plausibility. A more detailed, chapter-by-chapter, account of how this 
conclusion was reached and the other implications of this essay follow. 
 
 
Chapter Outline and Implications 
In Chapter 1 of this essay, the scene was set by defining well-being as the prudentially 
good life, or the life that is good for the one living it. To set the target for revival, a 
specific internalist definition of hedonism about well-being was then established 
(referred to as Hedonism about Well-Being), which was defined as follows: 
All pleasure, and only pleasure, intrinsically contributes positively to well-being and all 
pain, and only pain, intrinsically contributes negatively to well-being, where pleasure and 
pain supervene on mental states such that pleasure is the intrinsically good part of mental 
states that we are consciously aware of and pain is the intrinsically bad part of mental 
states that we are consciously aware of. 
 
Chapter 1 also explained the Argument from False Pleasures and the two thought 
experiments that are used to provide evidence for it: the Experience Machine and 
Deceived Businessman. The prima facie strength of the Argument from False Pleasures 
was established based on the force of the evidence provided by the Experience 
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Machine and Deceived Businessman thought experiments. Following this, how 
theories of well-being are evaluated by moral philosophers was discussed, with 
reference to the work of Timmons (2006), Kagan (1998) and Griffin (1986). The 
approach moral philosophers take when evaluating theories of well-being was then 
formalised into the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being, which is not 
particularly different to a reflective equilibrium approach. Specific attention was also 
focused on the role intuitions play in the Old Method of Assessing Theories of Well-
Being, especially in cases where Hedonism about Well-Being was being evaluated. 
Finally, the role of intuitions, which had been noted throughout the chapter, was 
discussed in more detail. Rachels’ (2003) attempt to discern what might give our 
moral intuitions the authority of a competent judge was discussed. However, the 
various reasons to think that our moral intuitions do have such authority that Rachels 
(2003) offered were found to be unsatisfactory. This prompted the need for an in-
depth investigation into exactly how our intuitions work in order to illuminate how 
they might have normative significance, which was then discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 2 provided a detailed account of moral intuitive cognition and discussed the 
role that Woodward and Allman (2007) recommend for intuitions in ethical 
theorising. First, Woodward and Allman’s (2007) definition of moral intuitive 
cognition as a fast, unconscious probabilistic process that can compute large amounts 
of data in parallel and produce an intuition, a simple visceral sensation, was explained 
in detail and corroborated by other leaders in the field of cognitive science. Then, this 
greater understanding of moral intuitions was used to assess and mostly agree with 
Woodward and Allman’s (2007) recommendations for appropriate use of moral 
intuitions in ethics. In particular, their recommendation that intuitive evidence from 
unrealistic thought experiments should not be considered reliable was agreed with 
and adapted into an argument for restricting the use of intuitive evidence from 
unrealistic thought experiments in evaluating theories of well-being. 
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The argument’s conclusion was that intuitions are an unreliable source of evidence 
for evaluating unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments and, therefore, that 
they should not be used if other types of evidence are available. The argument was 
based on the premises that intuitions are often affected by biases that can make them 
unreliable and that the nature of moral intuitions means that we can never really 
know whether any particular moral intuition is biased, especially moral intuitions 
about unrealistic well-being-related thought experiments. This argument provided the 
basis for proposing the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being. The New 
Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being was then briefly explained, including a 
guide on how to apply it. Importantly, this guide included a description of how to 
deal with objections to theories that have already been established as plausible. The 
guide provided a particular focus on dealing with intuitive evidence from unrealistic 
thought experiments, in which it was argued that intuitive evidence from unrealistic 
thought experiments should just act as warning signs, especially when there is reason-
based evidence to use instead. 
 
Lastly, the implications of the New Method of Assessing Theories of Well-Being 
were discussed, pointing to the considerable effect it would have if applied to the 
current objections to theories of well-being and their unrealistic thought experiment-
based intuitive evidence. Furthermore, there are many other implications of 
Woodward and Allman’s (2007) conclusions about the normative significance of 
various types of thought experiments, especially in normative and applied ethical 
debates. Most importantly, anyone wishing to use unrealistic thought experiments 
and analogies to argue their point should consider if their use of those scenarios is 
generating normatively significant moral judgements or just moral intuitions based on 
irrelevant biases. 
 
Chapter 3 used the insights from Chapter 2 and the resulting New Method of 
Assessing Theories of Well-Being to evaluate the plausibility of Hedonism about 
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Well-Being in light of the Argument from False Pleasures against it. First, a brief case 
was made for the plausibility of Hedonism about Well-Being. Then the evidence that 
the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine thought experiments are 
widely considered to provide was assessed according to the guide from Chapter 2. 
The intuitive evidence that each of the Deceived Businessman and the Experience 
Machine thought experiments is supposed to provide was clearly articulated and 
challenged with both intuitive and reason-based arguments. Because the intuitive 
evidence raised by each of these thought experiments was taken seriously, the 
conclusions made about them are significant for readers who accept the New Method 
of Assessing theories of Well-Being and, importantly, those who do not. Even 
proponents of reflective equilibrium, who might value our intuitive responses to 
unrealistic thought experiments more highly than Chapter 2 of this essay has argued 
that they should be, must heed the conclusions of Chapter 3 because of the thorough 
way the intuitive evidence was refuted.  
 
First, the negative intuition aroused by considering the Deceived Businessman’s life: 
that false pleasures do not contribute as positively to well-being as pleasures based on 
truth, was shown to be both unreliable and irrelevant to assessing Hedonism about 
Well-Being. This was mainly argued on the basis that it is at least very difficult for our 
intuitive cognition to abide by the Deceived Businessman’s stipulations that we 
would never find out about the deception or experience any negative effects because 
of it. 
 
Then, the negative intuition aroused by considering getting into the Experience 
Machine: that pleasures based on reality contribute more positively to well-being than 
those which are not, was also shown to be both unreliable and irrelevant to assessing 
Hedonism about Well-Being. This was mainly argued on the basis that the intuitive 
response to getting into the Experience Machine reacted to irrelevant biases, such as 
risk aversion and imaginative resistance (not being able to fully appreciate the life in 
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the Experience Machine). And, also because our intuitive responses to getting into 
the Experience Machine could easily be thrown off by our specific combination of 
moral emotions and obligations (which were supposed to have been ruled out by the 
stipulations of the thought experiment). 
 
For both the Deceived Businessman and the Experience Machine thought 
experiments, attempts were made to adjust them to avoid some of the intuitive biases 
that they trigger. However, these attempts failed to avoid the major problems with 
each thought experiment, resulting in the strong conclusion that neither the Deceived 
Businessman nor the Experience Machine thought experiments provide any reliable 
support for the Argument from False Pleasures’ attack on Hedonism about Well-
Being’s plausibility. 
 
Since Chapter 3 showed that neither the Deceived Businessman nor the Experience 
Machine thought experiments provide any support for the Argument from False 
Pleasures, regardless of exactly how highly intuitions are valued as a source evidence 
for assessing theories of well-being, the Argument from False Pleasures must be seen 
as much less persuasive than it has been. As discussed earlier, the Deceived 
Businessman and the Experience Machine thought experiments are the most used 
sources of evidence to support the controversial premise of the Argument from False 
Pleasures. However, now that the evidence that they supposedly provide has been 
shown to hold no normative significance for evaluating Hedonism about Well-Being, 
the Argument from False Pleasures sorely lacks evidence to support the premise: that 
pleasure based on truth, or something like it, contributes more positively to well-
being than pleasure based on falsity. Proponents of the Argument from False 
Pleasures, therefore, need to provide some other evidence to support their 
controversial premise if they desire to see their argument revived.  
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Furthermore, any new evidence that proponents of the Argument from False 
Pleasures do concoct will need to escape the criticisms brought against the Deceived 
Businessman and the Experience Machine thought experiments in this essay. It is not 
clear that this will be possible, especially if the New Method of Assessing Theories of 
Well-being is accepted. Regardless, at least for now the Argument from False 
Pleasures is left with no good evidence to support its controversial premise and, 
therefore, provides no good reason to believe its conclusion: that Hedonism about 
Well-Being is false. This result is a very positive one for Hedonism about Well-Being, 
which has for so long been considered implausible because of the Argument from 
False Pleasures.  
 
The result of these arguments was to conclude that the Argument from False 
Pleasures lacks sufficient evidence to pose any challenge to Hedonism about Well-
Being’s plausibility. There are, of course, many other arguments against the 
plausibility of Hedonism about Well-Being. However, with the most frequently used 
argument against it rejected, it is hoped that more thought will be applied to refuting 
the other arguments against Hedonism about Well-Being. This increased attention, 
and continuing scientific developments, may eventually lead to a full revival of 
Hedonism about Well-Being’s plausibility, which would allow it to regain equal 
plausibility with the other popular views about well-being. Indeed, if other attempts 
to make Hedonism about Well-Being more plausible are based on internalist 
experiential accounts, then it may turn out that Bentham’s (1789) hedonism was in 
fact the most plausible account of well-being all along.  
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